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In 1919–20 and also in 1921 I attended some of the bourgeois meetings. Invariably I had the same feeling towards these as towards the compulsory dose of castor oil in my boyhood days. It had to be taken because it was good for one, but it certainly tasted unpleasant. If it were possible to tie ropes round the German people and forcibly drag them to these bourgeois ‘meetings’, to keep them there behind barred doors and to allow nobody to escape until the meeting closed, then this procedure might prove successful in the course of a few hundred years. For my own part I must frankly admit that, in such circumstances, I should not find life worth living and indeed I should no longer wish to be a German. But, thank God, all that is impossible, and so it is not surprising that the sane and unspoilt masses shun these ‘bourgeois mass meetings’ as the devil shuns holy water. I came to know the prophets of the bourgeoisWeltanschauung, and I was not surprised at what I learned, as I knew that they attached little importance to the spoken word. At that time, I attended meetings of the Democrats, the German Nationalists, the German People’s Party and the Bavarian People’s Party (the Centre Party of Bavaria). What struck me at once was the homogeneous uniformity of the audiences. Nearly always they were made up exclusively of party members. The whole affair was more like a yawning card party than an assembly of people who had just passed through a great revolution. The speakers did all they could to maintain this tranquil atmosphere. They declaimed, or rather read out, their speeches in the style of an intellectual newspaper article or a learned treatise, avoiding all forcible expressions. Here and there a feeble professorial joke would be introduced, whereupon the people sitting at the speaker’s table felt themselves obliged to laugh—not loudly or infectiously, but with well-bred reserve.
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Oh, those people at the speaker’s table! I once attended a meeting in the Wagner Hall in Munich. It was a demonstration to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig. The speech was delivered, or rather read out, by a venerable old professor from one or other of the universities. The committee sat on the platform: one monocle on the right, another monocle on the left, and in the centre a gentleman with no monocle. All three of them were punctiliously attired in morning dress, and I had the impression of being present in a court of justice just as the death-sentence was about to be pronounced or at a christening or some more solemn religious ceremony. The so-called speech, which in printed form may have read quite well, had a disastrous effect. After three-quarters of an hour the audience fell into a sort of hypnotic trance, which was interrupted only when some man or woman left the hall, or by the clatter which the waitresses made, or by the increased yawning of members of the audience. I had posted myself behind three workmen who were present either out of curiosity or because they were sent there by their parties. From time to time they glanced at one another with an ill-concealed grin, nudged one another with their elbows and then silently left the hall. One could see that they had no intention whatsoever of interrupting the proceedings, nor indeed was it necessary to do so. At long last the proceedings showed signs of drawing to a close. After the professor, whose voice had meanwhile become more and more inaudible, had finally ended his speech the gentleman without the monocle delivered a rousing peroration to the assembled ‘German sisters and brethren.’ On behalf of the audience and himself he expressed his thanks for the magnificent lecture which they had just heard from Professor X and emphasised how deeply the Professor’s words had moved them all. If a general discussion on the lecture were to take place it would be tantamount to profanity, and he thought he was voicing the opinion of all present in suggesting that such a discussion should not be held. Therefore, he would ask the assembly to rise from their seats and join in singing the patriotic song,Wir Binden Einig Volk von Brüdern.
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The proceedings finally closed with the singing of the anthem,Deutschland über Alles. It appeared to me that when the second verse was reached the voices were fewer and that only when the refrain was reached did they swell louder. When we reached the third verse my suspicion that a good many of those present were not very familiar with the text was confirmed. But what does that matter when such a song is sung whole-heartedly and fervidly by an assembly of German Nationalists? After this the meeting broke up and everyone hurried to get outside, one to his glass of beer, one to a cafe, and others simply into the fresh air. Out into the fresh air! That was also my one desire. Was this the way to commemorate a heroic struggle in which hundreds of thousands of Prussians and Germans had fought? No, a thousand times no! That sort of thing might find favour with the Government, it being merely a ‘peaceful’ meeting. The minister responsible for law and order had no need to fear that enthusiasm might suddenly get the better of public decorum and induce these people to pour out of the room and, instead of dispersing to public houses and cafés, march four abreast through the town singingDeutschland hoch in Ehrenand causing some unpleasantness to a police force in need of sleep. He had reason to be well satisfied with this type of citizen. On the other hand, the National Socialist meetings were by no means ‘peaceable’ affairs. Two distinctWeltanschauungenraged in bitter opposition to one another, and these meetings did not close with the mechanical rendering of a dull patriotic song, but rather with a passionate outbreak of popular national feeling. It was imperative from the start to introduce rigid discipline into our meetings and establish the authority of the chairman absolutely. Our purpose was not to pour out a mixture of soft-soap bourgeois talk; what we had to say was meant to arouse the opponents at our meetings! How often did they not turn up in large numbers with a few agitators among them ready, judging by the expression on all their faces, to finish us off there and then.
547
How often did they turn up in strength, those supporters of the Red Flag, having been previously instructed to smash up everything once and for all, and put an end to our meetings. More often than not everything hung in the balance, and only the chairman’s ruthless determination and the rough handling by our hall-guards baffled our adversaries ‘intentions’. They had every reason to be irritated. The fact that we had chosen red as the colour for our posters sufficed to attract them to our meeting. The ordinary bourgeoisie were very shocked to see that we had also chosen the symbolic red of Bolshevism and they regarded this as something ambiguously significant. It was whispered in German Nationalist circles that we also were merely another variety of Marxists, perhaps even Marxists suitably disguised, or better still, Socialists. The actual difference between Socialism and Marxism still remains a mystery to these people to this day. The charge of Marxism was conclusively proved when it was discovered that at our meetings we deliberately substituted the word ‘compatriots’ for ‘Ladies and Gentlemen’ and addressed each other as ‘Party Comrade.’ We used to roar with laughter at these silly faint-hearted bourgeois and their efforts to puzzle out our origin, our intentions and our aims. We chose red for our posters after careful deliberation, our intention being to irritate the Left, so as to arouse their attention and tempt them to come to our meetings—if only in order to break them up—so that it this way we might have a chance of talking to the people. In those years it was indeed a delightful experience to follow the constantly changing tactics of our perplexed and helpless adversaries. First of all, they appealed to their followers to ignore us and keep away from our meetings. Generally speaking, this appeal was heeded. But, as time went on, more and more of their followers gradually found their way to us and accepted our teaching. Then the leaders became nervous and, uneasy.
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They clung to their belief that such a development should not be ignored forever, and that force must be applied in order to put an end to it. Appeals were then made to the ‘class-conscious proletariat’ to attend our meetings in masses and strike with the clenched hand of the proletarian at the representatives of a ‘monarchist and reactionary agitation.’ Our meetings suddenly became packed with work-people fully three-quarters of an hour before the proceedings were scheduled to begin. These gatherings resembled a powder cask ready to explode at any moment, and the fuse was conveniently at hand. But things always turned out differently. People came as enemies and left, not perhaps prepared to join us, yet in a reflective mood and disposed to examine critically the correctness of their own doctrine. Gradually, as time went on, my three-hour lectures resulted in supporters and opponents becoming, united in one single enthusiastic group of people. Every signal for the breaking up of the meeting failed. The result was that the opposition leaders became more frightened and once again looked for help from those quarters that had formerly discountenanced these tactics and, with some show of right, had been of the opinion that on principle the workers should be forbidden to attend our meetings. Thereafter, they did not come any more, or only in small numbers, but after a short time the whole game began again. The instructions to keep away from us were ignored, the comrades came in steadily increasing numbers, until finally the advocates of the radical tactics won the day. We were to be broken up. Yet when, after two, three and even many meetings, it was realised that to break up these gatherings was easier said than done and that every meeting resulted in a decisive weakening of the Red, fighting forces, the other cry was taken up again, ‘Proletarians and comrades, avoid the meetings of the National Socialist agitators.’ The same eternally alternating tactics were also to be observed in the Red press. At one time they tried to silence us, but discovered the uselessness of such an attempt. After that they swung round to the opposite tactics. Daily ‘reference’ was made to us solely for the purpose of ridiculing us in the eyes of the working classes.
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After a time these gentlemen must have felt that no harm was being done to us, but that, on the contrary, we were reaping an advantage in that people were asking themselves why so much space was being devoted to a subject which was supposed to be so futile. People became curious. Suddenly, there was a change of tactics and for a time we were treated as veritable criminals against mankind. One article followed another, in which our criminal intentions were explained and fresh proofs brought forward in support of what was said. Scandalous tales, all of them fabricated from start to finish, were published in order to help to poison the public mind, but in a short time even these attacks also proved unavailing and in fact they were of material assistance to us because they attracted public attention to us. In those days I took up the standpoint that it was immaterial whether they laughed at us or reviled us, whether they depicted us as fools or criminals; the important point was that they took notice of us and that in the eyes of the working classes we came to be regarded as the only force capable of putting up a fight. I said that we would one day show the rabble that was the Jewish press what we really were and what we were really aiming at. One reason why they never got so far as breaking up our meetings was undoubtedly the incredible cowardice displayed by the leaders of the opposition. On every critical occasion they left the dirty work to the smaller fry whilst they waited outside the halls for the results of the break-up. We were nearly always well-informed of our opponents’ intentions, not only because we allowed several of our party colleagues to remain members of the Red organisations for reasons of expediency, but also because the Red wire-pullers, were, most luckily for us, afflicted with a degree of talkativeness that is still unfortunately very prevalent among Germans. They could not keep their own counsel, and more often than not they started cackling before the proverbial egg was laid. Hence, time and again, we were able to take such far-reaching precautionary measures that the ‘Reds’ who had been told off to break up our meeting had no inkling that they were about to be ejected.
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This state of affairs compelled us to take the work of safeguarding our meetings into our own hands. No reliance could be placed on the protection of the authorities, on the contrary, experience showed that it was the disturbing element which gained by such intervention. The only real outcome of police intervention was that the meeting would be dissolved, which was precisely what our opponents wanted. Generally speaking, this led the police to adopt a method of procedure which, to say the least of it, was a most infamous example of official malpractice. The moment they received information of a threat that some meeting was to be broken up, instead of arresting the would-be disturbers, they promptly forbade the non-guilty party to hold the meeting, this being a measure which appealed to the average police mentality as the climax of wisdom. This step the police proclaimed to be a ‘precautionary measure in the interests of law and order.’ The political work and activities of decent people could, therefore, always be hindered by any desperate ruffians who had the means at their disposal. In the name of law and order State authority bowed down to these ruffians and demanded that others should not provoke them. When the National Socialists desired to hold meetings in certain places and the trade-unions declared that their members would resist, then it was not the blackmailers that were arrested and gaoled. On the contrary, our meetings were forbidden by the police. In fact, the strong arm of the law had the unspeakable impudence to advise us in writing to this effect on innumerable occasions. To avoid such eventualities it was necessary to see to it that every attempt to disturb a meeting was nipped in the bud. Another feature to be taken into account in this respect is that all meetings which rely on police protection must necessarily bring discredit to their promoters in the eyes of the general public. Meetings that can be held only with the protective assistance of a strong force of police convert nobody, because in order to win over the lower strata of the people there must be a visible show of strength on one’s own side.
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In the same way that a man of courage will win a woman’s affection more easily than a coward, so a fearless movement will be more successful in winning the hearts of a people than a weak movement which relies on police support for its very existence. It is for this latter reason in particular that our young Party had to assume the full responsibility of safeguarding its own existence, defending itself and foiling the terrorist tactics of its opponents. The measures adopted for the protection of our meetings were as follows: Firstly, energetic and judicious conduct of the meeting. Secondly, the organisation of a squad of men to maintain order. In those days, we and no one else were masters of the situation at our meetings, and on no occasion did we fail to emphasise this. Our opponents fully realised that any provocation would be a signal to have them thrown out of the hall at once whatever the odds against us. At meetings, particularly outside Munich, we had in those days from five to eight hundred opponents to fifteen or sixteen National Socialists; yet we brooked no interference for our opponents knew full well that we were prepared to die rather than capitulate. More than once a handful of party members offered a heroic resistance to a raging and violent mob of Reds. Those fifteen or twenty men would certainly have been overwhelmed in the end had not the opponents known that three or four times as many of themselves would first get their skulls cracked, and that risk they were not willing to run. We had done our best to study the Marxist and bourgeois methods of conducting meetings, and we had certainly learnt something. The Marxists had always exercised a most rigid discipline so that the question of breaking up their meetings could never have originated in bourgeois quarters. The more, therefore, did the Reds concentrate on these tactics. In time they not only became past masters in this art, but in certain large districts of the Reich they went so far as to declare that non-Marxist meetings were nothing less than a cause of provocation to the proletariat.
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This was particularly the case when the wire-pullers suspected that a meeting might call attention to their own transgressions and thus expose their own treachery and chicanery. Therefore, the moment such a meeting was announced, a howl of rage went up from the Red press. They, who despised the law on principle, nearly always appealed in the first instance to the authorities and requested in imperative and threatening language that this ‘provocation of the proletariat’ be stopped forthwith in the ‘interests of law and order.’ Their language was chosen according to the importance of the official blockhead with whom they were dealing and thus success was assured. If by chance the official happened to be a true German—and not a mere figurehead—and he did not comply with the impudent request, then the well-known appeal to stop ‘provocation of the proletariat’ was issued together with instructions to attend such and such a meeting on a certain date in full strength for the purpose of ‘putting a stop to the disgraceful machinations of the bourgeoisie by means of the proletarian fist.’ The pitiful and frightened manner in which these bourgeois meetings were conducted had to be seen to be believed. Very frequently these threats were sufficient to make them call off such a meeting at once. The feeling of fear was so marked that the meeting, instead of commencing at eight o’clock, very seldom opened before a quarter to nine or nine o’clock. The chairman thereupon did his best, by showering compliments on the ‘gentlemen of the opposition’ to prove how he and all others present were pleased (a palpable lie) to welcome the presence of men who were not as yet in sympathy with them, for the reason that only by mutual discussion (to which he hereby gave his consent) could they be brought closer together in mutual understanding. Apart from this the chairman also assured them that the meeting had no intention whatsoever of interfering with anybody’s professed conviction. Far from it. Everyone had the right to form and hold his own political views, but he should allow others to do likewise.
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He, therefore, requested that the speaker be allowed to deliver his speech without interruption—the speech in any case not being a long affair—so that this meeting should not provide the world with the spectacle of yet another shameful instance of the bitter fraternal strife raging in Germany. And so on and so forth. The brethren of the Left had little, if any, sympathy with that sort of talk; the speaker had hardly commenced when he was shouted down. One gained the impression at times that these speakers were grateful to the Fate which peremptorily cut short their martyr-like discourse. These bourgeois toreadors left the arena amidst a vast uproar, that is to say, if they escaped being thrown down the stairs with cracked skulls, as was very often the case. Therefore, our methods of organisation at National Socialist meetings were something quite strange to the Marxists. They came to our meetings in the belief that the little game which they had so often played successfully could, as a matter of course, be repeated on us. ‘To-day we shall finish them off.’ How often did they bawl this out to each other on entering the meeting hall, only to be thrown out with lightning speed before they had time to repeat it! In the first place, our method of conducting a meeting was entirely different. We did not crave permission to be allowed to speak, and we did not straightaway give everybody the right to hold endless discussions. We curtly gave everyone to understand that we were masters of the meeting and that we could, therefore, do as we pleased and that everyone who dared to interrupt would be unceremoniously thrown out. We stated clearly our refusal to accept responsibility for anyone treated in this manner. If time permitted, and if it suited us, a discussion would take place. Party member so-and-so would now speak. That kind of talk was sufficient in itself to astonish the Marxists. Secondly, we had at our disposal a well-trained and organised body of men for maintaining order at our meetings. On the other hand, the bourgeois parties protected their meetings with a body of men better classified as ushers who, by virtue of their age, thought they were entitled to authority and respect, but as the Marxist-taught mob had no respect either for age or authority, protective measures at the bourgeois meetings were practically non-existent.
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When our political meetings first started I made it a special point to organise a suitable defensive squad composed, as a matter of principle, solely of young men. Some of them were ex-service men who had seen active service with me. Others were young party members who, right from the start, had been trained to realise that terrorism can be combated only by terrorism, that only courageous and determined people had made a success of things in this world. Finally, they knew that we were fighting for an ideal so lofty that, it was worth the last drop of our blood. These young men had been trained to realise that where force replaced common sense in the solution of a problem, the best means of defence was attack and that the reputation of our hall-guard squads should stamp us as a political fighting force and not as a debating society. It was extraordinary how eagerly those boys of the war-generation responded to this order. They had indeed good reason to be bitterly disappointed and indignant at the miserable milksop methods employed by the bourgeoisie. Thus it became clear to everyone that the Revolution had only been possible thanks to the dastardly methods of a bourgeois government. At that time there was certainly no lack of man-power to suppress the revolution, but unfortunately there was an entire lack of an organising brain. How often did the eyes of my young men light up with enthusiasm when I explained to them the vital functions connected with their task. I assured them time and again that all earthly wisdom is useless unless it be supported and protected by force; that the gentle goddess of Peace can only walk in company with the god of War; and that every great measure performed in the name of Peace must be protected and furthered by means of force. In this way the idea of military service appeared to them in a far more realistic light—not in the fossilised sense of decrepit officials serving the dead authority of a dead State—but in the living realisation of the duty of each man to sacrifice his life for his country at any given time and in any given place.
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All honour to those young men for the way in which they performed their duty! Like a swarm of hornets they tackled disturbers at our meetings, regardless of superiority of numbers, however great, indifferent to wounds and bloodshed, inspired with the great idea of blazing a trail for the sacred mission of our Movement. As early as the summer of 1920 the organisation of squads of men as hall-guards for the purpose of maintaining order at our meetings was gradually assuming definite shape. By the spring of 1921 this body of men was sectioned off into squads of one hundred which, in turn, were subdivided into smaller groups. The urgency for this was apparent, as meanwhile the number of our meetings had steadily increased. We still frequently met in the Munich Hofbräuhaus, but more frequently in larger meeting halls throughout the city. In the autumn and winter of 1920–21 our meetings in the Burgerbrau and Münchener-Kindl-Keller had assumed vast proportions and the same thing always happened, namely, that the National Socialist German Labour Party meetings were always crowded out so that the police were compelled to close and bar the doors long before the proceedings commenced. The organisation of hall-guards to keep order at our meetings cleared up a very difficult question. Up till then the Movement had possessed no party badge and no party flag. The lack of these tokens was not only a disadvantage at that time, but was bound to prove intolerable in the future. The disadvantages were chiefly that members of the Party possessed no outward token of membership which linked them together and it was absolutely unthinkable that for the future they should remain without some token which would be a symbol of the Movement and could be set against that of the International. More than once in my youth the psychological importance of such a symbol had become clearly evident to me and from a sentimental point of view also it was advisable. In Berlin, after the War, I was present at a mass demonstration of Marxists in the Lustgarten in front of the Royal Palace. A sea of red flags, red armlets and red flowers was in itself sufficient to give that huge assembly of about one hundred and twenty thousand persons an outward appearance of strength.
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I was now able to feel and understand how easily the man in the street succumbs to the hypnotic magic of such a grandiose piece of theatrical demonstration. The bourgeoisie, which, politically speaking, neither possessed nor championed anyWeltanschauung, had, therefore, no banner of its own. Its parties were composed of ‘patriots’ who appropriated the colours of the Reich. Had these colours been the symbol of a definiteWeltanschauungthen one could understand the rulers of the State regarding this flag as expressive of their ownWeltanschauung, seeing that through their efforts the symbol of theirWeltanschauunghad become the emblem of the Reich. This was, however, not the case. The Reich was welded together without the aid of the German bourgeoisie and the flag itself was born of the War and was, therefore, merely a State emblem possessing no significance in the sense of any particular ideological mission. Only in one part of the German-speaking territory in German Austria was there anything like a bourgeois party flag in existence. Here a section of the national bourgeoisie selected the 1848 colours (black, red and gold) as their party flag and then they created a symbol which, though of no significance from the point of view of aWeltanschauung, had, nevertheless, a revolutionary character from a national political point of view. The most bitter opponents of this flag at that time (and this should not be forgotten to-day) were the Social Democrats and the Christian Socialists or the clergy. They it was, in particular, who degraded and besmirched these colours just as in 1918 they dragged black, white and red in the gutter. Of course, the black, red and gold of the German parties in the old Austria were the colours of the year 1848; that is to say, of a period likely to be regarded as somewhat visionary, but it was a period that had honest Germans as its representatives, although the Jews were lurking unseen as wire-pullers in the background. It was the act of high treason and the shameful bartering of the German people and German territory that first of all made these colours so attractive to the Marxists and the Centre Party; so much so, that to-day they revere them as their most cherished possession and found their own associations for the protection of the flag they once foully besmirched.
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It is a fact, therefore, that, up to 1920, there was no flag that could have stood for aWeltanschauungdiametrically opposed to Marxism. For even if the better political elements among the German bourgeoisie were loath to accept the suddenly discovered black, red and gold colours as their symbol after the year 1918, they were nevertheless incapable of countering this with a programme of their own for the future. At last, they had a reconstruction of the old Reich in mind. It is to this way of thinking that the black, white and red colours of the old Reich are indebted for their resurrection as the flag of our so-called national bourgeois parties. It is obvious that the emblem of a regime which had been, overthrown by the Marxists in inglorious circumstances is not now worthy to serve as a banner under which the same Marxism is to be crushed in its turn. However much any honourable German may love and revere those old colours, glorious in their youthful freshness, if he has fought under them and seen the sacrifice of so many lives; they can never serve as an emblem for the struggle of the future. In our Movement I have always adopted the attitude that it was a really lucky thing for the German nation that it had lost its old flag. This attitude of mine was in strong contrast to that of the bourgeois politicians. It may be immaterial to us what the Republic does under its flag, but let us be deeply grateful to Fate for having so graciously spared the most glorious war flag of all time from becoming an ignominious rag. The Reich of to-day, which has sold itself and its people, must never be allowed to adopt the honourable and heroic black, white and red colours. As long as the November outrage endures, that outrage may continue to bear its own external sign and not steal that of an honourable past. Our bourgeois politicians should awaken their consciences to the fact that whoever desires this State to adopt the black, white and red colours is pilfering the past. The old flag was suitable only for the old Reich and, thank Heaven, the Republic chose the colours best suited to itself.
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This was also the reason why we National Socialists recognised that to hoist the old colours would not be symbolic of our special aims, for we had no wish to resurrect from the dead the old Reich which had been ruined through its own blunders, but to build up a new State. The Movement which is fighting Marxism to-day along these lines must display on its banner the symbol of the new State. The question of the new flag, that is to say, the form and appearance it must take, gave us much food for thought in those days. Suggestions poured in from all sides, which although well-meant were not suitable. The new flag had not only to be a symbol expressing our own struggle but, on the other hand, it was necessary that it should prove effective as a large poster. All those who have to consider the tastes of the public will recognise and appreciate the great importance of these apparently petty details. In hundreds of thousands of cases a really striking emblem may be the first thing to awaken interest in a movement. For this reason we declined all suggestions from various quarters for the identification of our Movement, by means of a white flag, with the old State or rather with those decrepit parties whose sole political objective was the restoration of past conditions. Apart from this, white is not a colour capable of attracting and focussing public attention. It is a colour suitable only for temperance associations and not for a movement that stands for reform in a revolutionary period. Black was also suggested—certainly well-suited to the times, but embodying no significance expressive of the will behind our Movement. Moreover, black is incapable of attracting attention. White and blue were discarded, despite their admirable aesthetic appeal as being the colours of an individual German federal state—a state that, unfortunately, through its political attitude of particularist narrow-mindedness did not enjoy a good reputation. In addition, with these colours it would have been difficult to attract attention to our Movement. The same applies to black and white. Black, red and gold did not come into consideration; neither, for the reasons already mentioned, did black, white and red—at least not in the form hitherto in use.
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But the effectiveness of these three colours is far superior to all others and they are certainly the most strikingly harmonious combination. I myself was always for keeping the old colours, not only because I, as a soldier, regarded them as my most sacred possession, but because in their aesthetic effect they are, more than any others, symbolic of my personal sentiments. Accordingly, I had to discard all the innumerable suggestions and designs which had been proposed for the new Movement, among which were many that had incorporated the swastika in a design with the old colours. I, as leader, was unwilling to make public my own design, as it was possible that someone else would come forward with a design just as good, if not better, than my own. As a matter of fact, a dental surgeon from Starnberg submitted a good design very similar to mine, with only one mistake, namely, that upon a white ground he set a swastika with curved limbs. After innumerable trials I decided upon a final form—a flag of red material with a white disc bearing in its centre a black swastika. After many attempts I obtained the correct proportions between the dimensions of the flag and that of the white central disc, as well as of the swastika. This design was finally adopted. At the same time, we immediately ordered corresponding armlets for our squad of men who kept order at meetings, armlets of red material bearing a white disc with the black swastika upon it. A party badge was designed on the same lines, namely, a white disc on a red ground bearing the swastika in the centre. Herr Fuss, a Munich goldsmith, supplied the first practical and permanent design for this. The new flag made its first appearance in public in the summer of 1920. It suited out Movement admirably, both being new and young. Not a soul had seen this flag before and its effect at that time was something akin to that of a flaming torch. We ourselves experienced almost a boyish thrill when one of the women-members of the Party who had been entrusted with the making of the flag finally handed it over to us.
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A few months later we in Munich possessed six of these flags. The steadily increasing strength of our hall-guards was a main factor in popularizing the symbol, for it, became a symbol in the truest sense of the word. By incorporating those colours, dear to every one of us, which had once gained so much honour for the German nation it bore testimony to our reverence for the past and was at the same time symbolic of the Movement’s aims. Our nationalist and socialist programme was made manifest in our flag. The red expressed the social thought underlying the Movement, white the national thought, and the swastika signified the mission allotted to us—the struggle for the victory of Aryan mankind and at the same time the triumph of the ideal of creative work which in itself is, and always will be, anti-Semitic. Two years later, when our squad of hall-guards had long since grown into storm detachments, it seemed necessary to give this defensive organisation of a youngWeltanschauunga particular symbol of victory, namely, a standard. I also designed this and entrusted, the execution of it to an old party comrade, Herr Gahr, who was a goldsmith. Ever since that time this standard has been the distinctive emblem of the National Socialist struggle. The increasing interest taken in our meetings, particularly during 1920, compelled us at times to hold two meetings a week. Crowds gathered round our posters, the large meeting-halls in the town were always filled and tens of thousands of people, who had been led astray by the teachings of Marxism, found their way back to the national community to assist in the work of fighting for the liberation of the Reich. The public in Munich had got to know us. We were being talked about. The term ‘National Socialist’ had become common property to many and signified for them a definite party programme. Our circle of supporters and even of members was constantly increasing, so that in the winter of 1920–21 we were able to appear as a strong party in Munich. At that time there was no party in Munich, with the exception of the Marxist parties, and certainly no nationalist party which was able to hold such mass demonstrations as ours.
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The Münchner-Kindl-Keller, which held five thousand people, was more than once overcrowded and up till then there was only one other hall, the Circus Krone, which we had not yet ventured to hire. At the end of January 1921 there was again great cause for anxiety in Germany. The Paris Agreement, by which Germany pledged herself to pay the crazy sum of a hundred milliard gold marks, was to be confirmed by the London Treaty. Thereupon an well-established Munich co-operative association, representative of so-calledvölkischgroups, deemed it advisable to call a public meeting of protest. I became nervous and restless when I saw that a lot of time was being wasted and nothing achieved. At first a meeting was suggested in the Konigsplatz; on second thoughts this proposal was turned down, as someone feared the proceedings might be wrecked by Red elements. Another suggestion was a demonstration in front of the Feldherrnhalle, but this also came to nothing. Finally, a combined meeting in the Münchner-Kindl-Keller was suggested. Meanwhile day after day went by; the parties entirely ignored the terrible event and the co-operative association could not decide on a definite date for holding the demonstration. On Tuesday, February 1st, I put forward an urgent demand for a final decision. I was told I should be given it on Wednesday. On that day I demanded to be told clearly, if and when, the meeting was to take place. The reply was again uncertain and evasive, it being stated that it was ‘intended’ to arrange a demonstration for that day week. At that I lost all patience and decided to conduct a meeting of protest on my own. At noon on Wednesday I dictated in ten minutes the text of the poster and at the same time hired the Circus Krone for the next day, February 3rd. In those days this was a tremendous venture, not only because of the uncertainty of filling that vast hall, but also because of the risk of the meeting being broken up. Numerically, our squad of hall-guards was not strong enough for this vast hall. I was also uncertain about what to do in case the meeting was broken up, as I imagined it would be more difficult to deal with that contingency, in the huge circus building than in an ordinary meeting hall.
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But events showed that my fears were misplaced, the opposite being the case. In that vast building a band of men bent on breaking up the meeting could be tackled and subdued more easily than in crowded halls. One thing was certain—a failure would throw us back for a long time to come. If one meeting were broken up our prestige would be seriously injured and our opponents would be encouraged to repeat their success. That would lead to sabotage of our work in connection with further meetings and months of difficult struggle would be necessary to overcome this. We had only one day in which to post our bills, Thursday. Unfortunately it rained during the morning of that day and there was reason to fear that many people would prefer to remain at home rather than hurry to a meeting through rain and snow, especially when there was likely to be violence and bloodshed. Indeed on that Thursday morning I was suddenly struck by the fear that the hall might never be filled to capacity, which would have made me ridiculous in the eyes of the co-operative association. I therefore immediately dictated various leaflets and had them printed and distributed in the afternoon. Of course, they contained an invitation to attend the meeting. Two lorries which I hired were draped as much as possible in red, each had our new flag hoisted on it and was then ‘manned’ by fifteen or twenty members of our Party. Orders were given to the members to canvas the streets thoroughly, distribute leaflets and conduct propaganda for the mass meeting to be held that evening. It was the first time that lorries had driven through the streets bearing flags and not manned by Marxists. The public stared open-mouthed at these red-draped cars, and in the outlying districts clenched fists were angrily raised at this new evidence of ‘provocation of the proletariat.’ Were not the Marxists the only ones entitled to hold meetings and drive about in motor-lorries? By seven o’clock in the evening the circus hall was by no means full.
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I was being kept informed by telephone every ten minutes and was becoming uneasy. Usually at seven or a quarter past our meeting-halls were already halffilled and sometimes even packed, but I soon discovered the cause of this. I had entirely forgotten to take into account the huge dimensions of this new meeting-place. A thousand people in the Hofbräuhaus was quite an impressive sight, but the same number in the Circus building was swallowed up in its vastness and was hardly noticeable. Shortly afterwards I received more hopeful reports and at a quarter to eight I was informed that the hall was three-quarters full, with huge crowds still lined up at the pay-boxes. I then left for the meeting. I arrived at the Circus building at two minutes past eight. There was still a crowd outside, composed partly of inquisitive people and among them many opponents who preferred to wait outside for developments. When I entered the great hall I felt the same joy I had felt a year previously at the first meeting in the Festsaal of the Münchener Hofbrauhaus; but it was not until I had forced my way through the solid wall of people and reached the platform that I perceived the full measure of our success. The hall was before me, like a huge shell packed with thousands upon thousands of people. Even the arena was densely crowded. More than five thousand six hundred tickets had been sold and, allowing for the unemployed, poor students and our own detachments of men for keeping order, a crowd of about six thousand five hundred must have been present. My theme was, ‘Future or Downfall’ and I was filled with joy at the conviction that the future was represented by the crowd that I was addressing. I began, and spoke for about two and a half hours. I had the feeling after the first half-hour that the meeting was going to be a big success. Contact had at once been established with all those thousands of individuals. After the first hour the speech was already being received by spontaneous outbursts of applause, but after the second hour this died down to a solemn stillness which I was to experience so often later on in this same hall and which will be for-ever remembered by all those present.
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Nothing broke, this impressive silence and only when the last word had been spoken did the meeting give vent to its feelings by singing the national anthem. I watched the scene during the next twenty minutes, as the vast hall slowly emptied itself, and only then did I leave the platform, a happy man, and make my way home. Photographs were taken of this first meeting in the Circus Krone in Munich. They are more eloquent than words in demonstrating the success of this meeting. The bourgeois papers reproduced photographs and reported the meeting as having been merely ‘nationalist’ in character-in their usual modest fashion they omitted all mention of its promoters. Thus we had, for the first time, far exceeded the limits of an ordinary party. We could now no longer be ignored, and to dispel all doubt that the meeting was merely an isolated success, I immediately arranged for another at the Circus Krone in the following week, with the same results. Once more the vast hall was filled to overflowing; so much so that I decided to hold a third meeting in the same hall during the following week, and yet a third time the immense building was filled with people. After these initial successes early in 1921 I increased our activity in Munich still further. I not only held meetings once a week, but often twice a week and very often during, the summer and autumn as many as three meetings were held every week. We met regularly at the Circus Hall and it gave us great satisfaction to see that every meeting brought us the same measure of success. The result was shown in an ever-growing number of supporters and an increase in the number of party members. Naturally the news of our success did not allow our opponents to sleep soundly. At first their tactics fluctuated between the use of terrorist tactics and silence. But as they were forced to realise that neither terrorism nor silence could hinder the progress of our Movement, they had recourse to a supreme act of terrorism which was intended to put a definite end to our activities as regards the holding of meetings. As a pretext for action along this line they took advantage of a mysterious attack on one of the Landtag deputies, named Erhard Auer. It was declared that someone had fired several shots at this man one evening, that is to say, he was not actually hit, but an attempt had been made to shoot him.
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Fabulous presence of mind and heroic courage on the part of the Social Democratic leader not only foiled this dastardly attempt on his life, but also put the crazy would-be assassins to flight. They were so quick and fled so far that subsequently the police could not find even the slightest traces of them. This mysterious episode was used by the organ of the Social Democratic Party to arouse public feeling against the Movement and at the same time it delivered its old rigmarole about what was to happen in the near future. They would see to it that the proletariat would intervene in time and prevent us from flourishing like the green bay-tree. A few days later the real attack came. It was decided finally to interrupt one of our meetings which was billed to, take place in the Münchener Hofbräuhaus and at which I myself was to speak. On November 4th, 1921, between six and seven o’clock in the evening, I received the first definite news that the meeting would positively be broken up and that to carry out this action our adversaries had decided to send to the meeting large numbers of workmen employed in certain ‘Red’ factories. It was due to an unfortunate accident that we did not receive this news sooner. On that day, we had given up our old business office in the Sternecker Gasse in Munich and moved into other premises; or rather we had given-up the old offices and our new quarters were not yet in functioning order. The telephone had already been cut off in the old office and had not yet been installed in the new one. Hence it happened that several attempts to inform us by telephone of the break-up which had been planned for that evening failed. Consequently our hall-guards were not present in strength at that meeting. There was only one squad present, which did not consist of the usual one hundred men, but only of about forty-six, and our machinery for giving the alarm was not yet sufficiently perfect for us to be able to collect within the space of an hour a sufficient number of guards to deal with the situation. It must also be added that on several previous occasions we had been forewarned, but nothing unusual had happened. The old saying that revolutions which are predicted seldom take place had hitherto proved true in our case. Possibly this was an additional reason why sufficient precautions had not been taken on that day to cope with the brutal determination of our opponents to break up our meeting.
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Finally, we did not believe that the Hofbräuhaus in Munich was suitable for the interruptive tactics of our adversaries. We had feared such a thing far more in the bigger halls, especially in the Circus Krone, but on this point we were to learn a very serviceable lesson on that evening. Later, we studied this whole question scientifically and arrived at conclusions, both interesting and incredible, which were afterwards of fundamental importance in determining the organisation and tactics of our Storm Troops. When I arrived at the entrance hall of the Hofbräuhaus at 7:45 p.m. that evening, I realised that there could be no doubt as to what the Reds intended. The hall was filled, and for that reason the police had barred the entrances. Our adversaries, who had arrived very early, were in the hall, and our followers were, for the most part, outside. The small bodyguard of S.A. men awaited me at the entrance. I had the doors leading to the principal hall closed and then asked the bodyguard of forty-five or forty-six men to come forward. I made it clear to them that perhaps on that evening they would for the first time have to show their unbending and unbreakable loyalty to the Movement and that not one of us must leave the hall unless he were carried out dead. I added that I would remain in the hall and that I did not believe that one of them would abandon me, and that if I saw any one of them act the coward I myself would personally tear off his armlet and his badge. I demanded of them that they should come forward if the slightest attempt were made to sabotage the meeting and that they must remember that the best defence is always attack. I was answered with a triple ‘Heil’ which sounded more hoarse and enthusiastic than usual. Then I advanced through the hall and could take in the situation with my own eyes. Our opponents sat close together and tried to pierce me with their looks.
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Innumerable pairs of eyes glowing with hatred and rage were fixed on me, while others with sneering faces greeted me with shouts and threats to the effect that they would ‘settle our hash’, that we should ‘look out for ourselves’ and that they would ‘stop our mouths once and for all’, along with other expressions of an equally elegant character. They knew that they were superior in numbers and they acted accordingly. Yet we were able to open the meeting, and I began to speak. In the hall of the Hofbräuhaus I always stood against one of the side walls and my platform was a beer table. Therefore I was always right in the midst of the audience. Perhaps this circumstance was responsible for creating a certain atmosphere which I never sensed elsewhere. Before me, and especially towards my left, there were only opponents, seated or standing. They were mostly robust youths and men from the Maffei Factory, from Kustermann’s, from the Isaria meter works, etc. Along the left-hand wall of the hall they had pushed their way close to my table and now began to collect beer-mugs, that is to say, they ordered one beer after another and placed the empty mugs under the tables. In this way they succeeded in collecting whole batteries of ammunition, and no one would have been more surprised than I, had the meeting passed off quietly. In spite of all the interruptions, I was able to speak for about an hour and a half and I began to feel that I was master of the situation. Even the ringleaders among the disturbers appeared to be convinced of this, for they steadily became more uneasy, often left the hall, returned and spoke to their men in an obviously nervous way. A small psychological error which I committed in replying to an interruption, a mistake of which I myself was conscious the moment the words had left my mouth, gave the sign for the outbreak. There were a few furiously angry shouts and all in a moment a man jumped on a seat and shouted ‘Liberty!’ At that signal the champions of liberty began their work.
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In a few moments the hall was filled with a yelling shrieking mob. Numerous beer-mugs flew like shells above their heads. Amid this din, one heard the crash of chair legs, the crashing of mugs, shouts, yells and screams. It was a mad uproar and I should just like to have seen such a scene enacted at a bourgeois meeting. I stood were I was and could observe my men doing their duty, every one of them. The fun had hardly begun when my Storm Troops, as they were called from that day onwards, launched their attack. Like wolves they threw themselves on the enemy again and again, in parties of eight or ten and began steadily to drive them out of the hall. After five minutes I could see hardly one of them that was not streaming with blood. Then I realised what kind of men many of them were, above all my brave Maurice and Hess, who is my private secretary to-day, and many others who, even though seriously wounded, returned to the attack again and again, as long as they could stand on their feet. Pandemonium reigned for some twenty minutes and by that time our opponents, who had numbered seven or eight hundred, had been driven from the hall or hurled out headlong by my men, who had not numbered fifty. Only, in the left corner a big crowd was still standing out against our men and putting up a stiff fight. Then two pistol-shots rang out from the entrance to the hall and immediately wild shooting broke out on all sides. One’s heart almost rejoiced at this spectacle which recalled memories of the War. At that moment it was not possible to identify the persons who had fired the shots, but at any rate I could see that my men had returned to the attack with increased fury, until finally the last disturbers were overcome and flung out of the hall. About twenty-five minutes had passed since it all began. The hall looked as if a bomb had exploded there. Many of my comrades were being bandaged and others were being taken away, but we remained masters of the situation. Hermann Esser, who was chairman of the meeting, announced, ‘The meeting will continue. The speaker will proceed.’ So I went on with my speech.
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When we ourselves had declared the meeting at an end, an excited police officer rushed in, waved his arms and declared, ‘The meeting is dissolved.’ I could not help laughing at this example of the law’s delay. It was typical of the officiousness of the police. The more insignificant they are, the more important they try to appear. That evening taught us many a lesson and our adversaries never forgot the lesson they had received. Up to the autumn of 1923 theMünchener Postdid not again threaten us with the clenched fist of the proletariat.
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In the preceding chapter I mentioned the existence of a co-operative association between the German patriotic societies. Here I shall deal briefly with this question. In speaking of a co-operative association we generally mean a group of societies which, for the purpose of facilitating their work, establish mutual relations for collaborating along certain lines, appointing a common board of management vested with a varying degree of authority with a view to undertaking concerted action. This very fact shows that these were societies, associations and parties, whose aims and course of action were not too widely divergent, and it was asserted that this was invariably true. The average citizen is pleased and reassured when he hears that these societies, by establishing a co-operative association, have at long last discovered a common platform on which they can stand united and have eliminated all causes of dissension. Therewith a general conviction arises, to the effect that such a union is an immense gain in strength and that small groups which were weak as long as they stood alone have now suddenly become strong. Yet this conviction is generally a mistaken one. It will be interesting and, in my opinion, important for the better understanding of this question to try to get a clear notion of how it came about that so many of these associations, unions, etc., were formed when all of them declared that they had the same ends in view. In itself it would be logical to expect that one aim should be fought for by a single association and it would be more sensible if there were not a number of associations fighting for the same aim. In the beginning there was undoubtedly only one association which had this one fixed aim in view. Some men somewhere stated a definite fact, called for the solution of a definite problem, enunciated their aim and founded a movement for the purpose of achieving that aim.
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That is how an association or a party is founded, whose programme may be either the abolition of existing evils or the positive establishment of a certain order of things in the future. Once such a movement has come into existence it may lay practical claim to certain priority rights. The natural course of things would now be that all those who wish to fight for the same objective as this movement is striving for, should identify themselves with it and thus increase its strength, so that the common purpose in view may be the better served. Especially men of superior intelligence must feel, one and all, that by joining the movement they are establishing precisely those conditions which are necessary for practical success in the common struggle. Accordingly it is reasonable and, in a certain sense, honest—which honesty, as I shall show later, is an element of very great importance—that only one movement should be founded for the purpose of attaining one aim. The fact that this does not happen must be attributed to two causes. The first may almost be described as tragic; the second as despicable, because it has its source in the weaknesses of human nature. But, when all is said and done, I see in both causes only facts which go to strengthen our determination and our energy and which, by this intensification of human activity render possible the solution of the problem in question. The tragic reason why it so often happens that the pursuit of one definite task is not left to one association alone is as follows: Generally speaking, every action carried out on a grand scale is the expression of a desire that has already existed for a long time in millions of human hearts, a longing which may have been nourished, in silence. It may even happen that throughout the centuries many men have been yearning for the solution of a definite problem, because they have been suffering under an unendurable state of affairs, without hope of fulfilment of the universal longing.
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Nations which are no longer capable of finding a heroic deliverance from such a sorrowful fate may be looked upon as effete. But, on the other hand, nothing affords better proof of the vital forces of a people and the consequent guarantee of its right to exist than that one day, through a happy decree of Destiny, a man arises who is capable of liberating his people from some great oppression, or of wiping out some bitter distress, or of calming the national soul which had been tormented through is sense of insecurity, and thus fulfilling what had long been the universal yearning of the people. An essential characteristic of what are called the great questions of the age is that thousands undertake the task of solving them and that many feel themselves called upon to fulfil this task; it may even be that Destiny herself puts forward many for selection, in order that, through the free play of events the strongest and most capable man shall ultimately be the victor and be entrusted with the task of solving the problem. Thus it may happen that for centuries many are discontent with the form in which their religious life expresses itself and yearn for a reformation. So it may come about that through this impulse of the soul some dozens of men may arise who believe that, by virtue of their understanding and their knowledge, they are called upon to solve the religious difficulties of the day and accordingly present themselves as the prophets of a new doctrine or at least as declared adversaries of the accepted dogmas. Here also it is certain that the laws of Nature will take their course, inasmuch as the strongest will be destined to fulfil the great mission, but usually the others are slow to acknowledge that only one man is called upon to fulfil the task. On the contrary they all believe that they have an equal right to engage in the solution of the difficulties in question and that they are equally fitted for that task. Their contemporary world is generally quite unable to decide which of them possesses the highest gifts and accordingly merits universal support. Thus, in the course of centuries, and indeed often within the same epoch, different men establish different movements to achieve the same end. At least the end is declared by the founders of the movements to be the same, or may be looked upon as such by the bulk of the people.
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The people nourish vague desires and have only general opinions, without having any precise notion of their own ideals and desires or of the question whether and how it is possible for these ideals and desires to be fulfilled. The tragedy lies in the fact that many men struggle to reach the same objective by different roads, each one genuinely believing in his own mission and holding himself in duty bound to follow his own road without regard for the others. These movements, parties, religious groups, etc., originate entirely independently of one another out of the general urge of the age, and all with a view to working towards the same goal. It may seem a tragic thing, at least at first sight, that this should be so, because people are too often inclined to think that forces which are dispersed in different directions would attain their ends far more quickly and more surely if they were united in one common effort. This is, however, not so, for Nature herself decides according to the rules of her inexorable logic. She leaves these diverse groups to compete with one another and dispute the palm of victory in order, finally, to lead that movement to the final goal which has chosen the clearest, shortest and surest path. How can the world decide which path is right or wrong, if the available forces are note given free play, if the final decision is not taken out of the hands of men who are convinced of their own infallibility and left to the infallible test of established success which is always the final confirmation of the justice of a course of action. Therefore, if various groups are striving by various routes to reach the same goal, they will, inasmuch as they are aware that similar efforts are being made elsewhere, examine more critically their own method of procedure, simplify it if possible and, by exerting themselves to the utmost, try to reach that goal more quickly. Through this rivalry the faculties of each individual protagonist are developed to a still higher pitch of perfection and the human race has frequently owed its progress to the lessons learned front former attempts which have come to grief.
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Thus it happens that in the initial dispersion of effort for which the individual is not consciously to blame and which appeared at first sight to be fraught with tragic consequences, we may recognise the means by which the best method is finally selected. History shows that, as most people believe, the two parties by which a solution of the German problem might have been reached amid whose chief advocates were Austria and Prussia, the Habsburg and the Hohenzollern, should have been united from the outset. In the opinion of these same people both parties should have decided to follow either one path or the other, but at that time, the path chosen would inevitably have been that of the rival who was then more important and Austria’s aims would never have included the foundation of the German Reich. A strong and united German Reich finally arose out of that which many millions of Germans deplored in their hearts as the last and most terrible manifestation of our fratricidal strife. The truth is that the German Imperial Crown was secured on the battlefield of Koniggratz and not, as was commonly asserted afterwards, in the battles that were waged outside Paris. Thus the foundation of the German Reich was not the consequence of any common will working along common lines, but it was rather the outcome of a deliberate, if sometimes unconscious, struggle for hegemony, in which Prussia finally was victorious. Anybody who is not so blinded by party politics as to be unable to recognise the truth must perforce admit that the so-called wisdom of men would never have come to the same wise decision which the wisdom of Life itself, that is to say, the free play of forces, finally brought to realisation. For in the German territories of two hundred years ago who would seriously have believed that Hohenzollern Prussia, and not Habsburg, would become the nucleus, the founder and the tutor of the new Reich? And, on the other hand, who would deny to-day that Destiny thus acted with more insight than human wisdom. Who could now imagine a German Reich based on the foundations of an effete and degenerate dynasty?
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The natural course of events, even though it took centuries of struggle, finally awarded the superior force the position which it was fitted to occupy. This will always be so and will remain, as it always has been, an immutable law. It is, therefore, not a matter for regret if different men set out to attain the same objective by various means. In this way the strongest and swiftest is recognised and will be the victor. There is yet a second cause for the fact that often in the lives of nations several movements which show the same characteristics strive by different routes to reach what appears to be the same goal. This second cause is not at all tragic, but merely deserves scorn. It arises from a sad mixture of envy, jealousy, ambition and predatory instincts. Unfortunately these failings are often found united in single specimens of the human species. The moment a man arises who profoundly understands the distress of his people and, having diagnosed the evil with perfect accuracy, takes measures to cure it; the moment he fixes his aim and chooses the means to reach it then paltry and pettifogging people become all attention and eagerly follow the doings of this man who has thus come before the public eye. Just like sparrows who are apparently indifferent, but in reality keenly observant of the movements of their more fortunate companion with the morsel of bread, in order that they may snatch it from him if he should momentarily relax his hold, so it is also with the human species. All that is needed is that one man should strike out on a new road and then a crowd of poltroons will prick up their ears and begin to hope that some trifling gain may lie at the end of that road. The moment they think they have discovered where the reward is to be reaped they hasten to find another route by which to reach the goal more quickly. As soon as a new movement is founded and has formulated a definite programme, people of that kind come forward and proclaim that they are fighting for the same cause.
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This does not imply that they are honestly ready to join the ranks of such a movement and thus recognise its right of priority. It implies rather that they intend to steal the programme and found a new party. In doing this they are shameless enough to assure the unthinking public that they had long intended to take the same line of action as the other had now taken and frequently succeed in thus placing themselves in a favourable light, instead of arousing the general disapprobation which they justly deserve. For it is a piece of gross impudence to steal another’s slogan and proclaim it as one’s own, to steal the programme of another, and then to form a separate group as if all this had been created by the new founder of this group. The impudence of such conduct is particularly obvious when the individuals who first caused dispersion and disruption by their new foundation are, the same who (as experience has shown) are most emphatic in proclaiming the necessity for union and unity the moment they find they cannot catch up with their adversary’s advance. It is to that kind of conduct that so-called ‘völkischdisintegration’ is to be attributed. Certainly in the years 1918–1919 the founding of a multitude of new groups, parties, etc., calling themselves ‘völkisch’ was a natural phenomenon of the time, for which the founders were not responsible. By 1920 the National Socialist German Labour Party had slowly crystallised from all these parties and had become supreme. There could be no better proof of the sterling honesty of certain individual founders than the fact that many of them decided, in a way that calls for admiration, to sacrifice their manifestly less successful movements to the stronger movement, by joining it unconditionally and dissolving their own. This is especially true in regard to Julius Streicher, who was at that time the protagonist of the German Socialist Party in Nürnberg. The National Socialist German Labour Party had been founded with similar aims in view, but quite independently of the other. As I have already said, Streicher, then a teacher in Nürnberg, was the chief protagonist of the German Socialist Party. He had a sacred conviction of the mission and future of his own movement.
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As soon, however, as he recognised the superior strength and steadier growth of the National Socialist Party, he gave up his work in the German Socialist Party and called upon his followers to fall into line with the National Socialist German Labour Party, which had emerged victorious from the mutual contest, and carry on the fight for the common cause within its ranks. The decision was personally a difficult one for him, but it showed a profound sense of honour. When that first period of the Movement was over, there remained no further dispersion of forces, for their honest intentions had led the men of that day to the same honourable, straightforward and just conclusion. What we now call the ‘völkischdisintegration’ owes its existence exclusively to the second of the two causes which I have mentioned. Ambitious men who, at first, had no ideas of their own, and still less any ‘conception of aims to be pursued, felt themselves ‘called upon’ exactly at that moment in which the success of the National Socialist German Labour Party became unquestionable. Programmes suddenly appeared which were mere transcripts of ours. Ideas were proclaimed which had been filched from us. Aims were enunciated on behalf of which we had been fighting for several years, and a course of action chosen which the National Socialists had for a long time followed. All kinds of means were resorted to for the purpose of trying to convince the public that, although the National Socialist German Labour Party had now been in existence for a long time it was found necessary to establish these new parties, but the more noble the motives put forward, the more insincere the phraseology. In reality there was only one dominant motive, namely, the personal ambition of the founders, who wished to play a part in which their own pigmy talents could contribute nothing except the grass effrontery of appropriating the ideas of others, a mode of conduct which in ordinary life is looked upon as thieving. At that time there was not an idea or concept launched by other people which these political kleptomaniacs did not seize upon at once for the purpose of applying it for their own ends.
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Those who did all this were the same people who subsequently, with tears in their eyes, profoundly deplored ‘völkischdisintegration’ and spoke unceasingly about the ‘necessity for unity.’ In doing this they nurtured the secret hope that they might be able to cry down the others, who would tire of hearing these loud-mouthed accusations and would end up by abandoning in favour of the thieves, not only the ideas already stolen by the latter, but the movements which had been founded for the execution of these ideas. When that did not occur and the new enterprises, thanks to the poor mentality of their promoters, did not show, the favourable results which had been promised beforehand, then they became more modest in their pretensions and were happy if they could find refuge in one of the so-called ‘co-operative associations.’ At that period everything which could not stand on its own feet joined one of those co-operative associations, probably in the belief that eight cripples arm-in-arm equalled one gladiator. If among all these cripples there was one who was sound of limb he had to use all his strength to sustain the others and thus he himself was, in the long run, crippled. We ought to look upon the question of joining these co-operative associations as a tactical problem, but, in coming to a decision, we must never forget the fundamental principle that through the formation of a co-operative association, societies which are weak in themselves can never be made strong, whereas it can and does not infrequently happen that a strong society or party loses in strength by joining a coalition of weaker ones. It is a mistake to believe that a factor of strength will result from the coalition of weak groups, because experience shows that in any form and under any conditions the majority is representative of the stupid and cowardly elements. Hence, a multiplicity of societies or parties is, as soon as it comes under the control of a board of management consisting of several persons elected by the parties, the victim of weakness and cowardice. Through such a coalition the free play of forces is paralysed, the struggle for the selection of the best is abolished and therewith the necessary and final victory of the healthier and stronger elements is impeded.
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Coalitions of that kind are inimical to the process of natural development, because for the most part they hinder rather than advance the solution of the problem which is the object of the struggle. It may happen that, from considerations of a purely tactical kind, the leaders of a movement which looks ahead will enter into a coalition with other, movements for the treatment of special questions and may also act in common with them, but this can be only for a short and limited period. Such a coalition must not be permanent, if the movement does not wish to renounce its liberating mission, because if it should become indissolubly tied up in such a combination it would lose the capacity and the right to allow its own forces to work freely in following out a natural development, in order to overcome rivals and attain its own objective. It must never be forgotten that nothing really great in this world has ever been achieved through coalitions, but that such achievements have always been due to the triumph of the individual. Successes achieved through coalitions, owing to the very nature of their source carry in them from the very start the germs of future disintegration and the possibility of losing what has already been achieved. The great revolutions which have taken place in human thought and have transformed the aspect of the world would have been inconceivable and impossible except as the titanic struggles waged by individual elements. They could never have been the work of coalitions. Above all things, thevölkischState will never be created by the compromising attitude of co-operative associations but only by the iron determination of a single movement which has struggled and triumphed over all the others.
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583
584
The strength of the old state rested on three pillars: the monarchical form of government, the civil service, and the Army. The Revolution of 1918 abolished the form of government, disbanded the Army and abandoned the civil service to the corruption of party politics. Thus the essential supports of the so-called authority of the State were shattered. This authority nearly always depends on three elements, which are the essential foundations of all authority. Popular support is the first element which is necessary for the creation of authority, but an authority resting on that foundation alone is still quite frail, uncertain and vacillating. Hence, everyone who finds himself vested with an authority that is based only on popular support must take measures to improve and consolidate the foundations of that authority by the acquisition of power. Accordingly, we must look upon power, that is to say the capacity to use force, as the second foundation on which all authority is based. This foundation is more stable and secure, but not always stronger, than the first. If popular support and power are united and can endure for a certain time, then an authority may evolve which is based on a still stronger foundation, namely, the authority of tradition. Finally, if popular support, power, and tradition are united together, then the authority based on them may be looked upon as invincible. In Germany the Revolution abolished this last foundation. There was no longer even a traditional authority. With the collapse of the old Reich, the abolition of the monarchical form of government, the destruction of all the old insignia of greatness and the imperial symbols, tradition was shattered at a blow. The result was that the authority of the State was shaken to its foundations.
585
The second pillar of state authority, namely power, also ceased to exist. In order to carry through the Revolution it was necessary to disband that body which had hitherto incorporated the organised force and power of the State, namely, the Army. Indeed some decimated fragments of the Army itself had to be employed as fighting elements in the Revolution. The armies at the front were not subjected in the same measure to this process of disruption, but as they gradually left farther behind them the fields of glory on which they had fought heroically for four and a half years they were attacked by the corrosive acid that was destroying the discipline of the home front. When they arrived at the demobilizing centres, they fell into that state of confusion which was styled ‘voluntary obedience,’ at the time of the Soldiers’ Councils. Of course it was out of the question to think of founding any kind of authority on this crowd of mutineering soldiers, who looked upon military service as a job of eight hours per day. Therefore, the second element, that which guarantees the stability of authority, was also abolished and the Revolution had only the original element, popular support, on which to build up its authority, but this basis was extraordinarily insecure. With one mighty blow, the Revolution had shattered the old state edifice, but only because the normal equilibrium within the social structure of the nation had already been destroyed by the war. Every national body is made up of three main classes. At one extreme we have the best of the people, taking the word ‘best’ as indicating those who are highly endowed with the civic virtues and are noted for their courage and their readiness to sacrifice their private interests. At the other extreme are the worst dregs of humanity, in whom vice and egotistic interests prevail. Between these two extremes stands the third class, which is made up of the broad middle stratum, which does not incorporate either radiant heroism or vulgar vice. Those eras which mark the rise of a State are characterized and indeed made possible only by the fact that they occur under the exclusive leadership of that section belonging to the best extreme of the population.
586
Times of normal and steady development, or of stable conditions, owe their existence and outwardly visible characteristics to the preponderating influence of the middle stratum. In this stage the two extreme classes counterbalance each other, or in other words; they cancel each other. Times of national collapse are determined by the preponderating influence of the worst elements. It must be noted here, however, that the broad masses, which constitute what I have called the middle section, come forward and make their influence felt only when the two extreme sections are engaged in mutual strife, in case one of the extreme sections comes out victorious, the middle section will readily submit to its domination. If the best dominate, the broad masses will follow it. Should the worst extreme prove triumphant, then the middle section will at least offer no opposition to it, for the masses that constitute the middle stratum never fight their own battles. The bloodshed which continued for four and a half years during the War destroyed the inner equilibrium between these three sections in so far as it can be said (with all due respect for the sacrifices made by the middle section) that it nearly led to the best extreme being bled white, because the total amount of irreplaceable and heroic German lives lost during these four and a half years was really tremendous. Just think of the hundreds of thousands of instances when there was a call for volunteers for the front, volunteers for patrol duty, volunteer dispatch carriers, volunteers to go out and rig up a telephone, volunteers for bridge building, volunteers for the submarines, volunteers for the air service, volunteers for the storm battalions, and so on. During four and a half years, and on thousands of occasions, there was always the cry for volunteers and again for volunteers, and the result was always the same. Beardless young fellows or fully developed men, all filled with an ardent love for their country; urged on by their own courageous spirit or by a lofty sense of their duty—it was always such men who answered the call for volunteers. There were tens of thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands, of such cases, so that that kind of human material steadily grew scarcer and scarcer. Those who were not killed were either maimed on the field of battle or disappeared gradually owing to the steady decrease in the number of survivors.
587
Let us remember, above all, that in 1914 whole armies were composed of volunteers who, owing to a criminal lack of conscience on the part of our feckless parliamentarians, had not received a regulation peace-time training and were consequently defenceless cannon-fodder at the mercy of the enemy. The four hundred thousand who fell or were permanently maimed on the battlefields of Flanders were irreplaceable. Their loss was something far more than a numerical loss. With their death the scales, being too lightly weighted at the best end, tipped rapidly upwards and the vulgar, infamous and cowardly elements, in short, those who constituted the worst extreme of our population, weighed heavier in the balance than previously. In addition to this, for four and a half years, our best human material was being thinned to an exceptional degree on the battlefields, while the worst extreme surpassed itself in the art of self-preservation. For each heroic volunteer who made the supreme sacrifice and ascended the steps of Valhalla, there was a shirker who cunningly dodged death on the plea of being engaged in business that was of more or less national importance at home. Thus, the state of affairs at the end of the war was as follows: The great middle stratum of the nation had fulfilled its duty and paid its toll of blood. One extreme of the population, which was constituted of the best elements, had, with exemplary heroism, sacrificed itself almost to a man. The other extreme, which was, constituted of the worst elements of the population, had preserved itself almost intact, through taking advantage of absurd laws and also because the authorities failed to enforce certain articles of the military code. This carefully preserved scum of our nation then engineered the Revolution, and the reason why it could do so was that the extreme section composed of the best elements was no longer there to oppose it. It no longer existed.
588
Hence the German Revolution, from the very beginning, depended on only one section of the population. This act of Cain was not committed by the German people as such, but by an obscure rabble of deserters, hooligans, etc. The man at the front gladly welcomed the end of the strife in which so much blood had been shed. He was happy to be able to return home and be with his wife and children once again, but he had no moral connection with the Revolution. He did not like it, nor did he like those who had provoked and organised it. During the four and a half years of that utter struggle at the front he had come to forget the party hyenas at home and all their wrangling had become alien to him. The Revolution was really popular only with a small section of the German people, namely, that Class and their accomplices who had selected the rucksack as the hall-mark of all honorary citizens in this new State. They did not like the Revolution for its own sake, as many people still erroneously believe, but for the consequences which followed in its train. It was, however, very difficult to establish any abiding authority on the popular support given to these Marxist freebooters, and yet the young Republic stood in need of authority at any cost, unless it was prepared to be suddenly overthrown after a short period of chaos by an avenging force assembled from those last elements that still remained of the best extreme of the population. The danger which those who were responsible for the Revolution feared most at that time was that, in the turmoil of the confusion which they themselves had created, the ground would suddenly give under their feet, that they might be abruptly seized and transported to another milieu by an iron hand, such as has often made itself felt at such junctures in the history of nations. The Republic had to be consolidated at all costs. Hence, it was forced almost immediately after its foundation to erect another pillar beside that unstable pillar of its wavering popularity. Its promoters found that power must be organised once again in order to procure a firmer foundation for their authority.
589
When those who had been the matadors of the Revolution in December 1918, and January and February 1919, felt the ground trembling beneath their feet they looked around them for men who would be prepared to support, by means of military force, the insecure position which their popularity with the public afforded them. The ‘anti-militarist’ Republic had need of soldiers. Since, however, the first and only pillar on which the authority of the State rested, namely, its popularity, was grounded only on a conglomeration of rowdies, thieves, burglars, deserters, shirkers, etc., namely, on that section of the nation which we have called the evil extreme, it was useless to look to it to provide men who would be willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of a new ideal. The section which had nourished the revolutionary idea and carried out the Revolution was neither able nor willing to provide the men to protect it, for that section had no wish whatsoever to organise a republican State, but to disorganise what already existed in order the better to satisfy its own instincts. Their watchword was not the organisation and construction of the German Republic, but rather the pillaging of it. Hence, the cry for help, sent out by the public representatives, who were beset by a thousand anxieties, did not find any response among this class of people, but rather provoked a feeling of bitterness and repudiation. They looked upon this step as a breach of faith and trust, and in the building up of an authority which was no longer based on popular support, but also on force, they saw the beginning of a struggle against what was, for these elements, an essential factor of the Revolution, namely, the right to plunder and absolute domination by a horde of thieves and robbers in short, the worst rabble who had broken out of the convict prisons, leaving their chains behind. The representatives of the people might cry out as much as they liked, but they could get no help from that rabble and only the answering cry, ‘Traitors!’ revealed the attitude of the very people on whose support the popularity of the regime was founded. Then for the first time large numbers of young Germans were ready to don their military uniform once again in the service, as they believed, of ‘law and order,’shouldering their rifles and donning their steel helmets, to defend the wreckers of the Fatherland. Volunteer corps were assembled and, although hating the Revolution, they set to work to defend and to establish it firmly.
590
In doing this they acted in perfect good faith. The real organiser of the Revolution and the actual wire-puller behind it, the international Jew, had sized up the situation correctly. The German people were not yet ripe to be drawn into the bloody swamp of Bolshevism, as the Russian people had been drawn. That was because there was a closer racial unity between the intellectual classes in Germany and the manual workers, and also because, as was also the case in the other States in Western Europe, broadly speaking, most classes of the community had their quota of cultured persons, whereas this was not the case in Russia. In that country the intellectual classes were, for the most part, not of Russian nationality, or at least they did not have the racial characteristics of the Slav. The thin upper layer of intellectuals which then existed in Russia could be abolished at any time, because there was no intermediate stratum connecting it organically with the great mass of the people. There the mental and moral level of the great mass of the people was extremely low. In Russia, the moment the agitators were successful in inciting the broad masses of the people, who could neither read nor write, against the upper layer of intellectuals who were not in contact with the masses or permanently linked with them in any way, the fate of Russia was decided, the success of the Revolution assured. Thereupon the analphabetic Russian became the slave of his Jewish dictators who, on their side, were shrewd enough to name their dictatorship ‘the dictatorship of the people.’ In the case of Germany an additional factor must be taken into account. Here the Revolution could be carried into effect only if the Army could first be gradually dismembered. The real author of the Revolution and of the process of disintegration in the Army was not the soldier who had fought at the front, but canaille who more or less shunned the light and were either quartered in the home garrisons or were officiating as ‘indispensables’somewhere in the business world at home.
591
This canaille was reinforced by ten thousand deserters who, without running any particular risk, could turn their backs on the fighting front. At all times the real coward fears nothing so much as death, but at the front he had death before his eyes every day in a thousand different shapes. There has always been one possible way, and one only, of making weak or wavering men, or even downright cowards, face their duty steadfastly and that is that the deserter be given to understand that his desertion will bring upon him just the very thing from which he is fleeing. At the front a man may die, but the deserter must die. Only this draconian threat against every attempt to desert the flag can have an intimidating effect, not merely on the individual, but also on the mass. Therein lay the meaning and purpose of the military penal code. It was a magnificent delusion, to believe that the great struggle for the life of a nation could be carried through if it were based solely on voluntary fidelity, arising from and sustained by the knowledge that such a struggle was necessary. The voluntary fulfilment of one’s duty is a motive that determines the actions of only the best men, but not of the average type of man. Hence, special laws are necessary, just as, for instance, the law against stealing, which was not made for men who are honest on principle, but for the weak and unstable elements. Such laws are meant to hinder the evil-doer by their deterrent effect and thus prevent a state of affairs from arising in which the honest man is considered stupid, and which would end in the belief that it is better to have a share in the robbery, than to stand by with empty hands or allow oneself to be robbed. It was a mistake to believe that in a struggle which, according to all human reckoning, might last for several years it would be possible to dispense with those expedients which the experience of hundreds and even of thousands of years had proved to be effective in making weak and unstable men face and fulfil their duty in difficult times and at moments of great nervous stress. For the voluntary war-hero it is, of course, not necessary to have the death-penalty in the military code, but it is necessary for the cowardly egotists who value their own lives above the existence of the community in the hour of national need.
592
Such weak and characterless people can be deterred from surrendering to their cowardice only by the application of the heaviest penalties. When men have to struggle with death every day and remain for weeks in trenches of mire, often very badly supplied with food, the man who is unsure of himself and begins to waver cannot be made to stick to his post by threats of imprisonment or even penal servitude. Only by a ruthless enforcement of the death-penalty can this be effected, for experience shows that at such a time the weakling considers prison a thousand times preferable to the battlefield. In prison his precious life is not in danger. The abolition of the death-penalty during the War, that is to say, the fact that the military penal code was, to all practical purposes, in abeyance, was a mistake for which we had to pay dearly. An army of deserters poured into the stations at the rear or returned home, especially in 1918, and there began to form that huge criminal organisation with which we were suddenly faced, after November 7th, 1918, and which engineered the Revolution. The front had nothing to do with all this. Naturally, the soldiers at the front were yearning for peace, but it was precisely that fact which represented a special danger for the Revolution, for when the German soldiers began to draw near home, after the Armistice, the revolutionaries, in trepidation, asked again and again, ‘What will the troops from the front do? Will the men in fieldgrey stand for it?’ During those weeks the Revolution was forced to give itself at least an external appearance of moderation, if it were not to run the risk of being speedily wrecked by a few German divisions. For at that time, had the commander of one single division made up his mind to rally the men of his command, who had always remained faithful to him, to participate in an onslaught, to tear down the red flag and put the ‘councils’ against the wall, or, if there was any resistance, to break in with trench-mortars and hand-grenades, that division would have grown into an army of sixty divisions in less than four weeks.
593
The Jewish wire-pullers were terrified by the prospect more than by anything else, and to forestall this particular danger they found it necessary to give the Revolution a certain aspect of moderation. They dared not allow it to degenerate into Bolshevism, but, conditions being what they were, had to produce a semblance of ‘law and order’—hence many important concessions, the appeal to the old civil service and to the leaders of the old Army. They would be needed, at least for a certain time, and only when they had served their turn could they be dismissed with impunity and the Republic taken entirely cut of the hands of the old servants of the State and delivered into the clutches of the revolutionaries. They thought that this was the only means of duping the old generals and civil servants and of disarming beforehand any possible opposition through the apparently harmless and mild character of the new regime. Experience has shown to what extent the plot succeeded. The Revolution, however, was not made by the peaceful and orderly elements of the nation but rather by rioters, thieves and robbers, and the way in which the Revolution was developing did not accord with the intentions of these latter elements. Still, on tactical grounds, it was not possible to explain to them the reasons for the course things were taking and make that course acceptable. As Social Democracy gradually gained power, it lost more and more the character of a crude revolutionary party. Of course in their inner hearts the Social Democrats wanted a revolution and their leaders had no other end in view. The final result, however, was only a revolutionary programme and a body of men no longer capable of putting it into execution. A revolution cannot be carried through by a party often million members. In such a movement there is no longer a climax of activity, but merely the broad masses of the middle stratum, that is to say, inertia. Recognising all this, even during the War, the Jews brought about the famous split in the Social Democratic Party.
594
While the Social Democratic Party, conforming to the inertia of its mass following, hung like a leaden weight on the neck of the national defence, the actively radical elements were extracted from it and formed into a particularly efficient force for purposes of attack. The Independent Party and the Spartacist League were the storm-battalions of revolutionary Marxism. The objective assigned to them was to create afait accompli, on the basis of which the masses of the Social Democratic Party could take their stand, having been prepared for this event long beforehand. The spineless bourgeoisie had been estimated at its just value by the Marxists and treated en canaille. Nobody bothered about it, knowing well that in their canine servility the representatives of an old and worn-out generation would not be able to offer any serious resistance. When the Revolution had succeeded and its engineers believed that the main pillars of the old State had been broken down, the Army returning from the front began to appear in the light of a sinister sphinx and thus made it necessary to slow down the natural course of the Revolution. The main body of the Social Democratic horde occupied the conquered positions, and the Independent and Spartacist storm-battalions were sidetracked. This was not, however, possible without a struggle. Not only were the active assault formations that had started the Revolution dissatisfied and, feeling that they had been betrayed, eager to continue the fight on their own account, but their unchecked racketeering was even approved by the wire-pullers of the Revolution, for the Revolution itself had scarcely been accomplished when it appeared to be divided into two camps. In the one camp were the elements of law and order; in the other, those of blood and terrorism. Was it not perfectly natural that our bourgeoisie should take up its stand with flying colours in the camp of law and order? For once these pitiable, political organisations found it possible to act, inasmuch as, although not admitting it, they had gained a first foothold and thus to a certain extent they found themselves in coalition with that power which they hated but feared. The German political bourgeoisie achieved the high honour of being able to associate itself with the accursed Marxist leaders for the purpose of combating Bolshevism.
595
Thus as early as December 1918 and January 1919 the situation was as follows: A minority consisting of the worst elements had engineered the Revolution, and behind this minority all the Marxist parties immediately fell into step. The Revolution itself had an outward appearance of moderation, which aroused the enmity of the fanatical extremists. These began to resort to the use of hand-grenades and machine-guns, occupying public buildings, and thus threatening to destroy the moderate trend of the Revolution. To prevent this terrorism from developing further a truce was concluded between the representatives of the new regime and the adherents of the old order, for the purpose of waging a common fight against the extremists. The result was that the enemies of the Republic ceased to oppose the Republic as such and helped to subjugate those who were also enemies of the Republic, though for quite different reasons, but a further consequence was that all danger of the adherents of the old State putting up a fight against the new was now definitely averted. This fact must always be borne in mind. Only by remembering it, can we understand how it was possible that a nation in which nine-tenths of the people had not joined in a revolution, while seven-tenths repudiated it and six-tenths detested it, allowed the Revolution to be imposed upon it by the remaining one-tenth of the population. Gradually the barricade heroes in the Spartacist camp petered out, and so did the nationalist patriots and idealists on the other side. As these two groups steadily dwindled, the masses of the middle stratum triumphed, as they always will. The bourgeoisie and the Marxists met together on the basis of a fait accompli and the Republic began to be consolidated. At first, however, that did not prevent the bourgeois parties from continuing to propound their monarchist ideas for some time, especially at the elections, whereby they endeavoured to conjure up the spirit of the dead past to encourage and win over once more their own feeble-hearted followers. It was not an honest proceeding. In their hearts they had broken with the monarchy long ago; but the foulness of the new regime had begun to extend its corruptive action and make itself felt in the camp of the bourgeois parties.
596
The common bourgeois politician now felt better in the slime of republican corruption than in the severe austerity of the defunct State, which still lived in his memory. As I have already pointed out, after the destruction of the old Army the revolutionary leaders were forced to strengthen the authority of the State by creating a new factor of power. In the conditions that existed they could do this only by winning over to their side the adherents of aWeltanschauungwhich was diametrically opposed to their own. From those elements alone was it possible slowly to create a new Army, limited numerically by the peace treaties, whose spirit had to undergo a transformation, before it could become an instrument of the new regime. If, setting aside the very real defects of the old State, which undoubtedly constituted a contributory factor, we ask ourselves how it was possible for the revolutionary action to succeed, we arrive at the following conclusions: Firstly, it was due to the petrifaction of our sense of duty and obedience. Secondly, it was due also to the passive timidity of the parties who were supposed to uphold the State. Moreover, it should be emphasised that the process of petrifaction of our sense of duty and obedience was fundamentally due to our wholly non-national and purely State education which resulted in a confusion of the conceptions ‘means’ and ‘ends.’ Consciousness of duty, fulfilment of duty and obedience, are not ends in themselves any more than the State is an end in itself, but they all ought to be employed as means to facilitate and assure the existence of a community of people who are physically and mentally akin. At a moment when a nation is manifestly collapsing and when all outward signs show that it is on the point of becoming the victim of ruthless oppression, thanks to the conduct of a few miscreants, to obey these people and fulfil one’s appointed task is merely doctrinaire formalism, and indeed pure folly. On the other hand, refusal to obey and to ‘fulfil one’s appointed task’ in such a case might save the nation from collapse.
597
According to our current bourgeois idea of the State, a divisional general who received from his superior the order not to shoot fulfilled his duty and therefore acted rightly in not shooting, because, to the bourgeois mind blind obedience is more valuable than the life of a nation. But, according to the National Socialist concept it is not a sense of obedience to weak superiors that should prevail at such moments. In such an hour the duty of assuming personal responsibility towards the whole nation arises. The Revolution succeeded because that concept had ceased to be a vital force with our people, or rather with our governments, and lead given place to something that was merely formal and doctrinaire. As regards the second point, it may be said that the real reason for the cowardly attitude of the parties which supported the former State was that the most active and upright section of our people had been killed during the War. Apart from that, the bourgeois parties, which may be considered as the only political formations that stood by the old State, were convinced that they ought to defend their principles only by intellectual ways and means, since the use of physical force was permitted only to the State. That outlook was a sign of the weakness and decadence which had been gradually developing, and it was also senseless at a period when there was a political adversary in the field who had long ago abandoned that standpoint and had instead openly declared that he meant to attain his political ends by force whenever possible. When Marxism appeared in the world of bourgeois democracy, as a consequence of that democracy itself, the appeal sent out by the bourgeois democracy to fight Marxism with intellectual weapons was a piece of folly for which terrible expiation had to be made later on. Marxism always professed the doctrine that the choice of weapons was a matter which had to be decided from the standpoint of expediency and that success justified the choice of the weapon. This idea was proved correct during the days from November 7th to 11th, 1918. At that time the Marxists did not bother themselves in the least about parliament or democracy, but gave the death-blow to both by turning loose their horde of criminals to shoot and raise hell. It was, therefore, only natural that the long-winded bourgeois organisations were forthwith rendered defenceless.
598
When the Revolution was over, the bourgeois parties changed the name of their firm and suddenly reappeared, the heroic leaders emerging from the dark cellars or more airy storehouses where they had sought refuge. But, just as happens in the case of all representatives of antiquated institutions, they had not forgotten their errors or learned anything new. Their political programme was grounded in the past, even though they themselves had become reconciled to the new regime. Their aim was to secure, if possible, a share in the new institution, and so they continued to use words as their sole weapon. Therefore, after the Revolution the bourgeois parties also capitulated to the mob in a miserable fashion. When the Law for the Protection of the Republic was introduced the majority was not at first in favour of it, but, confronted with two hundred thousand Marxists demonstrating in the streets, tine bourgeois ‘statesmen’ were so terror stricken that they voted for the law against their better judgment, for the edifying reason that they feared they might otherwise be beaten up by the enraged masses on leaving the Reichstag—something which unfortunately did not occur upon the law being passed. Thus, the new State developed along its own lines, as if there had been no national opposition at all. The only organisations which might at that time have had the strength and courage to face Marxism and its incited masses were, first of all, theFreikorpsand subsequently the organisations for self-defence, the civic guards, and finally, the ex-servicemen’s association. For the following reasons the existence of these bodies did not appreciably change the course of German history. Just as the so-called national parties were unable to take any steps since they lacked an efficient force to deal with the mob, the defence leagues were likewise unable to exert any influence because they had no political ideal and especially because they had no definite political aim in view. The success which Marxism had scored was due to perfect co-operation between political determination and ruthless force.
599
What prevented nationalist Germany from taking a hand in shaping developments was the lack of determined co-operation between brute force and inspired political aims. Whatever may have been the aspirations of the ‘national’ parties, they had no force whatsoever to fight for these aspiration least of all in the streets. The power lay in the hands of the defence leagues. They were masters of the street and of the State, but they lacked political ideals and aims on behalf of which their forces could have been mobilised in the interests of the German nation. In both cases, the cunning Jew was able by his astute powers of persuasion, to make this unfortunate state of affairs permanent or at least to aggravate it. The Jew succeeded brilliantly in using his press for the purpose of spreading abroad the idea that the defence leagues were of a ‘non-political character,’ just as in politics he was always astute enough to praise the ‘purely intellectual’ character of the struggle and demand that it must always be kept on that plane. Millions of German imbeciles then repeated this folly, without having the slightest suspicion that by so doing, they were, to all practical purposes, disarming themselves and delivering themselves defenceless into the hands of the Jew. There is a natural explanation of this also. The lack of a great ideal capable of re-moulding conditions has always meant a limitation of fighting power. The conviction of the right to employ even the most brutal weapons is always associated with an ardent faith in the necessity for the triumph of a new and revolutionary order of things on this earth. A movement which does not fight for such high aims and ideals will never have recourse to extreme means. The appearance of a new and great ideal was the secret of the success of the French Revolution. The Russian Revolution owes its triumph to an ideal, and it was only the ideal that enabled Fascism to bestow on a whole nation the blessing of a complete reformation.
600
Bourgeois parties are not capable of such an achievement, and it was not the bourgeois parties alone whose political aim was a restoration of the past. This was also the aim of the defence leagues, in so far as they concerned themselves with political aims at all. The spirit of the old war legions and Kyffhäuser traditions lived on in them and thereby helped to blunt, from the political point of view, these, the sharpest weapons which nationalist Germany then possessed and to, allow them to degenerate to the level of slaves of the Republic. The fact that these leagues were inspired by the best of intentions in so doing, and certainly acted in good faith, does not alter in the slightest degree the foolishness of the course they adopted. In the consolidated Reichswehr, Marxism gradually acquired the support of force, which it needed for the exercise of its authority. As a logical consequence it proceeded to abolish the defence leagues, which it considered dangerous, declaring that they were now no longer necessary. Some particularly bold leaders who were regarded with suspicion were tried and sent to prison, but even so, Fate dealt with them as they deserved. With the founding of the National Socialist German Labour Party there came into being for the first time a movement whose aim, unlike that of the bourgeois parties, was not mechanically to restore the past, but to set up in place of the absurd State machinery of the present day an organicvölkischState. From the outset the new Movement took its stand on the principle that its ideas had to be propagated by intellectual means but that, when necessary, force would be employed in support of its propaganda. In accordance with their conviction of the paramount importance of the new doctrine, the leaders of the new Movement naturally believe that no sacrifice can be considered too great when it is a question of carrying out the purpose of the Movement. I have emphasised that in certain circumstances a movement which is meant to win the hearts of the people must be ready to defend itself with its own forces against terrorist attempts on the part of its adversaries.
601
It has invariably happened in the history of the world that formal State authority has failed to break a reign of terror which was inspired by aWeltanschauung. It can only be overcome by a new and differentWeltanschauungwhose representatives are quite as bold and determined. Recognition of this fact has always been very unpleasant for the bureaucrats who are the protectors of the State, but the fact remains nevertheless. The rulers of the State can guarantee law and order only if the constitution coincides absolutely with the prevailingWeltanschauungso that disturbing elements merely assume the character of isolated criminals, instead of being considered as the champions of an ideal which is diametrically opposed to the State ideology. In the latter case the State may employ the most violent measures for centuries against the terrorism that threatens it; but in the end all these measures will prove futile, and the State will have to succumb. The German State was systematically attacked by Marxism. In a struggle that went on for seventy years the State was not able to prevent the triumph of the Marxist idea. Even though the sentences to penal servitude and imprisonment amounted in all to thousands of years, and even though the most sanguinary measures were, in innumerable instances, adopted against the champions of the MarxistWeltanschauung, which threatened its safety, in the end the State was forced to capitulate almost completely. The ordinary bourgeois political leaders will deny all this, but in vain. The State which capitulated unconditionally to Marxism on November 9th, 1918, will not suddenly arise again to-morrow as the conqueror of Marxism— far from it! Bourgeois simpletons sitting on office stools in the various ministries babble about the necessity of not governing against the wishes of the workers and by the word ‘workers’ they mean the Marxists. By identifying the German worker with Marxism not only are they guilty of a vile distortion of the truth, but they are attempting to conceal the fact of their own collapse before the Marxist idea and the Marxist organisation.
602
In view of the complete subordination of the present State to Marxism, the National Socialist Movement feels all the more bound, not only to prepare the way for the triumph of its ideal by appealing to the reason and understanding of the public, but also to take upon itself the responsibility of organising its own defence against the terrorism of the International, which is intoxicated with its own victory. I have already described how the practical experience gained by our young Movement led us slowly to organise a system of defence at our meetings. This gradually assumed the character of a military body specially trained for the maintenance of order and tended to develop into a service having its properly organised cadres. This new formation might resemble the defence leagues externally, but in reality there were no grounds of comparison between the one and the other. As I have already said, the German defence leagues had no definite political ideas of their own. They were really only associations formed for purposes of self-defence, their training and organisation being more or less efficient so that they were an illegal complement or auxiliary to the legal forces of the State. TheirFreikorpscharacter arose only from the manner of their organisation and the situation in which the State found itself at that time, but they certainly could not claim to beFreikorpson the grounds that they were associations formed voluntarily and privately for the purpose of fighting for their own independent political convictions. Such they were not, despite the fact that some of their leaders and some associations as such were definitely opposed to the Republic, for before we can speak of political convictions in the higher sense, we must be something more than merely convinced that the existing regime is defective. Political convictions in the higher sense mean that a man has a clear conception and profound understanding of the form of a new regime and feels that the establishment of this regime is an absolute necessity and one which he regards as the aim of his life’s work. The body of men organised for the preservation of order, which was then formed under the National Socialist Movement, was fundamentally different from all the other defence associations.
603
This was by reason of the fact that our formations were not meant in any way to defend the state of things created by the Revolution, but rather that they were meant exclusively to support our struggle for the creation of a new Germany. In the beginning this body was merely a guard to maintain order at our meetings. Its first task was limited to making it possible for us to hold our meetings, which our opponents would otherwise have made completely unfeasible. These men were at that time trained to attack in blind obedience to orders but not, as was then pretended in stupid German patriotic circles, to revere the baton as the highest ideal, because they were aware that the highest ideals can be brought to naught if their champion is hit over the head with a club, since it has happened not infrequently in the course of history that great men have perished under the blows of the most insignificant helots. Our body-guards did not look upon violence as an end in itself, but they protected the protagonists of ideal aims and purposes against hostile coercion by means of violence. They also understood that there was no obligation to undertake the defence of a State which did not guarantee the defence of the nation, but that, on the contrary, they had to defend the nation against those who were threatening to destroy nation and State. After the fight which took place at the meeting in the Münchener Hofbräuhaus, where the small number of our guards who were present won everlasting fame for themselves by the heroic manner in which they stormed their adversaries, these guards were called the Storm Detachment. As the name itself indicates, they represent only a detachment of the Movement. They form one constituent element of it, as do the press, the propaganda, scientific institutes or other sections of the Party. We learned how necessary was the formation of such a body, not only from our experience on the occasion of that memorable meeting, but also when we sought gradually to carry the Movement beyond Munich and extend it to the other parts of Germany. Once we had begun to appear as a danger to Marxism, the Marxists lost no opportunity of trying to quash beforehand all preparations for the holding of National Socialist meetings.
604
When they did not succeed in this they tried to break up the meeting itself. It goes without saying that all, the Marxist organisations, no matter of what grade, blindly supported every move and action of this nature taken by their representatives. What can be said for the bourgeois parties which, when they had been reduced to silence by these same Marxists and in many places did not dare to let their speakers appear before the public, were, nevertheless, childishly and incomprehensibly delighted, every time we received any kind of set-back in our fight against Marxism? The bourgeois parties were happy to think that those whom they themselves could not oppose and to whom they had been forced to capitulate, could not be broken by us. What can be said for those State officials, chief of police, and even cabinet ministers, who showed a scandalous lack of principle in presenting themselves to the public as ‘nationalists’ and yet unashamedly played the part of henchmen to the Marxists in the disputes which we, the National Socialists, had with the latter? What can be said for persons who, for the sake of a little abject praise in the Jewish Press, debased themselves so far as to persecute those men to whose heroic courage and intervention, regardless of risk, they were partly indebted for not having been torn to pieces by the ‘Red’ mob a few years previously and strung up to the lamp-posts? One day these lamentable phenomena forced the late but unforgotten Prefect Pöhner (a man whose unflinching honesty forced him to hate all twisters and to hate them as only an honourable man can hate) to say, ‘All my life I wished to be first a German and then an official, and I never wanted to be taken for one of those creatures who, like prostitutes, sold themselves body and soul to anybody who could play lord and master for the time being.’ It was extremely sad that gradually tens of thousands of honest and loyal servants of the State did not only come under the power of such people, but were also slowly contaminated by their unprincipled morals. Moreover, men of this kind pursued honest officials with a furious hatred, hounding them out of their jobs, while passing themselves off as ‘nationalist’ with the aid of their lying hypocrisy.
605
From officials of that kind we could expect no support, and only in very rare instances was it given. Only by building up its own defence could our Movement become secure and attract that amount of public attention and general respect which is given to those who can defend themselves when attacked. We decided that, as an underlying principle in the internal development of the Storm Detachment, it should not only be perfectly trained as regards physical fitness, but that the men should be so instructed as to make them indomitably convinced champions of the National Socialist ideals and, finally, that they should be schooled to observe the strictest discipline. This body was to have nothing to do either with the defence organisations of the bourgeois type or with any secret organisation. Even at that time my reasons for guarding strictly against allowing the Storm Detachment of the National Socialist German Labour Party, to be organised on the lines of a defence league were as follows: On purely practical grounds it is impossible to build up a national defence organisation by means of private associations, unless the State makes an enormous contribution to it. Whoever thinks otherwise over-estimates his own powers. Now, it is entirely out of the question to form organisations of any military value for a definite purpose on the principle of so-called ‘voluntary discipline.’ Here the chief support for, the enforcement of orders, namely, the power to inflict punishment, is lacking. In the autumn, or rather in the spring, of 1919 it was still possible to raise so-calledFreikorps, not only because most of the men who came forward at that time had been through the school of the old Army, but also because the kind of duty imposed there constrained the individual to absolute obedience, at least for a definite period of time. That spirit is entirely lacking in the volunteer defence organisations of to-day. The larger the defence league grows, the weaker its discipline becomes and so much less can be demanded of the individual members. Thus, the whole organisation will assume more and more the character of the old non-political associations of ex-servicemen and veterans.
606
To attempt to instruct in military duties a large number of men who have volunteered to undergo such training, is impossible without the backing of absolute power to issue commands. There will always be very few men who will voluntarily and spontaneously submit to that kind of discipline which is considered natural and necessary in the Army. Moreover, a proper system of military training cannot be developed where the funds available are as ridiculously scanty as those at the disposal of the defence leagues. The principal task of such an institution must be to impart the best and most reliable kind of instruction. Eight years have passed since the end of the War, and during that time none of our German youth, at an age when formerly they would have had to do military service, have received any systematic training at all. The aim of a defence league cannot be to enlist all those who have already received a military training, since in that case it could be reckoned with mathematical accuracy when the last member would leave the league. Even the youngest soldier of 1918 will not be fit for front-line service twenty years later, and we are approaching that state of affairs with a rapidity that gives cause for anxiety. Thus the defence leagues must assume more and more the aspect of the old ex-service men’s association, but that cannot be the meaning and purpose of an institution which calls itself, not an association of ex-service men but a defence league. By that title it considers its task to be to preserve the tradition of the old soldiers and hold them together, to propagate the idea of national defence, and be able to put this idea into practice—which means the creation of a body of men who are fit and trained for military defence. In order to fulfil this condition, it is, however, necessary that those elements receive a military training which up to now have received none. This is something that, in practice, is impossible for the defence leagues to accomplish. Real soldiers cannot be made by training men for one or two hours per week.
607
In view of the enormously increasing demands which modern warfare imposes on each individual soldier to-day a military service of two years is barely sufficient to transform a raw recruit into a trained soldier. At the front during the War we all saw the fearful consequences which our young recruits had to suffer from their lack of a thorough military training. Volunteer formations which had been drilled for fifteen to twenty weeks under iron discipline and shown unlimited self-sacrificing enthusiasm proved nevertheless to be no better than cannon-fodder at the front. Only when distributed among the ranks of the old and experienced soldiers did the young recruits, who had been trained for four to six months, become useful members of a regiment. Guided by the ‘old stagers,’ they adapted themselves gradually to their task. In the light of all this, how hopeless must be any attempt to create a body of fighting troops by a so-called training of one to two hours in the week, without any definite power to enforce commands and without sufficient means. It might be possible to give old soldiers a ‘refresher course’ of this kind, but raw recruits cannot be turned into useful soldiers in this way. How such a proceeding produces utterly worthless results may also be strikingly demonstrated by the fact that, while these so-called volunteer defence leagues, by dint of tremendous effort and after overcoming many difficulties, train, or attempt to train, a few thousand willing men (the others being beyond their reach) for national defence; the State, through its pacifist-cum-democratic education, perverts the natural instincts of millions of young men, poisons their logical sense of patriotism and gradually turns them into a herd of sheep who will patiently follow any arbitrary command. In the face of all this how ridiculous are all the attempts made by defence leagues to inculcate their ideas upon the minds of the German youth! Almost more important is the following consideration, which has always made me take up a stand against all attempts at a so-called military training on the basis of the volunteer associations.
608
Assuming that, in spite of all the difficulties just mentioned, a defence league were successful in training a certain number of Germans every year to be efficient soldiers, with regards to mental outlook, physical fitness and the expert handling of arms; the result must necessarily be null and void in a State whose whole tendency makes it look upon such a defensive organisation as undesirable and even intolerable—because such an organisation would be in complete contradiction to the secret aims of the political leaders, who are the corruptors of this State. Such a result would, in any case, be worthless under governments which have demonstrated by their own acts that they do not attach the slightest importance to the military power of the nation and are not disposed to have recourse to that power unless for the preservation of their own existence on earth. That is the state of affairs to-day. Is it not ridiculous to think of training some ten thousand men in the use of arms, and to carry on that training surreptitiously, when a few years previously the State, having shamefully sacrificed eight and a half million highly trained soldiers, not merely did not require their services any longer but, as a mark of gratitude for their faithful service, held them up to public contumely? Shall we train soldiers for a regime which besmirched and spat upon our most glorious soldiers, tore the medals and badges from their breasts, trampled on their flags and derided their achievements? Has the present regime taken one step towards restoring the honour of the old Army and making those who destroyed and outraged it answer for their deeds? Not in the least. On the contrary, the people I have just referred to may be seen enthroned in the highest governmental positions to-day, and yet it was said at Leipzig, ‘Right is might.’ Since, however, in our Republic to-day might is in the hands of the very men who started the Revolution, and since that Revolution represents a most despicable act of high treason against the nation yes the vilest act in German history—there can surely be no grounds for saying that the might of these men should be enhanced by the formation of a new young army. It is against all sound reason. The importance which this State attached, after the Revolution of 1918, to the reinforcement of its position from the military point of view is clearly and unmistakably demonstrated by its attitude towards the large self-defence organisations which existed at that period.
609
They were not unwelcome as long as they were of use for the protection of the miserable creatures who had come into power with the Revolution. As soon as the danger threatening these creatures seemed to be on the decrease, thanks to the gradual debasement of our people, and the existence of the defence leagues represented a national-political strengthening factor, they became superfluous and every effort was made to disarm them and suppress them wherever that was possible. History records but few examples of gratitude on the part of princes and only a patriot belonging to the new bourgeoisie would dream of counting on the gratitude of revolutionary incendiaries and assassins, who have enriched themselves by robbing the public and by betraying the nation. On examining the problem as to the wisdom of forming these defence leagues, I could not refrain from asking: ‘For whom shall I train these young men? For what purpose will they be employed and when are they to be called out?’ The answer to these questions provides the best rule for us to follow. If the present State should one day call upon trained troops of this kind it would never be for the purpose of defending the interests of the nation against the foreigner, but rather to protect the oppressors of the nation within the country against the danger of a general outbreak of wrath on the part of a nation which has been deceived and betrayed and whose interests have been bartered away. For this reason it was decided that the Storm Detachment of the National Socialist German Labour Party ought not to be in the nature of a military organisation. It had to be an instrument of protection and education for the National Socialist Movement and its duties lay in quite a different sphere to those of the military defence association. Moreover, the Storm Detachment was not to be in the nature of a secret organisation. Secret organisations are established only for purposes that are illegal, and the purpose of such an organisation is limited by its very nature.
610
Considering the loquacious propensities of the German people, it is not possible to build up any vast organisation, at the same time keeping it secret or disguising its purpose. Every attempt of that kind is destined to turn out absolutely futile. It is not merely that our political officials to-day have at their disposal a staff of informers and other such rabble who are ready to play traitor, like Judas, for thirty pieces of silver and will betray whatever secrets they can discover and will invent what they do not know, for the sake of having something to reveal, but one’s own followers cannot be relied upon to maintain the silence necessary in such circumstances. Only small groups can become really secret societies, and that only after long years of selective elimination, but the very smallness of such groups would deprive them of all value for the National Socialist Movement. What we needed then, and need now, is not one or two hundred daredevil conspirators, but hundreds of thousands of devoted champions of ourWeltanschauung. The work must not be done through secret conventicles, but through impressive mass demonstrations in public. Dagger and pistol and poison-vial cannot clear the way for the progress of the Movement; that can be done only by winning over the man in the street. We must teach the Marxists that, in future, National Socialism will be master of the street, just as it will one day become master of the State. There is another danger connected with secret societies, It lies in the fact that their members often completely misunderstand the greatness of the task in hand and are apt to believe that the destiny of the nation can be assured overnight by the assassination of a, single man. Such a belief may find historical justification in cases where a nation had been suffering under the tyranny of some oppressor who at the same time was a man of genius and whose extraordinary personality was the sole guarantee for the continuance and frightfulness of his terrible oppression. In such cases a man may suddenly arise from the ranks of the people who is ready to sacrifice himself and plunge his deadly steel into the heart of the hated individual.
611
In order to look upon such a deed with horror one must have the republican mentality of petty rogues conscious of their own crime, but Schiller, the greatest poet-champion of liberty that the German people have ever had, has glorified such a deed in his ‘Wilhelm Tell.’ During 1919 and 1920 there was a danger that the members of secret organisations, under the influence of great historical examples and overcome by the immensity of the nations misfortunes, might attempt to wreak vengeance on the destroyers of their country, in the belief that this would end the miseries of the people. All such attempts were sheer folly, by reason of the fact that the Marxist triumph was not due to the superior genius of one remarkable person, but rather to immeasurable incompetence and cowardly shirking on the part of the bourgeoisie. The hardest criticism that can be uttered against our bourgeoisie is simply to state the fact that it submitted to the Revolution, even though the Revolution did not produce one single man of outstanding worth. One can, after all, understand how it was possible to capitulate to a Robespierre, a Danton, or a Marat; but it was utterly scandalous to go down on all fours before the withered Scheidemann, the obese Herr Erzberger, Friedrich Ebert, and the innumerable other political pygmies of the Revolution. There was not a single man of parts in whom one could see the revolutionary man of genius. Therein lay the country’s misfortune, for they were only revolutionary Spartacist vermin wholesale and retail. To put one of them out of the way was of little avail, as the only result was that another pair of blood-suckers, equally fat and thirsty, was ready to take his place. During those years we had to take up a determined stand against an attitude which had its origin and justification in genuinely great historical phenomena, but which did not, in the least, suit our present pigmy age. The same holds good in cases where it is a question of ‘bumping’ a so-called traitor to his country. It would be ridiculous and illogical to shoot a poor wretch who had betrayed the position of a gun to the enemy while the highest positions in the government are occupied by a rabble who bartered away a whole empire, who have on their consciences the deaths of two million men who were sacrificed in vain, fellows who were responsible for the millions maimed in the war, but who, nevertheless, continue unperturbed to ‘make a good thing’ out of the republican regime without allowing their conscience to be disturbed in any way.
612
It would be absurd to do away with small traitors in a State whose government absolves traitors on a large scale from all punishment. For it might easily happen that one day an honest idealist, who, out of love for his country, had removed some miserable informer who had betrayed the whereabouts of secret stores of arms was called upon to answer for his act before the chief traitors of the country. There is yet another important question, namely, is some petty traitorous wretch to meet death at the bands of another petty traitor, or of an idealist? In the former case the result would be doubtful and the deed would almost surely be revealed later on. In the second case an unworthy rascal is put out of the way, but the life of an idealist who may be irreplaceable is placed in jeopardy. For my own part, I believe that small thieves should not be hanged while big thieves are allowed go free. One day a national tribunal will have to judge and sentence some tens of thousands of organisers who were responsible for the criminal November betrayal and all the consequences that followed on it. Such an example will teach the necessary lesson, once, and for ever, to such as those paltry traitors who revealed to the enemy the places where arms were hidden. On the grounds of these considerations I steadfastly forbade all participation in secret societies, and I took care that the Storm Detachment should not assume such a character. During those years I prevented the National Socialist Movement from making experiments such as were being undertaken by young Germans who were, for the most part, inspired by a sublime idealism, but who became the victims of their own actions, without being able to ameliorate the lot of their Fatherland in the slightest degree. If, then, the Storm Detachment must not be either a military defence organisation or a secret society, we arrive at the following conclusion:
613
Firstly, its training must not be organised from the military standpoint, but from the point of view of what is most practical for party purposes. In so far as the members have to undergo a thorough physical training, attention must not be focussed mainly on military drill, but rather on the practice of sports. I have always considered boxing and ju-jitsu more important than training in rifle shooting, which, if inadequate, is definitely bad. If the German nation were presented with a body of six million young men who had been perfectly trained in athletic sports, who were imbued with an ardent love of their country and were ready to take the initiative in a fight, then the nationalist State could make an army out of that body within less than two years, if necessary, provided the cadres already existed. The situation being what it is to-day, the cadres would be furnished only by the Reichswehr, and not by a defence league that was neither one thing nor the other. Physical fitness must develop in the individual a conviction of his superiority and give him that confidence which is always based only on the consciousness of one’s own prowess. It must also develop that athletic agility which can be employed as a defensive weapon in the service of the Movement. Secondly, in order to safeguard the Storm Detachment against acquiring a secret character, the uniform must not only be such that it can immediately be recognised by everybody, but the large number of its members must serve as an indication of a course of action which is of advantage to the Movement and is known to the general public. The members of the Storm Detachment must not hold secret gatherings, but must march in the open and thus be employed in a manner which will put an end to all legends about a secret organisation in order to prevent them from finding an outlet for their mental energies in small conspiracies. We had from the very beginning to inculcate upon their minds the great idea behind the Movement and to educate them so thoroughly in the task of defending this idea that their horizon became enlarged and the individual no longer considered it his mission to ‘remove’some rascal or other, whether big or small, but to devote himself entirely to the task of bringing about the establishment of a new National SocialistvölkischState.
614
In this way the struggle against the present State was placed on a higher plane than that of petty revenge and small conspiracies. It was elevated to the level of a spiritual struggle on behalf of aWeltanschauung, for the destruction of Marxism in all its shapes and forms. Thirdly, the form of organisation adopted for the Storm Detachment, as well as its uniform and equipment, had to be on a different model from those of the old Army. They had to be specially adapted to the task that was assigned to the Storm Detachment. These were the ideas I followed out in 1920 and 1921. I endeavoured to instil them gradually into the members of the young organisation, with the result that by the midsummer of 1922 we had a goodly number of formations each consisting of a hundred men. By the late autumn of that year these formations received their distinctive uniforms. There were three events which turned out to be of supreme importance for the subsequent development of the Storm Detachment. The first was the great mass demonstration against the Law for the Protection of the Republic held in the late summer of 1922 in the Konigsplatz in Munich. The patriotic associations of Munich had announced the holding of a gigantic mass demonstration as a protest against the introduction of the Law for the Protection of the Republic. The National Socialist Movement also participated. Our Party marched into the Square, in serried ranks, led by six Munich Storm Detachment units followed by the political sections of the Party. Two bands marched with us and about fifteen banners were carried. When the National Socialists arrived at the great square it was already half full, but no banners were displayed. Our arrival aroused unbounded enthusiasm. I myself had the honour of being one of the speakers who addressed that crowd of about sixty thousand people.
615
The demonstration was an overwhelming success, especially because it was proved for the first time that nationalist Munich could march through the streets, in spite of all threats from the Reds. Members of the organisation for the defence of the Red Republic endeavoured to hinder the marching columns by their terrorist activities, but they were scattered by the companies of the Storm Detachment within a few minutes and sent packing. The National Socialist Movement then showed for the first time that in future it was determined to exercise its right to march through the streets and thus deprive the international traitors and enemies of the country of their monopoly of this privilege. The events of that, day provided incontestable proof that our views on the creation of the Storm Detachment were right, both from the psychological standpoint and from the point of view of organisation. The principle having thus been proved correct we pushed on with the establishment of Storm Detachment units so that within a few weeks the number of Munich units was doubled. The second event was the expedition to Coburg in October 1922. Certain so-calledvölkischsocieties had decided to hold a German Rally at Coburg. I was invited to take part, with the intimation that they wished me to bring a following along. This invitation, which I received at eleven o’clock in the morning, arrived just in time. Within an hour the arrangements for our participation in the German Rally were completed. I picked eight hundred men of the Storm Detachment to accompany me. These were divided into about fourteen companies and were to be conveyed by special train from Munich to Coburg, which had become a part of Bavaria. Corresponding orders were given to other groups of the National Socialist Storm Detachment which had meanwhile been formed in various other localities. This was the first time that a special train for us was run in Germany. At all the places where the new units of the Storm Detachment joined us, our train caused a sensation.
616
Many of the people had never seen our banner and it created a very great impression. When we arrived at the station in Coburg we were received by a deputation of the organising committee of the German Rally. They announced that by order of the local trade-unions—that is to say, the Independent and Communist Parties—it had been ‘arranged’ that we should not enter the town with our banners unfurled and our band playing (we had a hand consisting of forty-two musicians with us) and that we should not march in formation. I immediately rejected these undignified conditions and did not fail to declare to the gentlemen who had arranged this ‘rally’ how astonished I was at the idea of their negotiating with such people and coming to an arrangement with them. Then I announced that the Storm Troops would immediately march into the town in company formation, with flags flying and band playing—which we proceeded to do forthwith. As we emerged in to the station square we were met by a hissing, yelling mob of several thousands, which greeted us with shouts of: ‘Assassins!’ ‘Bandits!’ ‘Robbers!’ ‘Criminals!’ These were the choice names which these exemplary founders of the German Republic showered on us. The young Storm Detachment gave a fine exhibition of discipline. The companies fell into formation in the square in front of the station and at first took no notice of the insults hurled at them by the mob. The police were anxious. They did not pilot us to the quarters assigned to us on the outskirts of Coburg, a city quite unknown to us, but to the Hofbräuhaus-Keller in the centre of the town. To right and left of us as we marched the tumult raised by the accompanying mob steadily increased. Scarcely had the last company entered the courtyard of the Hofbräuhaus when the huge mob made a rush to get in after them, shouting madly. In order to prevent this, the police locked the gates. Seeing that the position was untenable I called the Storm Detachment to attention spoke a few words to them and then asked the police to open the gates immediately.
617
After a good deal of hesitation; they consented. We now marched back along the same route by which we had come, in the direction of our quarters and there we had to make a stand against the crowd. As their cries and yells all along the route had failed to disturb the equanimity of our companies, the champions of true Socialism, Equality, and Fraternity, now took to throwing stones. That brought our patience to an end. For ten minutes blows fell right and left, like a devastating shower of hail. Fifteen minutes later there were no Reds to be seen in the street. After nightfall serious clashes occurred. Patrols of the Storm Detachment had discovered National Socialists who had been attacked singly and were in a dangerous condition. Thereupon we made short work of the opponents. By the following morning the Red Terror, under which Coburg had been suffering for years, was definitely broken. With typical Marxist and Jewish mendacity, an attempt was made by the distribution of leaflets to passers-by in the street to incite the ‘comrades of the International Proletariat’ to demonstrate, once more in the public streets. Completely distorting the facts, they declared that our ‘bands of assassins’ had commenced ‘a war of extermination against the peaceful workers of Coburg.’ At half-past one that day there was to be a ‘great popular demonstration,’ at which it was hoped that thousands of workers from the whole district would turn up. I was determined finally to crush this Red Terror and so I summoned the Storm Detachment to meet at midday. Their number had now increased to fifteen hundred. I decided to march with these men to the Coburg citadel and to cross the big square where the Red demonstration was to take place.
618
I wanted to see if they would attempt to assault us again. When we entered the square we found that, instead of the thousands that had been advertised, there were only a few hundred people present. As we approached, they remained silent for the most part, and some ran away. Only at certain points along the route some bodies, of Reds, who had arrived from outside the city and had not yet come to know us, attempted to start a row, but they were soon put to flight. We could now observe how the town’s people, who had for such a long time been so thoroughly intimidated, slowly woke up and recovered their courage. They welcomed us openly, and in the evening, on our return march, spontaneous cheering broke out at several points along the route. At the station the railway officials informed us all of a sudden that our train would not depart. Thereupon I had some of the ringleaders told that if this were the case I would arrest all the Red Party heroes on whom we could lay our hands, that we would drive the train ourselves, but that we would take away with us, in the locomotive, on the tender and in every carriage, a few dozen disciples of international solidarity. I did not omit to let these gentry know that if we had to drive the train, the journey would undoubtedly be a very risky adventure and that we might all break our necks. It would be a consolation, however, to know that we should not go to Eternity alone, but in equality and fraternity with the Red gentry. Thereupon the train departed punctually and we arrived next morning safe and sound in Munich. Thus at Coburg, for the first time since 1914, the equality of all citizens was re-established in the eye of the law, for even if some coxcomb of a higher official should presume to assert to-day that the State protects the lives of its citizens, in those days at least it was not so. At that time the citizens had to defend themselves against the representatives of the present State. At first it was not possible fully to estimate the importance of the consequences of that day. The victorious Storm Troops had their confidence in themselves considerably reinforced and also their faith in the sagacity of their leaders.
619
Our contemporaries began to pay us special attention and for the first time many recognised in the National Socialist Movement an institution which was in all probability destined to bring the Marxist folly to an end. Only the democrats lamented the fact that we had not had the complaisance to allow our skulls to be cracked and that, in a democratic Republic, we had dared to reply to a brutal assault with fisticuffs and cudgels rather than with pacifist chants. The bourgeois press as a whole adopted, as usual, an attitude that was partly lachrymose and partly mean. Only a few decent newspapers expressed their satisfaction that in one locality at least, the Marxist street-bullies had been effectively dealt with. In Coburg itself, at least a section of the Marxist workers who must be looked upon as misled, learned from the blows of National Socialist fists that they too, were workers fighting for ideals, because experience teaches that the human being fights only for something in which he believes and which he loves. The Storm Detachment itself benefited most from the Coburg expedition. It grew so quickly in numbers that at the Party Congress in January 1923, six thousand men participated in the ceremony of consecrating the flags and the first companies appeared for the first time in the glory of their new uniform. Our experience at Coburg proved how essential it was to introduce one distinctive uniform for the Storm Detachment, not only for the purpose of strengthening itsesprit de corps, but also to avoid confusion and the danger of not recognising the opponent in a fight. Up to that time they had merely been distinguished by the armlet, but now the tunic and the well-known cap were added. The experience gained at Coburg had also another important result. We now determined to break the Red Terror in all those localities in which it had for many years prevented men of other views from holding meetings. We were determined to restore the right of free assembly. From that time onward we brought our battalions together in such places and little by little the Red citadels of Bavaria fell one after another before tie National Socialist propaganda. The Storm Troops became more and more adept at their task.
620
Gradually, they placed an increasingly wide gulf between themselves and the aimless defence movements and established themselves as an active militant organisation, fighting for the establishment of a new German State. This logical development continued until March 1923. Then an event occurred which made me divert the Movement from the course hitherto followed and introduce certain fundamental formations. The third event was that in the first months of 1923 the French occupied the Ruhr district. The consequence of this was of great importance in the development of the Storm Detachment. It is no yet possible, nor would it be in the interests of the nation, to write or speak openly and freely on the subject. I shall speak of it only in so far as the matter has been dealt with in public discussions and thus brought to the knowledge of everybody. The occupation of the Ruhr district, which did not come as a surprise to us, gave grounds for hoping that Germany would at last abandon her cowardly policy of submission and thereby give the defence leagues a definite task to fulfil. The Storm Detachment, which now numbered several thousand vigorous young men, would also have participated in this national service. During the spring and summer of 1923 it was transformed into a fighting military organisation. It is to this reorganisation that we must in great part attribute the later developments that took place during 1923, in so far as these affected our Movement. Elsewhere I shall deal in broad outline with the events of 1923. Here I wish only to state that the transformation of the Storm Detachment at that time was detrimental to the interests of the Movement, since the condition (namely, the adoption of a policy of active resistance against France) which had led to the change, was never realised. The events which took place at the close of 1923, terrible as they may appear at first sight, were almost a necessity if looked at from a higher standpoint; because in view of the attitude taken by the Government of the German Reich, the conversion of the Storm Troops into a military force became meaningless and thus a transformation which would have proved harmful to the Movement was stopped forthwith. Thereby it was made possible for us to set about the task of reconstruction at the point at which we had been diverted from our proper course.
621
In the year 1925 the National Socialist German Labour Party was refounded and had to organise and train its Storm Detachment once again according to the principles I had laid down. It must revert, to its original sound views and must once more consider as its most essential function the establishment of its Storm Detachments as an instrument of defence and strength in the Movement’s struggle to establish itsWeltanschauungand once more it must consider it as its most essential task to function as the instrument of defence and reinforcement in the spiritual struggle to establish the ideals of the Movement. The Storm Detachment must not be allowed to sink to the level of something in the nature of a defence league or a secret society. Steps must rather be taken to make it a force one hundred thousand strong to act as champion of the National Socialist, and thus of the genuinelyvölkischideal.
622
623
624
In the winter of 1919, and still more in the spring and summer of 1920, the young Party felt bound to take up a definite stand on a question which had already become serious during the War. In the first volume of this book I have briefly recorded certain facts which I had personally witnessed, and which foreboded the break-up of Germany. In describing these facts I made reference to the special nature of the Propaganda which was directed by the English as well as by the French towards reopening the breach that had existed between North and South in Germany. In the spring of 1915 there appeared the first of a series of leaflets, the aim of which was to arouse feeling against Prussia as being solely responsible for the War. By 1916 this kind of propaganda had been developed and perfected in a mariner that was as cunning as it was poisonous. Appealing to the basest of human instincts, this propaganda endeavoured to arouse the wrath of the South Germans against the North Germans and after a short time it bore fruit. Persons who were then in high positions in the Government and in the Army, especially those attached to the headquarters of the Bavarian divisions, merited the just reproof of having blindly neglected their duty and failed to take the necessary definite steps to counter such propaganda, but nothing was done. On the contrary, it did not appear to be wholly unwelcome in some quarters and probably they were short-sighted enough to think that such propaganda would not only put an end to the movement towards unification in Germany, but that it might even automatically serve to strengthen the federative states. Scarcely ever in the course of history has such wicked neglect called down a more severe retribution.
625
The weakening of Prussia, which, it was hoped, would result from this propaganda, affected the whole of Germany. It served to hasten the collapse which not only wrecked Germany as a whole, but primarily the federal states. The Revolution first broke out in the city in which the artificially created hatred against Prussia raged most violently and, as elsewhere, it took the form of revolt against the reigning House. It would be a mistake to think that the enemy propaganda was exclusively responsible for creating an anti-Prussian feeling and that there was no excuse for the people for having listened to this propaganda. The incredible fashion in which our national economy was administered during the War through an absolutely crazy system of centralisation by means of which the whole Reich territory was brought under its control and exploited, furnished the principal grounds for the growth of anti-Prussian feeling. The average citizen looked upon the companies formed for the collection and distribution of war-time supplies, all of which had their headquarters in Berlin, as identical with Berlin, and Berlin itself as identical with Prussia. The average citizen did not realise that the organisation of these robber companies, which were called war-companies, was not in the hands of either Berlin or Prussia or even in German hands at all. People recognised only the gross irregularities and the continual encroachments perpetrated by that hated institution in the metropolis of the Reich and directed their anger against Berlin and Prussia, all the more because in certain quarters nothing was done to correct this attitude, but it was even welcomed with silent satisfaction. The Jew was far too shrewd not to understand that the infamous campaign which he had organised, under the disguise of war-companies, for plundering the German nation must eventually arouse opposition. As long as that opposition was not directed against himself he had no reason to be afraid. Hence he decided that the best way of forestalling an outbreak of hatred against himself on the part of the enraged and desperate masses was to direct their wrath against someone else and thus to allow it to burn itself out. Let Bavaria quarrel as much as it liked with Prussia and Prussia with Bavaria! The more bitter the strife between the two states, the greater the security of the Jew.
626
Thus public attention was completely diverted from the international maggot in the body of the nation; indeed it seemed to have been forgotten. Then when there appeared to be a danger that level-headed people, of whom there were many even in Bavaria, called for reflection and the exercise of restraint, thus calming the rage against Prussia, so that the bitter struggle threatened to peter out, all the Jew in Berlin had to do was to stage a fresh provocation and await results. Immediately all those profiting by the conflict between North and South hailed such an incident with delight and again fanned the flame of indignation until it became a blaze. It was a shrewd and expert manoeuvre on the part of the Jew, to set the different branches of the German people quarrelling among themselves, so that their attention was turned away from himself and he could exploit them all the more completely. Then came the Revolution. Until the year 1918, or rather until the November of that year, the average German citizen, particularly the less educated lower middle classes and the workers, did not rightly understand what was happening and did not realise what must be the inevitable consequences, especially for Bavaria, of this internecine strife between the various branches of the German people. Those sections of the people who called themselves ‘national’ ought to have clearly perceived these consequences on the day on which the Revolution broke out, for the moment thecoup d’etathad succeeded, the leader and organiser of the Revolution came forward in Bavaria as the defender of ‘Bavarian’ interests. The international Jew Kurt Eisner, began to play off Bavaria against Prussia. This Oriental was the last person in the world fitted to defend the interests of Bavaria, since in following his profession as a newspaper reporter, he had wandered from place to place all over Germany, and of all the world, Bavaria was the place which interested him least. In deliberately giving the revolutionary rising in Bavaria the character of an offensive against the rest of the Reich, Kurt Eisner was not by any means acting from the standpoint of Bavarian interests, but merely as the authorised representative of Jewry.
627
He exploited existing instincts and antipathies in Bavaria as a means of facilitating the dismemberment of Germany. Once dismembered, the Reich would fall an easy prey to Bolshevism. The tactics employed by him were continued for a time after his death. The Marxists, who had always derided the individual German states and their princes, now suddenly appealed, as an ‘Independent Party’, to those sentiments and instincts which had their strongest roots in the houses of the reigning princes and in the individual states. The fight waged by the Bavarian Soviet Republic against the military contingents that were sent to free Bavaria from its grasp was represented by the Marxist propagandists as being primarily the Bavarian workers’struggle’ against ‘Prussian militarism.’ This explains why it was that the Soviet Republic in Munich did not have the same effect there as in the other German districts. Instead of recalling the masses to a sense of reason, it led to increased bitterness and anger against Prussia. The art of the Bolshevist agitators, in representing the suppression of the Bavarian Soviet Republic as a victory of ‘Prussian militarism’ over the ‘anti-militarist’ and ‘anti-Prussian’ people of Bavaria, bore rich fruit. Whereas at the elections for the Bavarian Legislative Diet in Munich, Kurt Eisner did not have ten thousand followers and the Communist Party less than three thousand, after the fall of the Bavarian Republic, the two parties together could reckon on nearly one hundred thousand voting in their favour. It was at this time that I began my own struggle against the folly of inciting one branch of the German people against the other. I believe that never in my life did I undertake a more unpopular task than I did when I took my stand against the anti-Prussian agitation. During the Soviet regime in Munich great public meetings were held at which hatred against the rest of Germany, but particularly against Prussia, was roused to such a pitch that a North German would have risked his life in attending one of those meetings. These meetings often ended in wild shouts of ‘Away from Prussia,’ Down with Prussia,’ ‘War against Prussia,’ and so on. This feeling was openly expressed in the Reichstag by a particularly brilliant defender of Bavarian sovereign rights, when he said: ‘Rather let us die Bavarians than rot as Prussians.’
628
Only those who attended some of the meetings held at that time can realise what it implied for me personally, when, for the first time and surrounded by only a handful of friends, I raised my voice against this folly at a meeting held in the Münchener Lowenbrau-Keller. My war comrades stood by me then. It is easy to imagine how we felt when we were howled at and threatened by a raging crowd, which was beyond all control and composed of men who, while we had been defending our country, had for the most part been deserters and shirkers skulking in billets behind the lines or at home. It is true that such episodes turned out to be of advantage to me. My small band of comrades felt for the first time absolutely united with me and readily swore to stand by me to the death. These clashes, which were constantly repeated throughout the year 1919, seemed to become more violent soon after the beginning of 1921. There were meetings I remember especially one in the Wagnersaal in the Sonnenstrasse in Munich, during the course of which my group, now grown much larger, had to defend itself against assaults of the most violent character. It happened more than once that dozens of my followers were manhandled, thrown to the floor and stamped upon by the attackers and were finally thrown out of the hall more dead than alive. The struggle upon which I had embarked, first on my own, and supported only by my war-comrades, was now continued by the young Movement, I might say almost as a sacred mission. I am proud of being able to say to-day that we-depending almost exclusively on our followers in Bavaria-were responsible for putting an end, slowly but surely, to the coalition of folly and treason. I say ‘folly and treason’ because, although convinced that the masses who joined in it meant well but were stupid, I cannot consider such simplicity as an extenuating circumstance in the case of the organisers and their abettors. I looked upon them then, and still look upon them to-day, as traitors in the pay of France. In one case, that of Dorten, history has already pronounced judgment.
629
The situation became specially dangerous at that time by reason of the fact that they were very astute in their ability to cloak their real tendencies, by insisting primarily on their federative intentions and claiming that these were the sole motives for their actions. Of course, it is quite obvious that the agitation against Prussia had nothing to do with federalism. Surely ‘federal activities’ is not the phrase with which to describe an effort to dissolve and dismember another federal state, for an honest federalist (in whom it is not hypocrisy to quote the formula used by Bismarck to define his idea of the Reich) could not in the same breath express the desire to cut off portions of the Prussian State, which was created or at least completed by Bismarck, nor could he publicly support such a separatist attempt. What an outcry would have been raised in Munich if some Prussian conservative party had declared itself in favour of detaching Franconia from Bavaria, or had publicly demanded or taken steps to promote such a separatist policy. Nevertheless, one cannot but feel sympathy for the genuine federalists who did not see through this infamous swindle, for they were its principal victims. By distorting the federalist idea in such a way, its own champions prepared its grave. One cannot make propaganda for a federal form of government within the Reich by debasing, abusing and besmirching the essential element of such a political structure, namely Prussia, and thus making such a state impossible as a member of the federation. It is all the more, incredible by reason of the fact that the fight carried on by those so-called federalists was directed against that section of the Prussian people which was the last that could be regarded as being connected with the November democracy. For the abuse and attacks of these so-called federalists were not levelled against the authors of the Weimar Constitution—the majority of whom were South Germans or Jews—but against those who represented the old conservative Prussia, which was the antithesis of the Weimar Constitution. The fact that those who directed this campaign were careful not to touch the Jews is not to be wondered at and perhaps gives the key to the whole riddle.
630
Before the Revolution, the Jew was successful in distracting attention from himself and his war-companies by inciting the masses, and especially the Bavarians, against Prussia; similarly, he felt obliged, after the Revolution, to find some way of camouflaging his new marauding campaign, the scope of which had increased tenfold. Again he succeeded, in this case by provoking the so-called ‘national’ elements in Germany against one another—the conservative Bavarians against the Prussians, who were just as conservative. He acted again with extreme cunning, inasmuch as he, who held the destiny of Germany in his hands, was behind acts of provocation so crude and tactless that the victims became incensed again and again—never against the Jew, but always against their own fellow-Germans. The Bavarian did not see the Berlin of four million industrious and efficient working people, but only the lazy and decadent Berlin which haunts the worst quarters of the West End, and yet antipathy was not directed against the West End of Berlin but against the ‘Prussian’ city. I was often driven to despair. The ability which the Jew displays in turning public attention away from himself and directing it elsewhere can be observed at the present time. In 1918 there was nothing like an organised anti-Semitic feeling. I still remember the difficulties we encountered the moment we mentioned the word Jew. We were either confronted with dumb-struck faces or else met with lively antagonism. The efforts we made at the time to point out to the public its real enemy seemed to be doomed to failure, but then things began to change for the better, though only very slowly. TheSchutz and Trutzbund(Watch and Ward League) was defectively organised, but at least it had the great merit of opening up the Jewish question once again. In the winter of 1918–1919 a kind of anti-Semitism slowly began to take root. Later on, the National Socialist Movement presented the Jewish problem in a new light.
631
Taking the question beyond the restricted circles of the upper classes and small bourgeoisie we succeeded in transforming it into the vital motive of a great popular movement, but the moment we were successful in placing this problem before the German people in the light of an idea that would unite them in one struggle, the Jew reacted. He resorted to his old tactics. With amazing alacrity lie, sowed the seeds of discord within thevölkischmovement itself and started a rift there. The raising of the ultramontane question and the resulting quarrels between Catholic and Protestant presented, under the conditions then prevailing, the only possibility of diverting public attention to other matters and staving off a concentrated attack upon the Jews. The men who dragged our people into this controversy can never make amends for the crime they then committed against the nation. Anyhow, the Jew has attained his ends. Catholics and Protestants are fighting one another to their heart’s content, while the enemy of Aryan humanity and of all Christendom is laughing up his sleeve. Just as it was once possible to occupy the attention of the public for several years with the struggle between federalism and unification, wearing out its energy in this mutual friction, while the Jew trafficked in the freedom of the nation and sold our country to the masters of international high finance—so in our day he has succeeded again, this time by raising strife between the two German religious denominations, while the foundations on which both rest are being eaten away and destroyed through the poison injected by international and cosmopolitan Jewry. Look at the injuries which our people are suffering daily as a result of being contaminated with Jewish blood. Bear in mind the fact that this poisonous contamination can be eliminated from the national body only after the lapse of centuries, if ever. Think further of how the process of racial degeneration is debasing and in some cases even destroying the fundamental Aryan qualities of our German people, so that our cultural creative ability as a nation is gradually decreasing and we are running the danger, at least in our great cities, of sinking to the level on which Southern Italy is to-day.
632
This pestilential adulteration of the blood, of which hundreds of thousands of our people take no account, is being systematically practised by the Jew to-day. Systematically these Swarthy parasites within our national body corrupt our innocent fair-haired girls and thus destroy something which can never be replaced in this world. The two Christian denominations look on with indifference at the profanation and destruction of a noble and unique creature who was given to the world as a gift of God’s grace. As regards the future of the world, it does not matter which of the two triumphs, the Catholic or the Protestant faith, but it does matter whether Aryan humanity survives or perishes. Yet the two Christian denominations are not contending against the destroyer of Aryan humanity, but are trying to destroy one another. It is the sacred duty, particularly of those who adopt a patriotic attitude, to see to it that within the framework of their own particular denomination, they do not render mere lip-service to God, but actually fulfil the Will of God and do not allow His handiwork to be debarred, for it was by the Will of God that man was created in a certain image and endowed with certain characteristics and certain faculties. Whoever destroys His work, wages war against God’s creation and God’s will. Therefore, everyone should endeavour, each in his own denomination, of course, and should consider it as his first and most solemn duty, to hinder any and every one whose conduct tends, either by word or deed, to overstep the limits of his own religious community and to raise a quarrel with those of another denomination. For, in view of the religious schism that exists in Germany, to attack the essential characteristics of one denomination must necessarily lead to a war of extermination between the two Christian denominations. There can be no comparison between our position and that of France, Spain or Italy. In those three countries one may, for instance, make propaganda for the side that is fighting against clericalism or ultramontanism, without thereby incurring the danger of a national rift among the French, Spanish or Italian people.
633
In Germany, however, that cannot be done, for here the Protestants would also take part in such a movement and thus the defence, which elsewhere only Catholics organise against clerical interference by their own prelates in political matters, would assume with us the character of a Protestant attack against Catholicism. What may be tolerated by the faithful belonging to one denomination even when it seems unjust to them, will at once be indignantly rejected and opposed ona priorigrounds if it should come from the militant leaders of another denomination. This is so true that even men who might be ready and willing to fight for the removal of manifest grievances within their own religious denomination will drop their own fight and turn their activities against the outsider, the moment the abolition of such grievances is counselled or demanded by one who is not of the same faith. They consider it unjustifiable, inadmissible and incorrect for outsiders to meddle in matters which do not concern them. Such attempts are not excusable even when they are inspired by a feeling for the supreme interests of the national community, because even in our day religious sentiment still has deeper roots than all feeling for political and national expediency. This cannot be changed by setting one denomination against another in bitter conflict. It can be changed only if, through a spirit of mutual tolerance, the nation can be assured of a future, the greatness of which will gradually operate as a conciliating factor in the sphere of religion also. I have no hesitation in saying with regard to those men who to-day seek to embroil thevölkischmovement in religious quarrels, that they are worse enemies of my country than any internationally-minded Communist. The National Socialist Movement has set itself the task of converting those Communists, but anyone who goes outside the ranks of his own movement and tends to divert it from the fulfilment of its mission, is acting in a manner that deserves the severest condemnation. He is acting as a champion of Jewish interests, whether consciously or unconsciously does not matter, for it is to the interest of the Jews to-day that the energies of thevölkischmovement should be frittered away in a religious conflict, because it is beginning to be dangerous for the Jews. I have purposely used the phrase about ‘frittering away’ the energies of the movement, because no one but he who is entirely ignorant of history could imagine that this movement can to-day solve a question which the greatest statesmen have tried for centuries to solve, and tried in vain.
634
Anyhow, the facts speak for themselves. The men who suddenly discovered in 1924, that the highest mission of thevölkischmovement was to fight ultramontanism, have not succeeded in smashing it, but they did succeed in splitting thevölkischmovement. I have to guard against some immature brain in thevölkischmovement thinking that it can accomplish what even a Bismarck failed to do. It will always be one of the first duties of those who are directing the National Socialist Movement to oppose unconditionally any attempt to place the National Socialist Movement at the service of such a conflict. Anybody who conducts propaganda with that end in view must be expelled forthwith from its ranks. As a matter of fact, we succeeded until the autumn of 1923 in keeping our Movement aloof from such controversies. The most devout Protestant could stand side by side with the most devout Catholic in our ranks, secure in the knowledge that his religious convictions would be respected. The bitter struggle which both waged in common against the wrecker of Aryan civilisation taught them mutual respect and esteem; and it was, moreover, just at that time that our Movement had to engage in a bitter strife with the Centre Party not on religious grounds, but on national, racial, political and economic issues. The success we then achieved showed that we were right, and it speaks against those who to-day think they know better. In recent years things have gone so far thatvölkischcircles, in the godforsaken blindness of their religious strife, could not recognise the folly of their conduct even in the light of the fact that atheist Marxist newspapers advocated the cause of one religious denomination or the other, according as it suited them—so as to inculpate now the one party and now the other by the repetition of remarks which were often incredibly foolish, thus fanning the fire to keep the blaze at its highest. To a people like the Germans, whose history, has so often shown them capable of fighting for phantoms to the point of complete exhaustion, every slogan of this kind is a mortal danger.
635
By these slogans the attention of our people has too often been diverted from the real problems affecting their very existence. While we were exhausting our energies in religious wars, other countries were acquiring their share of the world, and while thevölkischmovement is debating with itself whether the ultramontane danger be greater than the Jewish, or vice versa, the Jew is destroying the racial basis of our existence and thereby annihilating our people. As regards that kind ofvölkischchampion, I pray with all my heart on behalf of the National Socialist Movement and therefore of the German people, ‘Lord, preserve us from such friends, that we can more easily deal with our enemies.’ The controversy over federation and unification, so cunningly propagated by the Jews in 1919–1920 and thereafter, forced National Socialism, which repudiated the quarrel, to take up a definite attitude in relation to the essential problems bound up with it. Ought Germany to be a federated or a united State? What is the practical significance of these terms? To me it seems that the second question is more important than the first, because it is fundamental to the understanding of the whole problem and also because the answer to it may help to clear up confusion and therefore have a conciliating effect. What is a federation of states? By a federation of states we mean a union of sovereign states which, of their own free will, and by virtue of their sovereignty come together and create a collective unit, ceding to that unit as much of their own sovereign rights as will render the existence of the union possible and will guarantee it. The theoretical formula is not put wholly into practice by any federation of states that exists to-day, least of all by the American Union, where it is impossible to speak of original sovereignty in regard to the majority of the states.
636
Many of them were not included in the federal complex until long after it had been established. The states that make up the American Union are mostly in the nature of greater or smaller territories, limited for technical administrative purposes, their boundaries having in many cases been fixed in the mapping office. Originally, these states did not and could not possess sovereign rights of their own, since they did not combine to form the Union, but it was, on the contrary, the Union which created a number of these so-called states. Therefore the sovereign rights, often very comprehensive, which were left, or rather granted, to the various territories, correspond not only to the whole character of the Confederation, but also to its vast area, which is almost equivalent to the size of a continent. Consequently, in speaking of the United States of America one must not consider them as sovereign states, but as states enjoying certain rights, or perhaps one ought to say powers, which have been granted to them and guaranteed under the constitution. Nor does our definition adequately express the condition of affairs in Germany, although it is true that in Germany the individual states existed as states before the Reich and that the Reich was formed from them. The Reich, however, was not formed by the voluntary and equal co-operation of the individual states, but rather because the state of Prussia gradually acquired a position of hegemony over the others. The difference in territorial area alone precludes any comparison between the German states and the American Union. The great difference in territorial area between the very small German states which then existed and the larger, and, in a still more pronounced degree, the largest, demonstrates the inequality of their achievements and shows that they could not have played an equal part in founding the Reich and in shaping the federal Empire. In the case of most of these individual states it cannot be maintained that they ever enjoyed real sovereignty, unless we choose to regard the phrase ‘sovereign state’ as being merely an official designation. As a matter of fact, not only developments in the past, but also in our own time wiped out several of these so-called ‘sovereign states’ and thus proved in the most definite way how frail these structures were.
637
I cannot deal here with the historical question of how these individual states came to be established, but I must call attention to the fact that hardly in any case did their frontiers coincide with the ancestral tribal frontiers of their inhabitants. They were purely political phenomena which for the most part emerged during the darkest period in the history of the German Empire and they represented both cause and effect in that, process of exhaustion and partition of our Fatherland. The constitution of the old Reich took all this into account, at least to a certain degree, in so far as the individual states were not accorded equal representation in the Federal Council, but a representation proportionate to their respective areas, their actual importance and the role which they played in the formation of the Reich. Only in very few cases can it be asserted that the sovereign rights which the individual states renounced in order to render possible the foundation of the Reich were ceded voluntarily, since, for the most part, they did not exist in reality. In other instances they were simply done away with under the pressure exerted by the more powerful Prussia. The principle followed by Bismarck was not, to give to the Reich what he could take from the individual states, but to demand from the individual states only what was absolutely necessary for the Reich. A moderate and wise policy! On the one, hand, Bismarck showed the greatest regard for customs and traditions; on the other hand his policy secured for the new Reich, from its foundation onwards, a great measure of love and willing co-operation. It would, however, be a fundamental error to attribute Bismarck’s decision to any conviction on his part that the Reich had thus acquired such rights of sovereignty as would suffice for all time. That was far from being Bismarck’s idea. On the contrary, he wished to leave it to the future to settle what would be difficult to carry through at the moment and might not have been readily agreed to by the individual states. He trusted to the levelling effect of time and to the pressure exercised by the process of evolution, the steady action of which appeared to him more effective than an attempt to break the resistance which the individual states offered at the moment.
638
By adopting this policy, he showed his mastery of the art of statesmanship. As a matter of fact, the sovereignty of the Reich has continually increased at the cost of the sovereignty of the individual states. The passing of time has achieved what Bismarck hoped it would. The German collapse and the abolition of the monarchical form of government necessarily hastened this development. The German federal states, which had not been grounded on ethnological foundations, but arose rather out of political conditions, were bound to lose their importance the moment the monarchical form of government and the dynasties connected with it were abolished. For it was to the spirit inherent in these that the individual states owed their political origin and development. Thus deprived of their internal raison d’être, many of these petty states renounced all right to survival and were induced for purely practical reasons to fuse with their neighbours, or else they joined the more powerful states of their own free will. This proved in a striking manner low extraordinarily frail was the actual sovereignty these small states enjoyed, and it proved too, how lightly they were esteemed by their own citizens. Though the abolition of the monarchical regime and its representatives had dealt the federal character of the Reich a hard blow, still more destructive, from the federal point of view, was the acceptance of the obligations that resulted from the ‘peace’ treaty. It was only natural and logical that the federal states should lose all sovereign control over their finances, the moment the Reich, in consequence of a lost war, was subjected to financial obligations which could never have been met by means of individual agreements concluded with the individual states. The subsequent steps which led the Reich to take over the postal services and railways were the inevitable result of the enslavement of our people which had begun with the peace treaties. The Reich was forced to obtain sole possession of more and more resources, in order to be in a position to meet the obligations resulting from increased extortion.
639
The form in which the powers of the Reich were thus extended to embrace the federal states was often ridiculously stupid, but in itself the procedure was logical and natural. The blame for this must be laid at the door of those men and those parties that failed in the hour of need to concentrate all their energies in an effort to bring the War to a victorious issue. The guilt lies with those parties which, especially in Bavaria, catered for their own egotistic interests during the War, and refused to the Reich what the Reich had to requisition in a tenfold greater measure when the War was lost. The retribution of history! Rarely has the vengeance of Heaven followed so closely on the crime, as it did in this case. Those same parties which, a few years previously, placed the interests of their own states—especially in Bavaria—before those of the Reich, had now to look on passively while the pressure of events forced the Reich, in its own interests, to abolish the existence of the individual states. They were the victims of their own defaults. It is an unparalleled act of hypocrisy to complain to the electorate (for it is only to the electorate that our contemporary parties address their propaganda) of the loss suffered by the individual states in being deprived of certain of their sovereign powers, while, at the same time, these self-same parties vied with each other in pursuing a policy of favouring the fulfilment of the Versailles obligations—a policy of which the final outcome will be a profound alteration in the internal structure of the Reich. Bismarck’s Reich was free and unhampered by any obligations towards the outside world. Bismarck’s Reich never had to shoulder such heavy and entirely unproductive obligations as those imposed on Germany under the Dawes Plan. Even at home the authority of Bismarck’s Reich was confined to dealing with only a few absolutely essential matters. It was, therefore, possible for the Reich to dispense with the necessity for financial control over the federal states and to live on their contributions. It goes without saying that, on the one hand, the preservation of certain of their sovereign rights and, on the other, the relatively small financial tribute which the federal states had to pay to the Reich induced them to welcome its existence.
640
But it is untrue and unfair to state now, as certain propagandists do that the federal states were antagonistic to the Reich merely because of their financial subjection to it. That is not the true state of affairs. The lack of sympathy for the political idea embodied in the Reich is not due to the loss of sovereign rights on the part of the individual states. It is much more the result of the deplorable fashion in which the present regime acts as the representative of the German people. Despite all the celebrations in honour of the national flag and the constitution, the present Reich has failed to arouse the enthusiasm of any section of the people and the Law for the Protection of the Republic may prevent outrages against republican institutions, but it will not gain the devotion of one single German. The excessive care displayed by the Republic in attempting to protect itself against its own citizens by means of laws and sentences of imprisonment, constitutes the most damning and most humiliating criticism of all republican institutions as such. For yet another reason it is untrue to say, as certain parties do to-day, that the waning popularity of the Reich is due to its encroachment upon certain sovereign rights which the individual states had heretofore enjoyed. Supposing the Reich had not extended its authority over the individual states, there is no reason to believe that it would find more favour among those states, if the general obligations remained as heavy as they now are. On the contrary, if the individual states to-day had to pay contributions to the amount required by the Reich in order to fulfil the provisions of the dictates designed to reduce Germany to slavery, the hostility towards the Reich would be infinitely greater. For then not only would it prove difficult to collect the respective contributions due to the Reich from the federal states, but coercive methods would have to be employed in making the collections. The Republic, having accepted the peace treaties and having neither the courage nor the intention to break them, must reckon with the obligations which the peace treaties have imposed on it.
641
The responsibility for this situation lies solely with those parties who preach unceasingly to the patient electoral masses the necessity of maintaining the autonomy of the federal states, while at the same time they advocate and demand that the Reich should pursue a policy which must necessarily lead to the suppression of even the very last of those so-called ‘sovereign’ rights. I say ‘necessarily’ because the present Reich has no other possible means of bearing the burden of charges which an insane domestic and foreign policy have laid on it. The wedge is being driven ever deeper and every new debt which the Reich contracts, through the criminal way in which the interests of Germany are representedvis-à-visforeign countries, necessitates the exertion of fresh and stronger pressure at home. This again entails the progressive abolition of all the sovereign rights of the individual states in order to prevent the germs of opposition from becoming active or even from coming into being. The chief characteristic difference between the policy of the present Reich and that of former times lies in this: The old Reich gave freedom to its people at home and showed itself strong towards the outside world, whereas the Republic shows itself weak towards the foreigner and oppresses its own citizens at home. In both cases one attitude determines the other. A vigorous national state does not need to make many laws for the interior, because of the affection and loyalty of its citizens. The international servile state can live only by coercing its citizens to render it the services it demands, and it is a piece of impudence for the present regime to speak of ‘free citizens.’ They existed only in the Germany that is gone. The present Republic is a colony of slaves at the beck and call of the foreigner. At best it has subjects, but not citizens. Hence it does not possess a national emblem, but only a trade mark, introduced and protected by official decrees and legislative measures. This symbol, which is the Gessler’s cap of German Democracy, will always remain alien to our people. The Republic having no sense of tradition or respect for past greatness, dragged the emblem of the past in the mire, but it will be surprised to discover one day how superficial is the devotion of its subjects to their own emblems.
642
The Republic has given itself the character of an intermezzo in German history. This State is bound to restrict the sovereign rights of the individual states more and more, not only for general reasons of a financial character, but also on principle, for by enforcing a policy of financial blackmail. In order to squeeze the last ounce of substance out of its people, it is forced also to deprive them of their last remaining rights, lest the general discontent may one day flare up into open rebellion. We National Socialists would reverse this formula and would adopt the following fundamental principle: A strong national Reich which in its foreign policy represents and protects the interests of its citizens in the highest possible degree can allow freedom to reign at home without trembling for the safety of the State. On the other hand, a strong national government can encroach to a considerable degree on the liberties of the individual subject as well as on the liberties of the constituent states without thereby weakening the ideal of the Reich; and it is justified in so doing, if in these particular acts and measures the individual citizen recognises a means of promoting the prestige of the nation as a whole. It is a fact that the tendency in every state throughout the world is towards uniformity, and Germany will prove no exception in this respect. Even to-day it is absurd to talk of the sovereignty of individual states because this has already become impossible on account of the ridiculously small size of so many of these states. In the sphere of commerce, as well as in that of administration, the importance of the individual states has been steadily decreasing. Modern means of communication and mechanical progress have gradually reduced distance and space. What was once a state is to-day only a province and the territory covered by a modern state had once the importance of a continent. The purely technical difficulties connected with the administration of a State like Germany are not greater than those connected with the government of a province like Brandenburg a hundred and twenty years ago. To-day it is easier to cover the distance from Munich to Berlin than it was to cover the distance from Munich to Starnberg a hundred years ago.
643
Thanks to modern means of transport, the whole territory of the Reich to-day is smaller than that of certain German federal states at the time of the Napoleonic wars. To close one’s eyes to the consequences of these facts is to live in the past. There always were, there are, and always will be, men who do this. They may retard, but they cannot stop the wheels of history. We National Socialists must not close our eyes to the logical consequences of these facts. Here again we must not permit ourselves to be misled by the hollow phrases of our so-called national bourgeois parties. I say ‘hollow phrases,’ because these same parties do not seriously believe that it is possible for them to carry out their proposals, and because they themselves are chiefly responsible for the present state of affairs. Especially in Bavaria, the demand for de-centralisation is no more than a party move behind which there is no serious resolve. Whenever these parties had to pass from the realm of phrase-making into that of practical deeds they failed miserably. On every occasion on which the Reich ‘robbed’ the Bavarian State ‘of sovereign rights,’ it met with no real resistance apart from a senseless and revolting outcry. Indeed, when anyone seriously opposed the madness that was shown in carrying out this system of centralisation he was condemned by those same parties as disloyal to the present State. They slandered, condemned and persecuted him until he was either shut up in prison or illegally deprived of the right of public speech. These facts should serve to convince our followers of the profound hypocrisy which characterizes these so-called federalist circles. To a certain extent they use the federalist doctrine just as they use religion-merely as a means of promoting their own base party interests. A certain uniformity, especially in the field of transport appears logical. But we National Socialists feel it our duty to oppose with all our might such a development in the modem State, especially when the measures proposed are solely for the purposes of screening and rendering possible a disastrous foreign policy.
644
Just because the present Reich has undertaken the nationalisation of the railways, the postal and telegraph services, the finances, etc., not from the elevated standpoint of national politics, but in order to have in its hands the means and security for the execution of a policy of unrestricted fulfilment of its pledges, we National Socialists must take every step that seems suitable to obstruct and, if possible, to prevent such a policy. We must fight against the present system of centralising institutions that are vitally important for the existence of our people, because this system is being adopted solely to facilitate the payment of milliards and the transference of pledges to the foreigner in accordance with our post-war foreign policy. For this reason the National Socialist Movement has to take up a stand against any such attempt. A second reason why we must oppose such centralisation is because in domestic affairs it helps to reinforce a system of government which in all its manifestations has brought the greatest misfortunes on the German nation. The present Jewish-Democratic Reich, which has become a veritable curse to the German people, is seeking to negate the force of the criticism offered by all the federal states which have not yet become imbued with the spirit of the age, and is trying to carry out this policy by reducing them to complete insignificance. We National Socialists, on the other hand, have every reason for attempting not only to establish the opposition of those individual states on the basis of a constitutional force which promises to be successful, but to make their struggle against centralisation as a whole the expression of higher national German interests in a wide sense. Therefore, while the Bavarian People’s Party, acting from its own narrow and particularist standpoint, fights to maintain the ‘special rights’ of the Bavarian state, we must utilise this particular attitude in the service of higher national interests which are at variance with those of the November Democracy. A third reason for opposing a centralising process of that kind arises from the certain conviction that to a great extent this so-called ‘Reichisation’ does not make for unification at all and still less for simplification.
645
In many cases it is adopted simply as a means of removing from the sovereign control of the individual states certain institutions and of placing these in the hands of the revolutionary parties. Never in, the course of German history has flagrant favouritism played so great a part as in the democratic republic. A great deal of this mania for centralisation is the work of those parties which once promised that they would open the way for the promotion of talent, intending thereby to fill posts and offices entirely with their own partisans. Since the foundation of the Republic the Jews especially have been obtaining positions in the economic institutions taken over by the Reich and also positions in the national administration, so that the one and the other have become the preserves of Jewry. For tactical reasons, this last consideration obliges us to watch with the greatest attention any further move in the direction of centralisation and fight it at every step. But in doing this our standpoint must always be that of a lofty national policy and never of pettifogging particularism. This last observation is necessary, lest the opinion might gain ground among our own followers that we do not accredit to the Reich the right of incorporating in itself a sovereignty which is superior to that of the constituent states. As regards this right we cannot, and must not, entertain the slightest doubt. Since for us the State is nothing but a vessel and its contents (that is to say, the nation, the people) the essential factor, it is clear that every other interest must be subordinated to the supreme interests of the nation. In particular, we cannot accredit to any other state a sovereign power and sovereign rights within the confines of the nation and the Reich, which represents the nation. The absurdity which some federal states commit by maintaining ‘representatives’ abroad and among themselves must, and will, cease. Until this happens we cannot be surprised if certain foreign countries are dubious about the political unity of the Reich and act accordingly. The absurdity of these ‘representatives’ is all the greater because they do harm and do not yield the slightest advantage.
646
If the interests of a German abroad cannot be protected by the minister of the Reich, how much less can they be protected by the minister of some small federal state which appears ridiculous in the framework of the present world-order? The real truth is that these small federal states are envisaged as points of attack in connection with any attempt to bring about disintegration, engineered either from within or from without the German Reich, which attempts are always pleasing to a certain foreign State. We National Socialists must not allow some noble but degenerate family to obtain for one of its semi-moribund scions a ministerial post abroad with the idea that he might thrive in pastures new. Even in the days of the old Reich our diplomatic representatives abroad were such a sorry lot that further experiments of that kind are highly undesirable. It is certain that in the future the importance of the individual states will be transferred to the sphere of our cultural policy. Ludwig I, the monarch who did most to make Bavaria an important centre was not an obstinate particularist with anti-German tendencies, but was as much devoted to the ideal of a greater Germany as he was to art. His first consideration was to use the powers of the state to develop the cultural position of Bavaria and not its political power and in doing this he produced better and more durable results than if he had followed any other line of conduct. Up to this time Munich was a provincial capital of no great importance, but he transformed it into the metropolis of German art and by doing so he made it an intellectual centre which even to-day binds Franconia to Bavaria, though the Franconians are of quite a different temperament. If Munich had remained as it was formerly, what has happened in Saxony would have been repeated in Bavaria, with the difference that Nürnberg, the Bavarian counterpart of Leipzig, would have become, not a Bavarian, but a Franconian, city. It was not the cry of ‘Down with Prussia’ that made Munich great. What made this a city of importance was that the King wished to present it to the German nation as an artistic masterpiece that had to be seen to be appreciated, and it was both seen and appreciated. Therein lies a lesson for the future.
647
The importance of the individual states in the future will no longer lie in their political or constitutional power. I look on them rather as important Germanic ethnological and cultural political centres, but even here, time will perform its levelling work. Modem travelling facilities shuffle people together in such a way that tribal boundaries will fade out and even the cultural picture is gradually beginning to assume a more uniform pattern. The Army must definitely be kept clear of the influence of the individual states. The coming National Socialist State must not fall back into the error of the past by imposing on the Army a task which is not within its sphere and should never be assigned to it. The German Army is not meant to be a school for the preservation of provincial idiosyncrasies, but a school in which all Germans will learn to understand and adapt themselves to each other’s ways. Whatever tends to have a separating influence in the life of the nation ought to be made a unifying influence in the Army. The Army must raise the German boy above the narrow horizon of his own little native province and make him conscious that he is part of the nation. The youth must learn to know, not the confines of his own district, but those of his Fatherland, because it is the latter that he will have to defend one day. It is, therefore, absurd to have the German youth do his military training in his own native district. During that period he ought to learn to know Germany. This is all the more important to-day, since young Germans no longer travel during their years of apprenticeship as they once used to do, thus enlarging their horizon. In view of this, is it not absurd to leave the young Bavarian recruit in Munich, the Franconian in Nürnberg, the recruit from Baden in Karlsruhe, the Wurtemberger at Stuttgart and so on? Would it not be more sensible to show the Bavarian the Rhine and the North Sea, the native of Hamburg the Alps and the lad from East Prussia the mountains of Central Germany?
648
The character proper to each region ought to be maintained in the troops, but not in the barracks. We may disapprove of every attempt to achieve uniformity, but not as regards the Army. On the contrary, even if we were opposed to any such tendency, we would be bound to welcome it in this specific case, apart from the fact that, in view of the size of the present Army of the Reich, it would be absurd to maintain federal divisions. Moreover, we regard the uniformity which has been achieved in the Reich Army as something which we must retain even in future when we re-establish the national Army. Finally, a new and triumphant ideal should burst every chain which tends to paralyse its activity in promoting its ideas. National Socialism must claim the right to impose its principles on the whole German nation, without regard to what were hitherto the confines of federal states. We must educate the German nation in our ideology and principles. As the Churches do not feel themselves bound or limited by political frontiers, so the National Socialist ideology cannot be confined to any of the federal states which constitute our Fatherland. The National Socialist doctrine is not meant to serve the political interests of the individual federal states, but to dominate the whole German nation. It must determine the life of the whole people and shape that life anew. For this reason we must imperatively demand the right to overstep boundaries that have been traced by a political development which we repudiate. The more complete the triumph of the National Socialist ideology, the greater will be the liberty which it can concede to the individual within the State.
649
650
651
The year 1921 was, from many points of view, particularly important for me and for the National Socialist Movement. When I entered the German Labour Party, I at once took charge of the propaganda, believing this branch to be far the most important for the time being. The first necessity was not so much to rack one’s brains over problems connected with organisation as to spread out ideas among as many people as possible. Propaganda should go well ahead of organisation and gather together the human material for the latter to work up. I have never been in favour of hasty and pedantic methods of organisation, because, in most cases, the result is merely a piece of dead mechanism and rarely a living organisation. Organisation is a thing which derives its existence from organic life, organic evolution. When the same set of ideas have taken root in the minds of a certain number of people they tend of themselves to achieve a certain degree of order among those people and this inner development is of inestimable value. Of course, here, as everywhere else, one must take account of those human weaknesses which make men hesitate, especially at the beginning, to submit to the control of a superior mind. As soon as an organisation functions mechanically from above, there is always the danger that some individual who has been appointed to a certain office, but who has not yet proved his mettle and may be far from efficient, will, from motives of sheer jealousy, try to hinder abler persons from taking a leading place in the movement. The damage that results from that kind of thing may have fatal consequences, especially in a new movement. For this reason it is advisable first to propagate and publicly expound the ideas on which the movement is founded. This work of propaganda should continue for a certain time and should be directed from one centre.
652
When the ideas have gradually won over a number of people this human material should be carefully sifted for the purpose of selecting those who have, ability in leadership and of putting that ability to the test. It will often be found that apparently insignificant persons nevertheless turn out to be born leaders. At the same time it is quite wrong to imagine that possession of vast theoretical knowledge is a proof of capacity for leadership. The contrary is very frequently the case. Great theorists are only very rarely great organisers, because the greatness of the theorist and founder of a system coexists in being able to discover and lay down those laws that are right in the abstract, whereas the organiser must be first and foremost a psychologist. He must take men as they are, and for that reason he must know them, and have neither too high nor too low an estimate of human nature. He must take account of their weaknesses, their baseness and all their various characteristics, so as to form something which will be a living organism, endowed with great and unwavering force, fit to champion an ideal and pave the way for its successful realisation. It is still more rare to find a great theorist who is at the same time a great leader. An agitator is much more likely to prove a great leader a truth that is not palatable to many of those who deal with problems only from the scientific standpoint! Yet this is only natural, for an agitator who shows himself capable of expounding ideas to the great masses must always be a psychologist, even though he be only a demagogue. Therefore he will always be a much more capable leader than the contemplative theorist who, far from the madding crowd, meditates on his ideas. To be a leader means to be able to move the masses. The gift of formulating ideas has nothing whatsoever to do with the capacity for leadership.
653
It would be entirely futile to discuss the question as to which is the more important—the faculty for conceiving ideals and human aims or that of being able to realise them. Here, as so often in this world, the one would be entirely meaningless without the other. The noblest theoretical conceptions remain without purpose or value, if the leader cannot move the masses to accept them, and, conversely, what would it avail to have all the genius and verve of a leader if the intellectual theorist does not fix the aims for which mankind must struggle? But when the abilities of theorist, organiser and leader are united in the one person, then we have the rarest phenomenon on this earth, for it is that union which makes the great man. As I have already said, during my early days in the Party I devoted myself to the work of propaganda. I had to succeed in gradually gathering together a small nucleus of men who became imbued with the new doctrine, thus providing the human material which was subsequently to form the first elements of an organisation. Thus the goal of the propagandist was nearly always fixed far beyond that of the organiser. If a movement proposes to overthrow a certain order of things and set up a new one in its place, then the following principles must be clearly understood and respected by its leaders. Every movement which has gained its human material must first divide this material into two groups, namely, adherents and members. It is the task of the propagandist to gain adherents and it is the task of the organising body to enlist members. The adherent of a movement is he who sympathises with and accepts its aims, while the member is he who fights for them. The adherent is one for whom propaganda has converted to the doctrine of the movement. The member is he who will be charged by the organising body with collaborating in winning ever new adherents who will in turn become new members. Since to be an adherent demands only passive acceptance of an ideal, whereas membership implies championing and defending it, there will never be more than two members to every ten adherents.
654
Adhesion is based only on comprehension, whereas membership is founded on the courage to stand up for what has been comprehended and accepted and to propound it to others. The majority, being lazy and timid, is content with passive acceptance of a doctrine and only a minority will assume the responsibility of membership which implies readiness to defend one’s opinions. Such being the case, the propagandist must seek untiringly to acquire new followers for the movement, whereas the organising body must see to it that only the best elements among these followers are admitted to membership. The propagandist need not trouble about the personal worth of the individual converts he has won over to the movement. He need not inquire into their abilities, their intelligence or their character. From among these converts, however, the organising body will have to select those individuals who are most capable of actively helping to achieve victory for the movement. The propagandist aims at inducing the whole people to accept his teaching. The organising body includes within the framework of membership only those who, on psychological grounds, will not impede the further diffusion of the doctrines of the movement. The propagandist inculcates his doctrine upon the minds of the nation as a whole, preparing it for the time when this doctrine will triumph, whereas the organising body brings that triumph nearer by the continual, organic and combatant cohesion of those followers who have given proof of the necessary ability and will-power to carry on the struggle until victory is won. The more effectively propaganda has swayed the people as a whole and the more exclusive, rigorous and rigid the organisation, the greater the possibility of the triumph of its ideology. It follows, therefore, that the number of adherents can never be too large, whereas the number of members is apt to become too large rather than too small. When a whole nation has become imbued with an idea as a result of propaganda, the organising body can realise its aims with a handful of supporters.
655
There is, therefore, a certain fixed relationship between propaganda and organisation, and between the number of adherents and members. If the propaganda is good the organising body may be small, while the larger the number of adherents, the smaller the number of members. Conversely, if the propaganda be bad, the organising body must be large and if there be only a small number of adherents, the membership must be all the larger if the movement still genuinely hopes to be successful. The first task of the propagandist is to win over people who will subsequently belong to the organising body. The first duty of the organising body is to select and train men who will be capable of carrying on the propaganda. The second task of the propagandist is to disrupt the existing order of things and to saturate this order with the new teaching, while the second task of the organising body must be to fight for power, so that the doctrine may finally triumph. An ideological revolution will always be most successful, if the new ideology has been taught to the entire population, or if necessary, forced upon it subsequently, whilst, on the other hand, the movement itself, the organisation, should comprise only the minimum number of persons required to man the nerve-centres of the state in question. Put in another way, this means that in every great revolutionary movement of world-importance, the ideals of that movement must always first be propagated through the operation of propaganda. The propagandist must never tire in his efforts to make the new ideas clearly understood, to persuade others to adopt them and to endeavour to shake their confidence in the convictions they have hitherto held. In order that such propaganda should have a firm character, it must be based on an organisation. The organisation gains its members from any among those followers whom propaganda has won over and will grow the more rapidly if the work of propaganda be pushed forward intensively, and it will be all the more effective if the organisation at the back of it is vigorous and strong in itself. Hence, the supreme task of the organising body is to see to it that any discord or differences which may arise among the members of the movement will not lead to a split and thereby cramp the work within the movement.
656
Moreover, it is the duty of the organising body to see that the fighting spirit of the movement does not flag or die out, but that it is constantly reinvigorated and reinforced. It is not necessary that the number of members should increase indefinitely; on the contrary, in view of the fact that only a fraction of humanity has energy and courage, a movement which increases its own organisation indefinitely must of necessity one day become weakened thereby. Organisations, that is to say, memberships, which increase beyond certain limits gradually lose their fighting force and are no longer capable of backing up and turning to account propaganda on behalf of an ideal with the requisite verve and determination. Now, the greater and more revolutionary a doctrine is, the more active will be the spirit inspiring its body of members, because the very fact of the revolutionary nature of the doctrine implies danger for its champions and this suffices to frighten away the chicken-hearted and small-minded Philistines. In their hearts they may believe in the doctrine, but they are afraid to acknowledge their belief openly by becoming members of the movement. By reason of this very fact, however, an organisation inspired by a genuinely revolutionary ideal will attract as members only the most active of those who have been won over by its propaganda. It is in this activity on the part of the members, guaranteed by the process of natural selection, that we have the prerequisite conditions for the continuation of an active and spirited propaganda and also for the victorious struggle for the realisation of the ideal on which the movement is based. The greatest danger that can threaten a movement is an abnormal increase in the number of its members, owing to its too rapid success. So long as a movement has to carry on a hard and bitter fight, people of weak and fundamentally egotistic temperament will steer clear of it; but these will try to be accepted as members the moment the party appears likely to achieve, or has already achieved, a great measure of success.
657
It is for this reason that so many movements which are at first successful, slow down before reaching the fulfilment of their purpose and, from an inner weakness which cannot otherwise be explained, give up the struggle and finally disappear from the field. As a result of the early successes achieved, so many undesirable, unworthy and especially timid individuals become members of the movement that they are finally in the majority and overrule those who are filled with the fighting-spirit, use the movement to gain their own ends, dragging it down to their own petty level and do nothing to bring about the triumph of the original idea. The fire of the first fervour dies out, the fighting spirit flags and, as the bourgeois world is accustomed to remark (and in this case with some justice) the wine has become mixed with water and then it is, of course, impossible to achieve great things. For this reason it is necessary that a movement should, from the sheer instinct of self-preservation, close its list of membership the moment it becomes successful, while any further increase in its organisation should be undertaken only after the most careful precautions have been taken and after a painstaking sifting of those who apply for membership. Only thus will it be possible to keep the kernel of the movement intact, fresh and sound. Care must be taken that the conduct of the movement remains exclusively in the hands of the original nucleus, which means that this nucleus must direct the propaganda which aims at securing general recognition for the movement and is the central authority which decides what measures are to be adopted for the practical realisation of its ideals. The organisation should not only appoint the men who formed the original nucleus of the movement to all the important positions in those parts of the country that have been won over, but should see to it that the entire governing body is composed of such elements. This should continue until the maxims and doctrines of the party have become the foundation and substance of the new State. Only then will it be permissible gradually to transfer the reins to the hands of the constitution of that State which the spirit of the movement has created.
658
But this usually happens as the result of mutual rivalry, for here it is less a question of human intelligence than of the play of the forces whose development may indeed be foreseen from the start, but not perpetually controlled. All great movements, whether of a political or religious nature, owe their success to the recognition and adoption of these principles, and no durable success is conceivable if these laws are not observed. As director of propaganda for the Party, I took care not merely to prepare the ground for the size of the Movement in its subsequent stages, but I also adopted the most radical type of propaganda in order to make sure that none but the best would enter the organization. For the more radical and stirring my propaganda was, the more did it frighten away weak and wavering characters, thus preventing them from entering the first nucleus of our organisation. Perhaps they remained followers, but they did not advertise the fact, on the contrary, they maintained a discreet silence on the subject. Many thousands of persons then assured me that although they were in full agreement with us, they could not on any account become members of our Party. They said that the Movement was so radical that to take part in it as members would expose them to grave censure and even danger, so that nobody could take it amiss if an honest, peace-loving citizen chose to remain in the background, for the time being at least, though devoted whole-heartedly to our cause. This was all to the good. If all those men, who in their hearts did not approve of the Revolution, had joined our Movement as members at that time, we could regard ourselves to-day as a pious confraternity and not as a young Movement inspired with the spirit of combat. The lively and combative form which I gave to all our propaganda at that time fortified and guaranteed the radical tendency of our Movement, and the result was that, with few exceptions, only men of radical views were disposed to become members. It was due to the effect of our propaganda that, within a short period of time, hundreds of thousands of citizens not only became convinced in their hearts that we were right, but wished us victory, although personally they were too timid to make sacrifices for that victory or even to fight for it.
659
Up to the middle of 1921 the mere gaining of followers sufficed and was of value to the Movement, but in the summer of that year, certain events happened which made it seem opportune for us to bring our organisation into line with the manifest successes which the propaganda had achieved. An attempt made by a group of patriotic visionaries, supported by the chairman of the Party at that time, to take over the management of the party led, to the failure of this little intrigue, and, as the result of a motion carried unanimously at a general meeting of the members, the entire management of the Party was entrusted to me. At the same time a new statute was passed investing the chairman of the movement with absolute responsibility, abolishing the system of resolutions in committee and introducing in its stead a system of division of labour which, since that time, has worked excellently. From August 1st, 1921, onwards, I undertook the internal reorganisation of the Party and was supported by a number of excellent men. I shall mention them and their work individually in a postscript to the present work. In my endeavour to utilise the results gained by propaganda to the advantage of the organisation and thus to stabilise them, I had to abolish completely a number of established practices and introduce regulations which none of the other parties either possessed or recognised. In the years 1919–20 the Movement was controlled by a committee elected at meetings of the members, held in accordance with the constitution. The committee was composed of a treasurer and an assistant-treasurer, a secretary and an assistant-secretary and, at the head of it, a chairman and a vice-chairman. In addition to these there were a members’ representative, the director of propaganda, and various assessorial members. Comically enough, the committee embodied the very principle against which the Movement itself wanted to fight with all its energy, namely, the principle of parliamentarianism. It was evident that from the smallest local groups to the district and regional groups, the state groups and finally the supreme directorate for the Reich, the principle adopted incorporated the self-same system under which we were all suffering and continue to suffer.
660
It was imperative to change this state of affairs forthwith, if this bad foundation in the internal organisation was not to jeopardise the Movement and render the fulfilment of its high mission impossible. The sessions of the committee at which minutes were read out, and at which resolutions were passed according to the vote of the majority, presented the picture of a miniature parliament. Here there was no such thing as personal responsibility, the same absurdities and paradoxes prevailed as in the great representative bodies of the State. Names were presented to this committee for appointment as secretaries, treasurers, members of the organisation, propaganda agents and God knows what else. Every single question was discussed by the committee as a whole and put to the vote. Accordingly, the director of propaganda voted on a question that concerned the man who had to do with the finances, and the latter, in his turn, voted on a question that concerned only the organising side as such, the organiser voting on a subject that had to do with the secretarial department, and so on. Why select a special man for propaganda, if treasurers, secretaries, members’ representatives etc., had to deliver judgment on questions concerning it? To a person of common sense that sort of thing seems as incomprehensible as it would be if, in a large manufacturing concern, the board of directors or technical experts belonging to other departments and other branches were called upon to decide questions which had nothing to do with their own particular job. I refused to countenance this kind of folly and after a short time I ceased to appear at the meetings of the committee. I did nothing except attend to my own department of propaganda and I did not permit any of the others to poke their noses into my activities. Conversely, I did not interfere in the affairs of others. When the new statute was approved and I was appointed chairman, I had the necessary authority and also the corresponding right to make short shrift of all that nonsense.
661
In the place of decisions by majority vote of the committee, the principle of absolute responsibility was introduced. The chairman is responsible for the whole control of the Movement. He apportions the work to be done among the members of the committee subordinate to him and for special work he selects other individuals. Each of these gentlemen must bear sole responsibility for the task assigned to him. He is subordinate only to the chairman, whose duty is to supervise the general collaboration, selecting the personnel and giving general directions as to how co-operation is to be achieved. This principle of absolute responsibility has gradually become a matter of course within the Movement, at least in so far as the management of the Party is concerned. In the small local groups and perhaps also in the regional and district groups it will take yet a long time before the principle can be thoroughly imposed, because the timid and inefficient are naturally opposed to it. For them the idea of bearing absolute responsibility for an action opens up an unpleasant prospect and they feel more at ease and safer if, faced with a difficult decision, they have the support of the majority on a so-called committee. But it seems to me a matter of absolute necessity to take a decisive stand against that view, to make no concessions whatsoever to this fear of responsibility, even though it will take some time before we can attain this concept of duty and ability in leadership, which will place in positions of authority only those who possess the necessary gifts and are selected for the work. In any case, a movement which has to fight against the absurdity of parliamentary institutions must itself be immune from them. Only thus will it have the requisite strength to carry on the struggle. It is absolutely certain that a movement which, in an era in which the majority principle holds good in every sphere of life, adopts as its fundamental principle that of leadership (and consequently the assumption of responsibility by the leaders), will one day succeed in abolishing and triumphing over existing conditions.
662
This idea made it necessary to reorganise our Movement internally. The logical development of this reorganisation brought about a clear-cut distinction between the economic section of the Movement and the general political management. The principle of personal responsibility was extended to all the administrative branches of the party and inevitably had a regenerating effect, by liberating them from political influences and allowing them to operate solely on economic principles. In the autumn of 1919, when I joined the Party, there were only six members. The Party had neither an office, officials, forms, a stamp, nor printed material of any sort. The committee first held its sittings in a restaurant in the Herrengasse and then in a cafe in the Gasteig. This state of affairs was intolerable, so I at once took action in the matter. I went around to several restaurants and hotels in Munich with the idea of renting a room in one of them for the use of the Party. In the old Sterneckerbräu im Tal, there was a small vault-like room which in earlier times had served the Bavarian Counsellors of the Holy Roman Empire as a tap-room when they foregathered. It was dark and dismal and accordingly well suited to its ancient uses, though less suited to the new purpose it was now destined to serve. The little street on which its one window looked out was so narrow that even on the brightest summer day the room remained dim and sombre. This became our first office. As the rent came to only fifty marks per month, (then an enormous sum for us) we could not expect very much and we dared not complain even when the wooden wainscoting was removed a few days before we took possession. This panelling had been specially put up for the Imperial Counsellors. The place began to look more like a tomb than an office. Still it marked an important step forward. By degrees, we had electric light installed and later on a telephone. A table and some borrowed chairs were put in, open bookshelves, and afterwards, a cupboard. Two sideboards, which belonged to the landlord, served to store our leaflets, placards, etc. As time went on, it proved impossible to direct the course of the Movement merely by holding a committee meeting once a week.
663
The current business administration of the Movement could not be regularly attended to unless we had a salaried official, but at that time it was very difficult for us to arrange anything of the kind. The Movement had still so few members that it was hard to find among them a suitable person for the job, who would be content with very little for himself and would at the same time be ready to meet the manifold demands which the Movement would make on his time and energy. After a long search we discovered a soldier who consented to become our first business-manager. His name was Schüssler, an old war-time comrade of mine. At first he came to our new office every day between six and eight o’clock in the evening, later on he came from five to eight and subsequently for the whole afternoon; finally, it became a full-time job and he worked in the office from morning until late at night. He was an industrious, upright and thoroughly honest man, who was exceedingly painstaking and a loyal supporter of the Movement. He brought with him a small Adler typewriter of his own—it was the first typewriter to be used in the service of the Party. Subsequently, the Party bought it, paying for it in instalments. We needed a small safe in order to keep our papers and register of members out of harm’s way, not to hold our funds, which were then non-existent. On the contrary, our financial position was so hopeless that I often had to dip into my own personal savings. After eighteen months had passed our business quarters had become too small, so we moved to a new place in the Cornelius Strasse. Again our office was in a restaurant, but instead of one room we now had three smaller rooms and one large room with counters. At that time this appeared a wonderful thing to us. We remained in these premises until November 1923. In December 1920, we acquired theVölkischer Beobachter. This newspaper which, as its name implies, championed thevölkischcause, was now to become the organ of the National Socialist German Labour Party. At first it appeared twice weekly; but at the beginning of 1923 it became a daily paper, and at the end of August in the same year it began to appear in the form now so well known.
664
As a complete novice in journalism I then learned many a lesson for which I had to pay dearly. In contrast to the enormous number of papers in Jewish hands, there was at that time scarcely any important newspaper that defended thevölkischcause. This state of affairs ought to have provided us with food for thought. As I have often seen from experience, the reason for that state of things was, to a great extent, attributable to the incompetent way in which the business side of the so-calledvölkischnewspapers was managed. These were conducted too much according to the view that political opinion should be taken into consideration before efficiency—quite a mistaken attitude, inasmuch as political opinion should not be paraded, but should find expression in efficient work. The man who does valuable work for the nation expresses thereby the soundness of his political opinions, whereas another who merely talks about his opinions and does nothing that is of real value to the nation is detrimental to any real political opinion, and his attitude is also prejudicial to his particular political party. TheVölkischer Beobachterwas a so-calledvölkischpaper as its name indicates. It had all the good qualities, but still more the errors and weaknesses, inherent in allvölkischinstitutions. Though the reading-matter was excellent, the business side was conducted on very inefficient lines. Here also the underlying idea was that avölkischnewspaper ought to be subsidized by contributions from people holdingvölkischviews, and the fact was ignored that it had to make its way in competition with the others and that it was dishonest to expect the subscriptions of good patriots to make up for the mistakes and inefficiency of the management of the undertaking. I took care to alter these conditions promptly, for I recognised the danger inherent in them. Luck was on my side inasmuch as it brought me a man who, since that time, has rendered incalculable service to the Movement, not only as business-manager of the newspaper, but also as business-manager of the Party. In 1914, during the War, I made the acquaintance of Max Amann, who was then my superior officer and is to-day general business-manager of the Party.
665
During four years of war I had occasion to observe the unusual ability, diligence and rigorous conscientiousness of my future collaborator. In the summer of 1921 I applied to my old regimental comrade, whom I met one day by chance, and asked him to become business-manager of the Movement. At that time the Movement was passing through a grave crisis and I had reason to be dissatisfied with several of our officials, with one of whom I had had a very bitter experience. Amann then held a good position with good prospects. After long hesitation he agreed to my request, but only on condition that he would not be at the mercy of incompetent committees and would be responsible to one master, and one only. It is to the inestimable credit of this first business-manager of the Party, whose commercial knowledge is extensive and profound, that he brought order and probity into the various business concerns of the Party. Since that time these have remained exemplary and cannot be equalled, or excelled, by any other branches of the Movement. But as often happens in life, great ability provokes envy and disfavour; that was to be expected in this case and had to be put up with. From 1922 onwards we followed definite guiding principles as regards the commercial development of the Movement as well as in connection with its organisation. There already existed a central filing system, where the names and personal data of all the members were noted. The finances of the Party had been rendered sound. The current expenditure had to be covered by the current receipts and special receipts were used only for special expenditure. Thus, notwithstanding the difficulties of the time, the Movement remained practically free of debt, except for a few small current accounts. Indeed there was a steady increase in the funds. Things were managed as in a private business. The personnel employed held their jobs by virtue of their efficiency and could not in any way take cover behind their professed loyalty to the Party.
666
A good National Socialist proves his loyalty by the readiness, diligence and efficiency with which he discharges whatever duties are assigned to, him, in performing whatever work is allotted to him within the national community. The man who does not fulfil his duty in the job he holds cannot boast of a loyalty against which he actually transgresses. Adamant against all kinds of influence, the new business-manager of the party firmly maintained the standpoint that there were no sinecure posts in the party administration for followers and members of the Movement who did not want to work. A movement, which fights energetically against the corruption introduced into our civil service by the various political parties must be immune from that vice in its own administrative department. It happened that some men were taken on to the staff of the paper who had formerly been adherents of the Bavarian People’s Party, but whose work showed that they were excellently qualified for the job. The result of this experiment was, generally speaking, eminently satisfactory. It was owing to this honest and frank recognition of individual efficiency that the Movement won the hearts of its employees more readily and more profoundly than had ever been the case before. Subsequently these men became good National Socialists and remained so, not only professedly, but proved to be so by the steady, honest and conscientious work which they performed in the service of the new Movement. Although a well-qualified party member was preferred to another who had equal qualifications, but did not belong to the Party, nobody obtained a post merely by reason of the fact that he was a member of the Party. The rigid determination with which our new business-manager applied these principles and gradually put them into force, despite all opposition, turned out to be of great advantage to the Movement. To this we owe the fact that it was possible for us, during the difficult period of the inflation, when thousands of businesses failed and thousands of newspapers had to cease publication, not only to keep the commercial department of the Movement going and finance its activities, but also to make steady progress with theVölkischer Beobachter. At that time it came to be ranked among the big newspapers.
667
The year 1921 was of further importance by reason of the fact that, as chairman of the party, I slowly but steadily succeeded in putting a stop to criticism and interference by numerous members of committee with regard to various business concerns of the Party. This was important, because we could not get a capable man to take on a job if nincompoops were constantly allowed to butt in, pretending that they knew better, whereas in reality they left only chaos behind them. Then these wiseacres retired, for the most part quite modestly, to seek another field for their supervisory and animating activities. Some men seemed to have a mania for finding fault with everything and were, so to speak, always in a permanent state of pregnancy with magnificent plans, ideas, projects and methods. Naturally, their great aim and ideal was always the formation of a committee which, in its supervisory capacity, would be in a position to poke its nose into the efficient work being done by others. Many of these committee fiends failed to realise that it is offensive and contrary to the spirit of National Socialism if unauthorised people constantly interfere in the work of really competent persons. During those years I felt it to be my duty to safeguard against such annoyance all those who were performing good work or were entrusted with responsible task, to give them support so that they were guaranteed a free hand in their day’s work. The best means of rendering innocuous those committees, which either did nothing or hatched impracticable decisions, was to give them some real work to do. It was then amusing to see how the members would silently fade away and were soon nowhere to be found. It made me think of that great institution of the same kind, the Reichstag. How quickly its members would evanesce, if they were put to some real work instead of talking, especially if each member were made personally responsible for the work assigned to him. I always demanded that, as in private life so in the Movement, we should not abandon the search until the best, most honest and manifestly most competent person had been found for the position of official manager or leader, as the case might be, in every business concern of the Movement.
668
Once installed in his position he should be given absolute authority and full freedom of action in regard to his subordinates and at the same time be called upon to assume full responsibility towards his superiors. Nobody was placed in a position of authority over subordinates unless he himself was more competent than they to perform the work entrusted to them. In the course of two years I put my views more and more into practice, so that to-day, at least as far as the higher positions of authority in the Movement are concerned, they are accepted as a matter of course. The manifest success of this attitude was shown on November 9th, 1923. Four years previously, when I entered the Movement, it did not possess even a rubber stamp. On November 9th, 1923, the Party was dissolved and its property confiscated. This, including all objects of value and the newspaper, amounted to more than one hundred and seventy thousand gold marks.
669
670
671
Owing to the rapid growth of the movement, we felt compelled in 1922 to take a definite stand on a question which has not been fully solved even yet. In our efforts to discover the quickest and easiest way for the Movement to reach the heart of the broad masses, we were always confronted with the objection that the worker could never completely belong to us while his interests in the purely vocational and economic sphere were cared for by a political organisation conducted by men whose principles were quite different from ours. That was quite a serious objection. The general belief was that a workman engaged in some trade or calling could not exist if he did not belong to a trade-union. Not only were his professional interests thus protected, but his position in the factory or concern, would, in the long run, have become untenable, if he were not a member of a trade-union. The majority of the workers belonged to trade-unions. Generally speaking, the unions had conducted successfully the battle for the establishment of a definite scale of wages and had concluded agreements which guaranteed the worker a steady income. Undoubtedly, all workers benefited by the results of that campaign and, for honest men especially, conflicts of conscience must have arisen if they took the wages which had been assured through the struggle fought by the trade-unions and at the same time refrained from taking part in the fight. It was difficult to discuss this problem with the average bourgeois employer. He had no understanding (or did not wish to have any) for either the material or moral side of the question. Finally, his own supposed economic interests were, on principle, opposed to every kind of organisation which united the workmen that were dependent on him. Hence it was for the most part impossible to bring these bourgeois employers to take an impartial view of the situation.
672
Here, therefore, as in so many other cases, it was necessary to appeal to disinterested outsiders who would not be liable to fix their attention on the trees and fail to see the forest. With a little goodwill on their part, they could readily understand a state of affairs which is of the highest importance for our present and future existence. In the first volume of this book I have already expressed my views on the nature, purpose and necessity of trade-unions. There I adopted the standpoint that, unless measures are undertaken by the State (usually futile in such cases) or a new ideal is introduced in our education, which would change the attitude of the employer towards the worker, no other course will be open to the latter, except to defend his own interests himself by claiming his equal rights as a contracting party within the economic sphere of the nation’s existence. I stated further that this would conform to the ideal of a national community, if thereby social injustices could be redressed which would otherwise cause serious damage to the whole social structure. I stated, moreover, that the worker would always find it necessary to undertake this protective action as long as there were men among the employers who had no sense of their social obligations or even of the most elementary human rights, whilst I concluded by saying, that, if such self-defence be considered necessary, its form ought to be that of an association made up of the workers themselves on the basis of trade-unions. This was my general idea and it remained the same in 1922, but a clear and precise formula was still to be discovered. We could not be satisfied with merely understanding the problem; it was necessary to come to some conclusions that could be put into practice. The following questions had to be answered:
673
I think that I have already answered the first question adequately. In the present state of affairs I am convinced that we cannot possibly dispense with the trade-unions. On the contrary, they are among the most important institutions in the economic life of the nation. Not only are they important in the sphere of social policy but also, and even more so, in the national political sphere, for, when the great messes of a nation see their vital needs satisfied through a just trade-unionist movement, which is at the same time educating them, the stamina of the whole nation in its struggle for existence will be enormously reinforced thereby. Above all, the trade-unions are necessary as building stones for the future economic parliament, which will be made up of chambers representing the various professions and occupations. The second question is also easy to answer. If the trade-unionist movement is important, then it is clear that National Socialism ought to take a definite stand on that question, not only theoretically, but also in practice. But how? That is more difficult to decide. The National Socialist Movement, which aims at establishing the National SocialistvölkischState, must always bear in mind the principle that every future institution under that State must be evolved from the Movement itself. It is a great mistake to believe that, by the mere acquisition of supreme political power, we can suddenly bring about a definite reorganisation, from nothing, without the help of a certain reserve of men who have been trained beforehand, especially in the spirit of the Movement. Here, also, the principle holds good that the spirit is always more important than the external form which it animates, since this form can be created mechanically and quickly. For instance, the leadership principle may be imposed on an organised political community in a dictatorial way. But, this principle can become a living reality only when, by means of a gradual process of development from an extremely small nucleus, and by that process of elimination which the hard realities of life continually enforce, there is produced, after the lapse of years, the necessary material from which leaders, capable of carrying the principle into practical effect, are chosen.
674
It is out of the question to think that a scheme for the constitution of a State can be pulled out of a portfolio at a moment’s notice and ‘introduced’ by imperative orders from above. One may try that kind of thing, but the result will always be something that cannot endure, and may even prove abortive. This calls to mind the origin of the Weimar Constitution and the attempt to impose on the German people a new constitution and a new flag, neither of which had any inner relation to the vicissitudes of our nation’s history during the last half century. The National Socialist State must guard against all such experiments. It can only grow out of an organisation which has already existed for a long time. This organisation must be in itself the essence of National Socialist life, so that finally it may be able to establish a National Socialist State which will be a living reality. As I have already said the germ-cells of the economic chambers must be established in the various vocational representative bodies and especially in the trade-unions. If this subsequent vocational representation and the central economic parliament are to be National Socialist institutions, these important germ-cells must be vehicles of the National Socialist ideology. The institutions of the Movement must be transferred to the State; but the State cannot call into existence all of a sudden and as if by magic, corresponding organisations unless these are to remain completely lifeless. Looking at the matter from the highest standpoint, the National Socialist Movement will have to recognise the necessity for instituting its own trade-unionist activities. It must do so for a further reason, namely, because a real National Socialist education for the employer as well as for the employee, in the spirit of mutual co-operation within the common framework of the national community, cannot be secured by theoretical instruction, appeals and exhortations, but only through the struggle of daily life.
675
In and through this struggle the Movement must educate the several large economic groups and bring them closer to one another through a wider outlook. Without this preparatory work it would be sheer illusion to hope that a real national community could be brought into existence. Only the greatWeltanschauungfor which the Movement is fighting can serve to form by degrees that general attitude which the new era will one day prove to be internally and fundamentally sound and not mere outward show. Hence, the Movement must not only adopt a positive attitude towards the trade-unionist idea, it must go further; it must, by means of practical activity, provide the multitude of its members and adherents with the education requisite for the future National Socialist State. The answer to the third question follows from what has already been said. The National Socialist trade-union is not an instrument for class warfare, but a representative organ of the various professions and callings. The National Socialist State recognises no ‘classes’ but, from the political point of view, only citizens with absolutely equal rights and equal obligations corresponding thereto. Apart from these, it recognises subjects of the State who have no political rights whatsoever. According to the National Socialist concept, it is not the task of the trade-union to band together certain men within the national community and thus gradually to transform these men into a class, so as to use them in a conflict against other similarly organised groups within the national community. We certainly cannot assign this task to the trade-union as such. This was the task assigned to it the moment it became a fighting weapon in the hands of the Marxist. The trade-union is not naturally an instrument of class warfare; but the Marxists transformed it into an instrument for use in their own class struggle. They created the economic weapon which the international Jew uses for the purpose of destroying the economic foundations of free and independent national States, of ruining their national trade and industry and thereby enslaving free nations to serve Jewish world finance, which transcends all state boundaries.
676
In contradiction to this, the National Socialist trade-union must organise definite groups of those who participate in the economic life of the nation. They will thus enhance the security of the national economic system, reinforcing it by the elimination of all those anomalies which ultimately exercise a destructive influence on the social body of the nation, damage the vital forces of the national community, prejudice the welfare of the State and, by no means least, bring evil and destruction on economic life itself. In the hands of the National Socialist trade-union the strike is not, therefore, an instrument for disturbing and dislocating national production, but for increasing it and making it run smoothly, by fighting against all those abuses which, by reason of their non-social character, hinder efficiency in business and thereby hamper the existence of the whole nation. Individual efficiency is always in direct relation to the general social and legal position of the individual in the economic process, and to the consequent conviction that the economic prosperity of the nation must necessarily redound to the benefit of the individual citizen. The National Socialist employee will have to recognise the fact that his own material welfare is bound up with the economic prosperity of the nation. The National Socialist employer must recognise that the welfare and contentment of his employees are necessary prerequisites for the existence and development of his own economic prosperity. National Socialist workers and employers are both, at one and the same time, the representatives and administrators of the whole national community. The large measure of personal freedom which is accorded to them for their activities is to be explained by the fact that experience has shown that the productive powers of the individual are greater if he is accorded a generous measure of freedom than if he is coerced from above. Moreover, by according this freedom, we give free play to the natural process of selection which brings forward the ablest, most capable and most industrious. For the National Socialist trade-union, therefore, the strike is a means that may, and indeed must be, resorted to as long as there is not yet a National SocialistvölkischState, but when that State is established it will, as a matter of course, abolish the class struggle between the two great groups made up of employers and employees respectively. For that is a struggle which has always resulted in lessening national production and injuring the national community.
677
In place of this struggle, the National Socialist State will undertake the task of caring for and defending the rights of all parties concerned. It will be the duty of the economic chambers to keep the national economic system in smooth working order and to remove whatever defects or errors may affect it adversely. Questions which are to-day settled only by the struggle of millions of people will then be settled in the representative chambers of trades and professions and in the central economic parliament. Thus employers and employees will no longer find themselves drawn into a mutual conflict over wages and hours of work, always to the detriment of the interests of both. They will solve these problems together before a higher authority, whose sole aim will be to safeguard the welfare of the national community and of the State. Here, as everywhere else, the inflexible principle must hold good that the interests of the country must come before party interests. The task of the National Socialist trade-union will be to educate and prepare its members to conform to these ideals, namely, that all must work together for the maintenance and security of our nation and its State, each one according to the abilities and powers with which Nature has endowed him and which have been developed and trained by the national community. Our fourth question was, ‘How can we establish trade-unions for such tasks and aims?’ It is by far the most difficult to answer. Generally speaking, it is easier to establish something in new territory than in old territory which already has its established institutions. It is easy to set up a new business in a district where there is no existing business of the same kind, but it is more difficult if the same kind of enterprise already exists and it is most difficult of all when the conditions are such that only one enterprise of this kind can prosper. In the latter case, the promoters of the new enterprise find themselves confronted not only with the problem of introducing their own business, but also that of how to bring about the destruction of the other business already existing in the district, so that the new enterprise may prosper.
678
It would be senseless to have a National Socialist trade, union side by side with other trade-unions, for the former must be thoroughly imbued with a feeling for the ideological nature of its task and the resulting obligation not to tolerate other similar or hostile institutions. It must also insist that it alone is necessary, to the exclusion of all the rest. It can come to no arrangement and no compromise with kindred tendencies, but must assert its own absolute and exclusive right to exist. There were two ways which might have led to such a development:
The effects of the inflation were steadily spreading and made the situation still more difficult, because at that time the trade-unions were unable to render their members any tangible service. From this point of view, there was no reason why the individual worker should pay his dues to the union. Even the Marxist unions then existing were on the point of collapse when, as the result of Herr Curio’s inspired Ruhr policy, millions suddenly poured into their coffers. This so-called ‘national’ Chancellor of the Reich should be dubbed the ‘saviour’ of the Marxist trade-unions. We could not count on similar financial facilities, and nobody would have felt inclined to join a new trade-union which, on account of its financial weakness, could not offer him the slightest material benefit. On the other hand, I had to guard against the danger of creating a new organisation of this kind which would only serve to provide ‘cushy jobs’ for men of little ability.
679
At that time the question of personnel played a most important role. I did not have a single man whom I could have called upon to carry out this important task. He who could have succeeded at that time in overthrowing the Marxist unions to make way for the triumph of the National Socialist corporative idea, which would have replaced this weapon of ruinous class warfare, could have been reckoned as one of the very greatest men our country had produced and his bust installed in the Valhalla at Regensburg for the admiration of posterity. But I knew of no person who could have qualified for such an honour. In this connection we must not be led astray by the fact that the international trade-unions are conducted by men of only mediocre significance. This fact is actually of no importance, for when those unions were founded there was nothing else of a similar kind in existence. To-day, the National Socialist Movement must fight against a monster organisation which has existed for a long time, and has been carefully thought out to the last detail. The assailant must always exercise more intelligence than the defender, if he is to overthrow the latter. The Marxist trade-unionist citadel may be governed to-day by mediocre leaders, but it cannot be taken by assault, except through the dauntless energy and genius of a superior leader on the other side. If such a leader cannot be found it is futile to haggle with Fate and even more foolish to try to make the attempt under a leader wanting in the necessary qualities. Here one must apply the maxim that in life it is often better to leave a thing alone for the time being, rather than try to do it by halves or do it badly, owing to a lack of suitable means. To this we had to add another consideration, which was not at all of a demagogic character. At that time I had, and I still have to-day, the firmlyrooted conviction that when one is engaged in a great ideological struggle in the political field, it would be a grave mistake to mix up economic questions with this struggle in its earlier stages. This applies particularly to our German people, because in their case, the economic struggle would immediately divert their energy from the political fight.
680
Once people are brought to believe that they can buy a little house with their savings they will devote themselves to the task of increasing their savings and no spare time will be left to them for the political struggle against those who, one way or another, intend one day to secure possession of the pennies that have been hoarded. Instead of participating in the political conflict on behalf of the opinions and convictions which they have been brought to accept, they will now go ‘all out’ for their ‘settlement’ idea and in the end they will fall between two stools. To-day the National Socialist Movement is at the beginning of its struggle. To a great extent it must first of all shape and develop its ideals. It must employ every ounce of its energy in the struggle to have its great ideals accepted, but this effort will not be crowned with success, unless the combined energies of the Movement be devoted exclusively to this struggle. To-day we have a classic example of how the militant strength of a people becomes paralysed when that people is too much taken up with purely economic problems. The Revolution which took place in November 1918, was not brought about by the trade-unions, but was carried out in spite of them, and the German bourgeoisie is not waging a political fight for the future of its country because it believes that that future can be amply secured by constructive work in the economic field. We must learn as lesson from such phenomena, because in our case the same thing would happen in the same circumstances. The more the combined strength of our Movement is concentrated in the political struggle, the more confidently may we count on being successful along our whole front, but if we busy ourselves prematurely with trade-unionist problems, settlement problems, etc., it will be to the detriment of our cause, taken as a whole. For, though these problems may be important, they cannot be solved in an adequate manner until we have political power in our hands and are able to use it in the service of these schemes. Until that day comes these problems can have only a paralysing effect on the Movement and if it takes them up too soon they will only be a hindrance in the effort to attain its ideological aims. It may then easily happen that trade-unionist considerations will decide the political trend of the Movement, instead of theWeltanschauungof the Movement determining the course the trade-unions are to adopt.
681
The Movement and the nation can derive advantage from a National Socialist trade-unionist organisation, only if the latter be so thoroughly inspired by National Socialist ideas that it runs no danger of falling into step behind the Marxist movement, for a National Socialist trade-union which considered itself only as a competitor against the Marxist unions would be worse than none. It must declare war against the Marxist trade-union, not only as an organisation but, above all, as an ideal. It must declare itself hostile to the idea of class and class warfare and, in place of this, it must declare itself the defender of the various vocational and professional interests of the German people. Considered from all these points of view it was not then advisable, nor is it yet advisable, to think of founding our own trade-union, unless somebody appeared who was obviously called upon by Fate to solve this particular problem. Therefore, there remained only two possible courses—either to recommend our own party members to leave the trade-unions in which they were enrolled, or to remain in them for the moment, with the idea of disrupting them as much as possible. In general, I recommended the latter alternative. There could be nothing against this, especially in 1922–1923, since, during the inflation, the financial gain which the trade-unions derived from the few members who belonged to our, as yet, youthful Movement was negligible, but the damage done to the unions was very considerable since the adherents of National Socialism were their most inveterate critics and consequently exerted a disintegrating influence from within. I entirely discountenanced all experiments which were destined from the very beginning to be unsuccessful. I would have considered it criminal to deprive a worker of some part of his scanty earnings on behalf of an organisation which, according to my inner conviction, could not promise any real advantage to its members. If a new political party fades out of existence it is seldom a matter for regret, but nearly always for congratulation and nobody has a right to complain, for what each individual contributes to a political movement is given with the idea that he may receive no return for it.
682
The man who pays his dues to a trade-union has the right to expect that the promises made to him will be kept in return; if this is not done, then the promoters of such a trade-union are swindlers, or at least irresponsible persons who ought to be brought to book. The course of action we pursued in 1922 was adopted in accordance with these principles. Others thought they knew better and founded trade-unions. They upbraided us for being short-sighted and failing to see into the future, but it did not take long for these organisations to disappear and the result was the same as in our own case, with this difference, that we had deceived neither ourselves nor other people.
683
684
685
The erratic manner in which the foreign affairs of the Reich were conducted was due to a lack of sound guiding principles in the formation of practical and useful alliances. Not only did this state of affairs continue after the Revolution, but it became even worse. If the confused state of our political ideas in general before the War may be looked upon as the chief cause of our defective foreign policy, in the post-war period this must be attributed to a lack of honest intentions. It was natural that those parties which had finally achieved their destructive purpose by means of the Revolution were not interested in the adoption of a policy of alliances which must ultimately result in the restoration of a free German State. A development in this direction would not have been in conformity with the purposes of the November crime; it would have interrupted, or even put an end to, the internationalisation of German national economy and German labour. Above all, it would put an end to the political repercussions within the country resulting from a foreign policy which aimed at liberating Germany, which would, in the long run, have been fatal to those who now wield the power in the Reich. One cannot imagine the revival of a nation unless that revival be preceded by a process of nationalisation. Conversely, every important success in the field of foreign politics must call forth a favourable reaction at home. Experience proves that every struggle for liberty increases national sentiment and national self-confidence and thereby gives rise to a keener awareness of anti-national elements and tendencies. Conditions and persons that may be tolerated and even pass unnoticed in times of peace will not only become the object of aversion when national enthusiasm is aroused, but will even provoke positive opposition, which frequently turns out disastrous for them.
686
In this connection we may recall the spy-scare that became prevalent when the war broke out, when human passion suddenly manifested itself to such a heightened degree as to lead to the most brutal persecutions, often without justifiable grounds, although everybody knows that the spy danger is greater during long periods of peace. Yet, for obvious reasons, it does not then attract a similar amount of public attention. For this reason the subtle instinct of those parasites of the State who came to the surface of the national body as a result of the events which took place in November 1918 makes them feel at once that a movement to restore the freedom of our people, supported by a wise foreign policy and the consequent awakening of national feeling—which would possibly mean the end of their own criminal existence. Thus we may explain the fact that, since 1918, the competent government departments have failed as regards foreign policy and the Government of the country has practically always worked systematically against the interests of the German nation, for that which at first sight seemed a matter of chance proved, on closer examination, to be a logical advance along the lines first openly followed by those responsible for the November Revolution of 1918. Undoubtedly a distinction ought to be made between, (1) the responsible administrators of our affairs of State, or rather those who ought to be responsible; (2) the average run of our parliamentary ‘politicians,’ and (3) the bulk of our people, whose sheepish docility corresponds to their want of intelligence. The first know what they want. The second fall into line with them, either because they know what is afoot, or because they have not the courage to take an uncompromising stand against a course which they know and feel to be detrimental. The third just submit because they are too stupid to understand. While the National Socialist German Labour Party was only a small and practically unknown society, problems of foreign policy could have only a secondary importance in the eyes of many of its members. This was the case especially because our Movement has always proclaimed, and must proclaim, the principle, that the freedom of the country in its foreign relations is not a gift that will be bestowed upon us by Heaven or by any earthly powers, but can only be the fruit of a development of our inner strength.
687
Only by fist rooting out the causes which led to our collapse and by eliminating all those who are profiting by that collapse can we establish the conditions necessary for the struggle for freedom abroad. It will be easily understood, therefore, why during the early stages of our young Movement’s development, we preferred to concentrate on the problem of internal reform rather than on foreign policy. But, when the small and insignificant society expanded and finally outgrew its first framework, and the young organisation assumed the importance of a great association, we then felt it incumbent upon us to take a definite stand on problems regarding the development of a foreign policy. It was necessary to lay down fundamental principles which would not only be in accord with the basic ideas of ourWeltanschauung, but would actually be an outcome of it. Just because our people have had no political education in matters concerning our relations abroad, it is necessary for the youthful Movement to teach its leaders and also the masses of the people, the guiding principles governing our foreign political attitude. This is the prerequisite for the practical execution of any measures adopted in our foreign policy of the future with the object of regaining the freedom of our people and of re-establishing the genuine sovereignty of the Reich. The fundamental and guiding principles which we must always bear in mind when studying this question are, that foreign policy is only a means to an end and that the sole end to be pursued is the welfare of our own people. Every problem in foreign politics must be considered solely from the following point of view: Will such and such a solution prove advantageous to our people now or in the future, or will it injure their interests? That is the only question which must be considered in dealing with any problem. Party politics, religious considerations, humanitarian ideals—all such and all other preoccupations must, without compromise, give way to this. Before the War, the purpose to which German foreign policy should have been directed was to ensure the supply of material necessities for the maintenance of our people and their children, to prepare means for the attainment of this end and the gaining of the necessary support in the shape of advantageous alliances.
688
The task to be accomplished is the same to-day, but with this difference, that in pre-war times it was a question of caring for the maintenance of the German people, with the help of the power which a strong and independent State then possessed, but our task to-day is to make our nation powerful once again by re-establishing a strong and independent State. The re-establishment of such a State is the prerequisite and necessary condition which must be fulfilled in order that we may be able subsequently to put into practice a foreign policy which will serve to guarantee the existence, welfare and subsistence of our people in the future. In other words, the aim which Germany ought to pursue to-day in her foreign policy is to prepare the way for the recovery of her liberty to-morrow. In this connection there is a fundamental principle which we must bear in mind, namely, that the possibility of winning back the independence of a nation is not absolutely bound up with territorial integrity. It will suffice if a remnant, no matter how small, of a nation and State still exists, provided it possesses the necessary independence to become not only the vehicle of the common spirit of the whole people, but also to prepare the way for the military fight for the nation’s liberty. If a people numbering a hundred million souls tolerates the yoke of common slavery in order to prevent the territory belonging to its State from being broken up and divided, that is worse than it such a State and such a people were dismembered, and only one fragment still retained its complete independence. Of course, the proviso here is that this fragment is inspired with a consciousness of the solemn duty that devolves upon it, not only persistently to proclaim its spiritual and cultural unity, but also to make the necessary preparations for the military conflict which will finally liberate and re-unite the fragments suffering under oppression. One must also bear in mind the fact that the restoration of lost territories which were formerly part of the State, both ethnologically and politically, must, in the first instance, be a question of winning back political power and independence for the mother-country itself.
689
In such cases, the special interests of the lost territories must be uncompromisingly regarded as a matter of secondary importance in the face of the one main task, which is to win back the freedom of the mother-country. The liberation of oppressed or detached fragments of the population, or provinces of an empire, cannot be accomplished by reason of the wishes of the oppressed or the protests of the bereaved mother-country, but only by resort to force on the part of those sections of the one-time united parent-country which have still more or less retained their sovereign rights. Therefore, the first condition for the reconquest of lost territories is intensive promotion of the welfare, and reinforcement of the strength, of that portion of the State which remained intact after the partition. It must be allied to a cherished and indestructible determination to consecrate the fresh strength thus being developed to the cause of liberating and uniting the entire nation when the time is ripe. That is to say, the interests of the separated territories must be subordinated to a single purpose, namely, to gain for the remaining portion of the original State that degree of political strength and power necessary to oppose the will of the hostile victor. Oppressed territories are not returned to the bosom of their common parent-country as a result of heated protests, but only by the power of the sword. The forging of this sword must be the aim of the domestic policy adopted by a country’s government, whereas it is the object of foreign policy to safeguard the forging process and to gain allies. In the first volume of this book I discussed the inadequacy of our policy of alliances before the War. There were four possible ways of securing the necessary foodstuffs for the maintenance of our people. Of these ways, the fourth, which was the most unfavourable, was chosen: Instead of a sound policy of territorial expansion in Europe, our rulers embarked on a policy of colonial and trade expansion. Their policy was the more mistaken, inasmuch as they presumed that in this way the danger of an armed conflict would be averted. The result of their attempt to sit on two stools at the same time might have been foreseen, they fell between them, and the World War was only the final reckoning which the Reich had to pay for the failure of its foreign policy.
690
The course that should have been adopted in those days was the third, which I indicated, namely, to increase the strength of the Reich as a continental Power by the acquisition of new territory in Europe. At the same time, a further expansion through the subsequent acquisition of colonial territory, might thus have been brought within the range of possibility. Of course, this policy could not have been carried through except in alliance with Britain, or by making such an abnormal effort to increase the country’s military strength and armament that, for forty or fifty years, all cultural undertakings would have had to be completely relegated to the background. This would have been justifiable, for the cultural importance of a nation is almost always dependent on its political freedom and independence. Political freedom is a prerequisite condition for the existence, or rather the growth, of culture. Accordingly, no sacrifice can be too great when there is a question of securing the political freedom of a nation. The sacrifices which have to be made in the sphere of general culture, in favour of an intensive strengthening of the military power of the State will be richly rewarded later on. Indeed, it may be asserted that such a concentrated effort to preserve the independence of the State is usually succeeded by a certain easing of tension or is counterbalanced by a sudden blossoming forth of the hitherto neglected cultural spirit of the nation. Thus Greece flourished during the great Periclean era after the miseries she had suffered during the Persian Wars, and the Roman Republic turned its energies to the cultivation of a higher civilisation when it was freed from the stress and troubles of the Punic Wars. Of course, it is not to be expected that a parliamentary majority of cowardly and stupid people would ever be capable of deciding on such a resolute policy entailing the absolute subordination of all other national interests to the one sole task of preparing for a future conflict of arms which would result in establishing the security of the State.
691
The father of Frederick the Great sacrificed everything in order to be ready for such a conflict; but the fathers of our absurd parliamentarian democracy, with the Jewish hall-mark, could not do so. That is why, in pre-war times, the military preparations necessary to enable us to conquer new territory in Europe were only very mediocre, so that it was difficult to dispense with the support of really useful allies. Those who directed our foreign affairs would not entertain the bare idea of systematically preparing for war. They rejected every plan for the acquisition of territory in Europe and, by preferring a policy of colonial and trade expansion, they sacrificed the alliance with England, which was then possible. At the same time, they neglected to seek the support of Russia, which would have been a logical proceeding. Finally, they stumbled into the World War, abandoned by all except the ill-starred Habsburgs. The characteristic of our present foreign policy is that it follows no discernible or even intelligible line of action. Whereas before the War, a mistake was made in taking the fourth way that I have mentioned, and in pursuing it in a half-hearted manner, since the Revolution not even the then keenest observer can detect any attempt to pursue a definite course. Even more than before the War, there is absolutely no such thing as a systematic plan, except systematic attempts to destroy the last possibility of a national revival. If we make an impartial examination of the situation existing in Europe to-day as far as concerns the relation of the various Powers to one another, we can establish the following facts. For the past three hundred years the history of our Continent has been definitely determined by Britain’s efforts to preserve the balance of power in Europe, thus ensuring the necessary protection of her own rear while she pursued the great aims of British world-policy. The traditional tendency of British diplomacy ever since the reign of Queen Elizabeth has been to employ systematically every possible means to prevent any one Power from attaining a preponderant position over the other European Powers and, if necessary, to break that preponderance by means of armed intervention.
692
The only German parallel to this has been the tradition of the Prussian Army. Throughout the centuries Britain has adopted various methods to achieve her ends, choosing them according to the actual situation or the task to be faced; but the will and determination to use them has always been the same. The more difficult Britain’s position became in the course of history, the more did the British Imperial Government consider it necessary to maintain a condition of political paralysis among the various European States, as a result of their mutual rivalries. When the North American colonies obtained their political independence, it became still more necessary for Britain to make every effort to establish and maintain the defence of her flank in Europe. In accordance with this policy, Britain, after having crushed the great naval Powers, Spain and Holland, concentrated all her forces against the increasing strength of France, until she brought about the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte and thereby destroyed the military hegemony of France, her most dangerous rival. The change in the attitude of British statesmen towards Germany took place only very slowly, because the German nation did not represent an obvious danger for Britain as long as it lacked national unification, and because the current of public opinion in Britain—long moulded along certain lines for political purposes—could be directed into a fresh channel only by slow degrees. In this case the calm reflections of the statesman are transformed into sentimental values which are not only more telling in effect, but also more permanent. When the statesman has attained one of his ends he immediately turns his thoughts to others; but only by degrees and by the slow process of propaganda, can the sentiment of the masses be shaped into an instrument for the attainment of the new aims which their leaders have chosen. As early as 1870/71, Britain had, however, decided on the new stand she would take. On certain occasions minor oscillations in that policy were caused by the growing influence of America on the commercial markets of the world and also by the increasing political power of Russia. Unfortunately, Germany did not take advantage of these and, therefore, the original tendency of British diplomacy was reinforced.
693
Britain looked upon Germany as a Power which was of importance commercially and politically and which, partly because of its enormous industrial development, was assuming such threatening proportions that the two countries were already contending against one another in the same sphere. The so-called peaceful conquest of the world by commercial enterprise, which, in the eyes of those who governed our public affairs at that time, represented the highest peak of human wisdom, was just the thing that led British statesmen to adopt a policy of resistance. That this resistance assumed the form of organised aggression on a vast scale was in full conformity with a type of statesmanship which did not aim at the maintenance of a dubious world peace, but aimed at the consolidation of British world-mastery. In carrying out this policy, Britain allied herself with all those countries which were of any military importance and this was in keeping with her traditional caution in estimating the power of her adversary and also in recognising her own temporary weakness. That line of conduct cannot be called unscrupulous, because such a comprehensive organisation for war purposes must not be judged from the heroic point of view, but from that of expediency. The object of a diplomatic policy is not to see that a nation perishes heroically, but rather that it survives. Hence, every road that leads to this goal is justifiable and failure to take it must be looked upon as criminal neglect of duty. When the German Revolution took place, Britain’s fears of German world-hegemony were laid to rest. From that time onward Britain has not been interested in erasing Germany from the map of Europe. On the contrary, the astounding collapse which took place in November 1918, found British diplomacy confronted with a situation which at first appeared incredible. For four and a half years the British Empire had fought to break the presumed preponderance of a continental Power. A sudden collapse then occurred which apparently removed this Power from the foreground of European affairs.
694
Germany betrayed such a lack of even the primordial instinct of self-preservation, that European equilibrium was destroyed within forty-eight hours. Germany was annihilated and France became the first political Power on the continent of Europe. The tremendous propaganda which was carried on during the War for the purpose of encouraging the British public to ‘stick it out’ to the end aroused all the primitive instincts and passions of the populace and was bound eventually to act as a drag on the decisions of British statesmen. With the colonial, economic and commercial destruction of Germany, Britain’s war aims were realised. Anything in excess of these aims was an obstacle to the furtherance of British interests. Only the enemies of Britain could profit by the disappearance of Germany as a great continental Power in Europe. In November 1918, however, and up to the summer of 1919, it was not possible for Britain to change her diplomatic attitude, because during the long war she had appealed, more than ever before, to the feelings of the populace. In view of the feeling prevalent among her own people, Britain could not change her foreign policy. Another reason which rendered this impossible was the military strength to which other European Powers had now attained. France had taken the direction of affairs into her own hands and could impose her law upon the others. During those months of negotiation and bargaining the only Power that could have altered the course which things were taking was Germany herself but Germany was torn asunder by a civil war, and had declared through the medium of her so-called statesmen that she was ready to accept any and every dictate imposed on her. Now, in the history of nations, when a nation loses its instinct for self-preservation and ceases to be a possible active ally, it sinks to the level of an enslaved nation and its territory is fated to deteriorate into a colony. The only possible course which Britain could adopt in order to prevent France from becoming too powerful was to participate in her lust for aggrandisement.
695
Actually, Britain had not realised her war aims. Not only had she failed to prevent a continental Power from predominating and thus upsetting the balance of power in Europe, but she had helped to bring about this very situation and in an acute degree. In 1914, Germany, considered as a military State, was wedged in between two countries, one of which equalled, while the other excelled her in military strength. Then there was Britain’s supremacy at sea. France and Russia alone hindered and opposed the excessive aggrandisement of Germany. The unfavourable geographical situation of the Reich, from the military point of view, might be looked upon as another coefficient of security against an exaggerated increase of German power. In the event of a conflict with Britain, Germany’s seaboard, being short and cramped, was unfavourable from the military point of view, whilst her frontiers on land were too extensive and open to attack. France’s position is different to-day. She is the foremost military Power, without a serious rival on the Continent. Her southern frontiers are practically secure from attack by Spain and Italy, she is safeguarded against Germany by the prostrate condition of our country. A long stretch of her coast-line faces the vital nerve-centre of the British Empire. Not only could French aeroplanes and long-range batteries attack the vital industrial, commercial and administrative, centres in Great Britain, but submarines could threaten the great British commercial routes. A submarine campaign based on France’s long Atlantic coast and on the European and North African coasts of the Mediterranean, would have disastrous consequences for Britain. Thus the political results of the war to prevent the development of German power was the creation of French hegemony on the Continent. The military result was the consolidation of France as the first continental Power and the recognition of American equality at sea. The economic result was the cession of great spheres of British interests to her former allies and associates. Just as Britain’s traditional policy renders the Balkanisation of Europe desirable and necessary up to a certain point, France aims at the Balkanisation of Germany.
696
What Britain has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent any one continental Power in Europe from attaining a position of world-importance. Therefore, Britain wishes to maintain the balance of power in Europe, for this appears to be the prerequisite of British world hegemony. What France has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent Germany from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore, France wants to maintain a system of small German States, whose forces would balance one another and over which there would be no central government. This, in conjunction with the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, would furnish the conditions necessary for the establishment and guarantee of French hegemony in Europe. The final aims of French diplomacy will inevitably be in perpetual opposition to the ultimate tendencies of British statesmanship. Taking these considerations as a starting-point, anyone who investigates the possible alliances which Germany could form to-day, is forced to the conclusion that the only course open to Germany is a rapprochement with Great Britain. Although the consequences of Britain’s war policy were, and are, disastrous for Germany, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as things stand to-day, Britain’s vital interests no longer demand the destruction of Germany. On the contrary, British policy must tend more and more, from year to year, towards curbing France’s unbridled lust for hegemony. Now, a policy of alliances cannot be pursued by bearing past grievances in mind, but it can be rendered fruitful by taking account of past experiences. Experience should have taught us that alliances formed for negative purposes are intrinsically weak. The destinies of nations can be welded together only by the prospect of a common success, of common gain and conquest, in short, a common extension of power for both contracting parties. Our people’s lack of insight in questions of foreign politics is clearly demonstrated by the reports in the daily press, which talk about the ‘pro-German attitude’ of one or the other foreign statesman, this assumed pro-German attitude being taken as a special guarantee that such persons will champion a policy that will be advantageous to our people.
697
That kind of talk is absurd to an incredible degree and reckons with the unparalleled simplicity of the average German Philistine when he comes to talking politics. There is no British, American, or Italian statesman who could ever be described as ‘pro-German.’ Every British statesman is, first and foremost, a Britisher, the American statesman, an American, and no Italian statesman would be prepared to adopt a policy that was not pro-Italian. Therefore, anyone who expects to form alliances with foreign nations on the basis of a pro-German feeling among the statesmen of other countries is either a fool or a deceiver. The necessary condition for linking together the destinies of nations is never mutual esteem or mutual sympathy, but rather the prospect of advantages accruing to the contracting parties. Although it is true that a British statesman will always follow a pro-British and not a pro-German policy, it is also true that certain definite interests involved in this pro-British policy may, for various reasons, coincide with German interests. Naturally, that can be so only to a certain degree and the situation may one day be completely reversed. But the art of the statesman consists in finding at the crucial moment, for the execution of his own vital policy, those allies who must, in their own interests, adopt a similar course. The practical application of these principles at the present time must depend on the answers to the following questions: What States are not vitally interested in the fact that, by the complete abolition of a German Central Europe, the economic and military power of France has reached a position of absolute hegemony? Which are the States that, in consideration of the conditions which are essential to their own existence and in view of the tradition that has hitherto been followed in conducting their foreign policy, envisage such a development as a menace to their own future? One point on which we must be clear is that France is, and will remain, the implacable enemy of Germany.
698
It does not matter what governments have ruled or will rule in France, whether Bourbon or Jacobin, Napoleonist or bourgeois-democratic, clerical Republican or Red Bolshevik, their foreign policy will always be directed towards acquiring possession of the Rhine frontier and consolidating France’s position on this river by disuniting and dismembering Germany. Britain did not want Germany to be a world-power, but France did not want Germany as a Power to exist at all—a very different matter! To-day we are not fighting for our position as a world-power, but only for the existence of our country, for national unity and our children’s daily bread. Taking this point of view into consideration, only two States remain to us as possible allies in Europe, namely, Britain and Italy. Britain is by no means desirous of having a France on whose military power there is no check in Europe, with the result that she might one day pursue a policy which, in some way or other, would inevitably conflict with British interests. Nor can Britain be pleased to see France in possession of such enormous coal and iron fields in Western Europe, which might make it possible for her one day to play a role in world-commerce which might endanger British interests. Moreover, Britain will never be desirous of having a France whose political position on the Continent, owing to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe, seems so absolutely assured that she is riot only able to resume a French world-policy on a large scale, but even finds herself compelled to do so. It would be possible for an enemy to drop nightly a thousand times as many bombs as the Zeppelins did in the past. The military predominance of France weighs heavily on the minds of the British. Italy is another Power which cannot, and surely will not, welcome any further strengthening of France’s power in Europe. The future of Italy will be conditioned by developments in the territories bordering on the Mediterranean. The reason that made Italy come into the War was not a desire to contribute towards the aggrandisement of France, but rather to deal her hated Adriatic rival a mortal blow.
699
Any further increase of France’s power on the Continent would hamper the development of Italy’s future, and Italy does not deceive herself into thinking that racial kinship between the nations will in any way eliminate rivalries. Serious and impartial consideration proves that it is these two Powers, Great Britain and Italy, whose natural interests not only do not run counter to the conditions essential to the existence of the German nation, but are to a certain extent identical with them. When we consider the possibility of alliances we must be careful not to lose sight of three factors. The first factor concerns ourselves; the other two concern the States in question. Is it at all possible to conclude an alliance with Germany as she is to-day? Can a Power which would enter into an alliance for the purpose of securing assistance in the execution of its own offensive aims form an alliance with a State, whose rulers have, for years, presented a spectacle of deplorable incompetence and pacifist cowardice? A State where the majority of the nation, blinded by democratic and Marxist teachings, betrays the interests of its own people and country in a manner that cries to Heaven for vengeance? As things stand to-day, can any Power hope to establish useful relations with a State and hope to fight together for the furtherance of their common interests, if this State has neither the will nor the courage to lift a finger in defence of its bare existence? Can a Power for which an alliance must be much more than a pact to guarantee a state of slow decomposition on the lines of the old and disastrous Triple Alliance, associate itself for life or death with a State whose most characteristic signs of activity consist in an abject servility in external relations and a scandalous repression of the national spirit at home? Can such a Power be associated with a State in which there is nothing of greatness, because its whole policy does not deserve it? Or can alliances be made with governments which are in the hands of men who are despised by their own fellow-citizens and are consequently not respected abroad?
700
Never! A self-respecting Power which expects something more from alliances than commissions for greedy parliamentarians will not, and cannot, enter into an alliance with our present-day Germany. Our present inability to form alliances furnishes the principal and most profound reason for the solidarity of the enemies who are robbing us. Because Germany does not defend herself in any way apart from the flamboyant protests of our parliamentarian elect; because there is no reason why the rest of the world should take up the fight in our defence; and because God does not follow the principle of granting freedom to a nation of cowards, despite all the blubbering prayers addressed to Him by our ‘patriotic’ associations; even those States which have not a direct interest in our annihilation cannot do otherwise than participate in France’s campaign of plunder—if for no other reason than that, by their participation, they at least prevent France from being the sole country to be aggrandised thereby. In the second place, we must not underestimate the difficulty of changing the opinion of the bulk of the population in former enemy countries, which had been influenced in a certain direction by means of propaganda. When a foreign nation has for years been presented to the public as a horde of ‘Huns,’ ‘robbers,’ ‘Vandals,’ etc., it cannot suddenly be presented as something different, and the enemy of yesterday cannot be recommended as the ally of to-morrow. A third factor, however, deserves greater attention, since it is of essential importance for the establishment of future alliances in Europe. From the political point of view it is not in the interests of Great Britain that Germany should be ruined still more, but such a development would be very much in the interests of the Jews who manipulate the international money-markets. The cleavage between official, or rather traditional, British statesmanship and the controlling influence of the Jew on the money-markets is nowhere so clearly manifested as in the various attitudes adopted towards problems of British foreign policy.
701
Contrary to the interests and welfare of Great Britain, Jewish finance demands not only the absolute economic destruction of Germany, but its complete political enslavement. The internationalisation of our German economic system, that is to say, the transference of our productive forces to the control of Jewish international finance, can be completely carried out only in a State that has been politically Bolshevised. But the Marxist fighting forces of international and Jewish stock-exchange capital cannot finally smash the German national State without friendly, help from outside. To this end the armies of France will have to attack Germany until the Reich, inwardly cowed, succumbs to the Bolshevist storm-troops of international money-grubbing Jewry. Hence it is that, at the present time, the Jew is the chief agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Whenever we read of Germany being attacked in any part of the world the Jew is always the instigator. In peace-time as well as during the War the Jewish-Marxist stock-exchange press systematically stirred up hatred against Germany, until one State after another abandoned its neutrality and placed itself at the service of the Allies in the World War, even against the real interests of its own people. The Jewish way of reasoning is quite clear. The Bolshevisation of Germany, that is to say, the extermination of thevölkischand national German intellectuals, and the resultant exploitation of German labour under the yoke of Jewish international finance, is only the overture to the movement for expanding Jewish power on a wider scale and finally subjugating the world to its rule. As has so often happened in the course of history, Germany is the chief pivot of this formidable struggle. If our people and our State fall victims to these oppressors of the nations, who lust after blood and gold, the whole earth will become the prey of that hydra-headed monster. If Germany succeeds in freeing herself, from its grip, this great menace to the nations of the world will thereby be eliminated.
702
It is certain that Jewry will resort to every possible underhand device in order not only to keep alive the old anti-German feeling among other nations, but to intensify it if possible. It is no less certain that these activities are only very partially in keeping with the true interests of the nations among whom the poison is being spread. As a general principle, Jewry carries on its campaign in the various countries by the use of arguments that are best calculated to appeal to the mentality of the respective nations and are most likely to produce the desired results. Our nation has been so torn asunder racially that it is easy for Jewry in its fight for power to make use of the more or less ‘cosmopolitan’ and pacifist ideas, in short, the international tendencies, which are the result of this disruption. In France, the Jews exploit the well-known and accurately estimated chauvinistic spirit. In England, they exploit the commercial and world political outlook. In short, they always work upon the essential characteristics peculiar to the mentality of each nation. When they have by this means achieved a decisive influence in the political and economic spheres, they can drop the pretence which their former tactics necessitated, now disclosing their real intentions and the ends for which they are fighting. Their work of destruction now goes ahead more quickly, reducing one State after another to a mass of ruins on which they will erect the everlasting and sovereign Jewish Empire. In England, and also in Italy, the contrast between the better kind of native statesmanship and the policy of the Jewish financiers often becomes strikingly evident. Only in France does there exist to-day, in a greater degree than ever before, a profound harmony between the aims of the Stock Exchange, of the Jews who control it and those of a chauvinistic national policy. This identity of purpose constitutes an immense danger for Germany and it is for this very reason that France is, and will remain, by far her most dangerous enemy.
703
The French nation, which is becoming more and more polluted by Negro blood, represents a menace to the existence of the white race in Europe, because it is bound up with the Jewish campaign for world domination. The contamination caused by the influx of Negroid blood on the Rhine, in the very heart of Europe, is in accord with the sadistic and perverse lust for vengeance on the part of the hereditary enemy of our people. This suits the purpose of the cool, calculating Jew, who would use this means of beginning a process of bastardisation in the very centre of the European continent and, by infecting the white race with the blood of an inferior stock, destroy the foundations of its independent existence. France’s activities in Europe to-day, spurred on by the French lust for vengeance and systematically directed by the Jew, are a criminal attack upon the existence of the white races and will one day arouse against the French people a spirit of vengeance among a generation which will recognise racial pollution as the original sin of mankind. As far as Germany is concerned, the danger which France represents, makes it her duty to relegate all sentiment to a subordinate plane and to extend a hand to those who are threatened with the same menace and who are not willing to suffer or tolerate France’s lust for hegemony. For a long time to come there will be only two Powers in Europe with which it may be possible for Germany to conclude an alliance. These Powers are Great Britain and Italy. If we take the trouble to review the way in which German foreign policy has been conducted since the Revolution we must, in view of the constant and incomprehensible failure of our governments, either lose heart or be overcome with rage and take up the cudgels against such a regime. Their way of acting cannot be attributed to a want of understanding, because what seemed to every thinking man to be inconceivable was accomplished by the leaders of the November parties, with their Cyclopean intellects. They wooed France and begged her favour. Indeed, throughout these past years, they have, with the touching simplicity of incorrigible visionaries, gone on their knees to France again and again, they have grovelled before the Grande Nation, and thought they recognised in each successive wily trick performed by the French hangmen the first signs of a change of feeling.
704
Our real political wire-pullers never shared this absurd credulity. The idea of establishing a friendship with France was for them only a means of thwarting every attempt on Germany’s part to adopt a practical policy of alliances. They had no illusions about French aims or those of the men behind the scenes in France. What induced them to take up such an attitude and to act as if they honestly believed that the fate of Germany could possibly be changed in this way, was the cool calculation that otherwise our people might take the reins into their own hands and choose another road. Of course, it is difficult for us, even within the framework of our own Movement, to propose Britain as our possible ally in the future. Our Jewish press has been adept in concentrating hatred against Britain, in particular, and many of our good German simpletons perched on the branches which the Jews had lined to fool them. They babbled about a restoration of German sea-power and protested against the robbery of our colonies. Thus they furnished material which the contriving Jew transmitted to his clansmen in England, to be used there for purposes of practical propaganda. It is high time that even our easily duped bourgeoisie, which loves to dabble in politics, realised that to-day we have not to fight for ‘sea-power’ and the like. Even before the War it was absurd to direct the national energies of Germany towards this end without first having secured our position in Europe. Such an aspiration to-day reaches that peak of absurdity which may be called criminal in the domain of politics. The success of the Jewish wire-pullers in concentrating the attention of the people on things which are only of secondary importance to-day was often calculated to, drive one to despair. They incited the people to demonstrations and protests while at the same time France was tearing our nation asunder bit by bit and systematically removing the very foundations of our national independence.
705
In this connection I have in mind one particular bone of contention of which the Jew has made extraordinarily skilful use in recent years, namely, South Tyrol. The reason why I take up this question here is that I want to call to account that shameless canaille, who, relying on the ignorance and short memory of a large section of our people, simulate a national indignation which is as foreign to the real character of our parliamentary imposters as the idea of respect for private property is to a jackdaw. I should like to state here that I was one of those who, at the time when the fate of South Tyrol was being decided—that is to say, from August 1914 to November 1918—took their place where that country could be most effectively defended, namely, in the Army. I did my share of the fighting during those years, not merely to save South Tyrol from being lost, but also to save every other German province for the Fatherland. The parliamentary highwaymen, the whole gang of party politicians, did not take part in that combat. On the contrary, while we carried on the fight in the belief that a victorious issue to the War would enable the German nation to keep South Tyrol, along with other frontier provinces, these traitors carried on a seditious agitation against such a victorious issue, until the fighting Siegfried succumbed to the dagger-thrust in his back. The inflammatory and hypocritical speeches of the elegantly dressed parliamentarians in the Vienna Rathaus Plat or in front of the Feldherrnhalle in Munich could not save South Tyrol for Germany. That could have been done only by the battalions fighting at the front. Those who broke up that fighting front betrayed South Tyrol, together with all the other provinces of Germany. Anyone who thinks that the South Tyrolean question can be solved to-day by protests, declarations and processions organised by various associations, is either a humbug or merely a German Philistine. It must be quite clearly understood that we shall not get back the territories we have lost if we depend on solemn prayers addressed to Almighty God or on pious faith in a League of Nations, but only by the force of arms. The only question is, therefore: Who is ready to take up arms for the restoration of the lost territories?
706
As far as I myself am concerned, I can state with a good conscience, that I would have courage enough to take part in a campaign for the reconquest of South Tyrol, at the head of parliamentarian storm battalions consisting of parliamentary gasconaders, other party leaders and various Councillors of State. How I should enjoy seeing the shrapnel burst above the heads of those taking part in an ‘enthusiastic’ protest demonstration! I think that if a fox were to break into a poultry-yard his presence would not provoke such a helter-skelter and rush for cover as we should witness in the case of such a fine assembly of ‘protesters.’ The vilest part of it all is, that these talkers themselves do not believe that anything can be achieved in this way. Each one of them knows very well how harmless and ineffectual their whole play-acting is. They do it only because it is easier to babble about the restoration of South Tyrol now, than it was to fight for its preservation in days gone by. Each one plays the part that he is best suited to play in life. In those days we sacrificed our lives. To-day these people are engaged in shouting themselves hoarse. It is particularly interesting to note to-day how Legitimist circles in Vienna preen themselves on their work for the restoration of South Tyrol. Seven years ago their august and illustrious dynasty helped, by an act of perjury and treason, to make it possible for the victorious world-coalition to take away South Tyrol. At that time these circles supported the perfidious policy adopted by their dynasty and did not trouble themselves in the least about the fate of South Tyrol or any other province. Naturally, it is easier to-day to take up the fight for this territory, since the present struggle is waged with ‘the weapons of the mind.’ Anyhow it is easier to join in a ‘meeting of protest’ and talk yourself hoarse in giving vent to the righteous indignation that fills your breast, or stain your finger with the writing of a newspaper article, than to blow up a bridge, for instance, during the occupation of the Ruhr.
707
The reason why certain circles have made the question of South Tyrol the pivot of German-Italian relations during the past few years is quite evident. Jews and Habsburg Legitimists are greatly interested in preventing Germany from pursuing a policy of alliance which might one day lead to the resurgence of a free German Fatherland. It is not out of love for South Tyrol that they play this role to-day—for their policy would turn out detrimental rather than helpful to the interests of that province—but through fear of an agreement being established between Germany and Italy. A tendency towards lying and calumny is inborn in these people, and that explains how they can calmly and brazenly attempt to twist things in such a way as to make it appear that we have ‘betrayed’ South Tyrol. One thing must be made clear to these gentlemen, namely, that South Tyrol was betrayed, in the first place, by every German who was sound in wind and limb and was not at the front during the years 1914–1918 to do his duty to his country. In the second place, South Tyrol was betrayed by every man who, during those years, did not help to reinforce the national spirit and the national powers of resistance, so as to enable the country to carry on the war and keep up the fight to the very end. In the third place, South Tyrol was betrayed by everyone who took part in the November Revolution, either directly by co-operation, or indirectly by a cowardly toleration of it, and thus destroyed the sole weapon that could have saved South Tyrol. In the fourth place, South Tyrol was betrayed by those parties and their adherents who put their signatures to the disgraceful treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. Thus the matter stands, my brave gentlemen, who make your protests only in words. To-day I am guided by a calm and cool recognition of the fact that the lost territories cannot be won back by the glib tongues of parliamentary speechifiers, but only by the whetted sword; in other words, through a fight in which blood will be shed.
708
I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that now the die is cast, it is impossible to win back South Tyrol through a war. In fact, I would definitely take my stand against such a move, because I am convinced that it would not be possible to arouse the national enthusiasm of the German people to the pitch necessary to carry such a war to a successful issue. On the contrary, I believe that if we have to shed German blood once again it would be criminal to do so for the sake of liberating two hundred thousand Germans, when close at hand more than seven million Germans are suffering under a foreign yoke, while a life-line of the German nation has become a playground for hordes of African Negroes. If the German nation is to put an end to a state of things which threatens to wipe it off the map of Europe, it must not fall into the error of the pre-war period and make the whole world its enemy. It must ascertain who is its most dangerous enemy, so that it can concentrate all its forces in a struggle to rout him, and if, in order to gain the victory in this struggle, sacrifices have to be made elsewhere, future generations will not condemn us on that account. The more brilliant the resulting victory, the better will they be able to appreciate the dice necessity and the deep anxiety which led us to make that bitter decision. We must always be guided by the fundamental principle that, as a preliminary to winning back lost provinces, the political independence and strength of the mother-country must first be restored. The first task which a strong government must accomplish in the sphere of foreign politics is to make that independence possible and to secure it by a wise policy of alliances, but it is just on this point that we National Socialists have to guard against being dragged along in tow by our ranting bourgeois patriots who take their cue from the Jew. It would be a disaster if, instead of preparing for the coming struggle, our Movement, too, were to content itself with mere protests by word of mouth. It was the fantastic idea of a Nibelungen alliance with the rotting body of the Habsburg State that brought about Germany’s ruin. Fantastic sentimentality in dealing with the possibilities arising in the field of foreign politics to-day would be the best means of preventing our revival for innumerable years to come.
709
Here I must briefly answer the objections which may be raised in connection with the three questions I have put.
I think that I have already dealt adequately with one aspect of the first question. Of course nobody will enter into an alliance with present-day Germany. No Power in the world would link its fortunes with those of a State whose government does not afford grounds for the slightest confidence. I strongly object to the attempt which has been made by many of our compatriots to explain and excuse the conduct of the government by referring to the woeful state of public feeling. The lack of character which our people have shown during the last six years is indeed deeply distressing. The indifference with which they have treated the crying needs of our nation is depressing in the extreme and their cowardice is often revolting, but one must never forget that we are dealing with a people who gave the world, a few years previously, an admirable example of the highest human qualities. From the first days of August 1914 to the end of the tremendous struggle between the nations, no people in the world gave a better proof of manly courage, tenacity and patient endurance, than this people which is so cast down and dispirited to-day. Nobody dare assert that our humiliating position to-day is in keeping with the true character of our nation. What we have to endure to-day, physically and spiritually, is due only to the appalling, soul destroying influence of the act of high treason committed on November 9th, 1918. More than ever before the poet is right when he says that evil must inevitably continue to breed evil.
710
But even to-day, the fundamentally sound qualities of our nation are not dead, they are only dormant in the depths of the national conscience, and sometimes in the clouded firmament we see the gleam of qualities which Germany will one day remember as the first symptoms of a revival. More than once thousands of young Germans have rallied to a call, resolved, as in 1914, freely and willingly to offer themselves as a sacrifice on the altar of their beloved Fatherland. Millions of men have resumed work, whole-heartedly and zealously, as if no revolution had ever affected them. The smith is at his anvil once again, the farmer is driving his plough and the scientist is in his laboratory—all doing their duty, with the same zeal and devotion as formerly. The oppression which we suffer at the hands of our enemies is no longer accepted, as formerly, with a laugh and a shrug, but is resented with bitterness and anger. There can be no doubt that a great change of attitude has taken place. This change has not yet taken the shape of a conscious intention and urge to restore the political power and independence of our nation, but the blame for this must be attributed to those who, less in response to a heaven-sent call than in order to satisfy their own ambition, have been governing our nation since 1918 and leading it to ruin. If any man seeks to sit in judgment upon our nation to-day he must ask himself, ‘What has been done to help it?’ Was the poor support which the nation gave the resolutions passed by our governments (which were of a shadowy nature) a sign of our nation’s lack of vitality or was it not rather a sign of the complete failure of the methods employed in administering this valuable trust? What have our governments done to reawaken in this nation a spirit of proud self-assertion, courageous defiance and righteous hatred? In 1919, when the Peace Treaty was imposed on the German nation, these were grounds for hoping that this instrument of unrestricted oppression would help to reinforce the outcry for the freedom of Germany.
711
Peace treaties which make demands that fall like a whip-lash on the people turn out not infrequently to be the signal for a future revival. How could the Treaty of Versailles have been exploited! How, in the hands of a willing government, could this instrument of unlimited blackmail and shameful humiliation have been applied for the purpose of rousing national sentiment to fever-pitch! How could a well-directed system of propaganda have utilised the sadistic cruelty of that treaty in order to change the indifference of the people into a feeling of indignation and transform that indignation into a spirit of dauntless resistance! Every clause of that treaty should have been branded upon the hearts and minds of the German people until, in the souls of sixty million men and women, a common sense of shame and a hatred shared in common burst into flame like a torrent of fire, in the heat of which were forged an inflexible resolve and the cry, ‘We must have arms!’ A treaty of that kind can be used for such a purpose. Its unbounded oppression and its impudent demands were an excellent propaganda weapon to arouse the sluggish spirit of the nation and restore its vitality. Then, every type of reading-matter from the child’s story-book to the last newspaper in the country, every theatre and cinema, every pillar where placards are posted and every free space on the hoardings should be utilised in the service of this one great mission; until the faint-hearted cry of ‘Lord, deliver us,’ which our patriotic associations send up to Heaven to-day was transformed, even in the mind of the smallest child, into the ardent prayer, ‘Almighty God, bless our arms when the hour comes. Be just, as Thou hast always been just. Judge now if we deserve our freedom. Lord, bless our struggle.’ All opportunities were neglected and nothing was done. Who can be surprised if our people are not such as they should be or might be, when the rest of the world looks upon us only as its valet, or as an obedient dog that will lick his master’s hand after he has been whipped. Of course the possibility of forming alliances with other nations is hampered by the indifference of our own people, but much more by our government. Their corrupting influence is to blame for the fact that now, after eight years of indescribable oppression, there exists only a faint desire for liberty.
712
Before our nation can embark upon a policy of alliances, it must restore its prestige among other nations, and it must have an authoritative government that is not a drudge in the service of foreign States and the taskmaster of its own people, but rather the herald of the national will. If our people had a government which looked upon this as its mission, a courageous foreign policy pursued by the Reich government would, before six years had elapsed, enjoy the equally courageous support of a people yearning for freedom. The second objection referred to the difficulty of changing ex-enemy nations into friendly allies. That objection may be answered as follows: The general anti-German psychosis which has developed in other countries through war-propaganda must of necessity continue to exist as long as there is no renascence of the national instinct of self-preservation among the German people. The appearance of such an instinct will transform the German Reich once more into a State able to play its part on the chess-board of European politics and one which the others regard as a worthy partner. Only when the government and the people give evidence of their fitness to enter into an alliance will some Power, whose interests coincide with ours, set about instituting a system of propaganda for the purpose of changing public opinion among its own people. Naturally, it will take several years of persevering and ably directed work to achieve such a result. Just because a long period is needed in order to change the public opinion of a country, it is necessary to reflect calmly before such an enterprise be undertaken. This means that one must not enter upon this kind of work unless one is absolutely convinced that it is worth the trouble and that it will bring results which will bear good fruit in the future. One must not try to change the opinions and feelings of a people by basing one’s actions on the vain cajolery of a more or less brilliant Foreign Minister, but only if there be a tangible guarantee that the new orientation will be really useful.
713
Otherwise, public opinion in the country concerned would be plunged into a state of complete confusion. The most reliable guarantee that can be given for the possibility of subsequently entering into an alliance with a certain State is not to be found in the loquacious suavity of some individual member of the government, but in the manifest stability of a definite and practical policy on the part of the government as a whole, and in public opinion which is solidly of the same mind. Universal faith in this policy will be strengthened in the same measure in which the government give tangible evidence of their activity through the medium of preparatory and supporting propaganda and in the measure in which the trend of public opinion is reflected in the government’s policy. Therefore, a nation in such a position as ours will be looked upon as a possible ally only when public opinion and the government are united in the same enthusiastic and openly avowed determination to carry through the fight for national freedom. That condition of affairs must be firmly established before any attempt can be made to change public opinion in other countries which, for the sake of defending their own interests, are disposed to take the road shoulder-to-shoulder with a companion who seems able to play his part in defending those interests—in other words, they are ready to establish an alliance. For this purpose, however, one thing is necessary. Seeing that the task of bringing about a radical change in the public opinion of a country calls for hard work—and many will at first not understand what that means—it would be both foolish and criminal to commit mistakes which could be used as weapons in the hands of those who are opposed to such a change. One must recognise the fact that it takes a long time for a people to understand completely the inner purposes which a government has in view, because it is not possible to explain the ultimate aims of the preliminary steps undertaken with a view to pursuing a certain policy. The government has to count on the blind faith of the masses or the intuitive instinct of the more intellectually developed ruling caste—but since many people lack this insight and political acumen, and since political considerations forbid a public explanation of why such and such a course is being followed—a certain number of leaders in intellectual circles will always oppose new tendencies which, because they are not easily grasped, can easily be regarded in the light of mere experiments.
714
It is in this way that the opposition of over-anxious conservative circles is aroused. For this reason it is our bounden duty not to allow any weapon to fall into the hands of those who would interfere with the work of bringing about a mutual understanding with other nations. This is especially so when, as in our case, we have to deal with the pretensions and unpractical talk of our patriotic associations and our small bourgeoisie who air their political opinions in the cafés. That the cry for a new navy, the restoration of our colonies, etc., is just silly talk which is not based on any plan for its practical execution, cannot be denied by anyone who thinks over the matter calmly and seriously. At the same time the manner in which Britain exploits the foolish tirades of these champions of the policy of protest who are in reality playing into the hands of our mortal enemies cannot be considered advantageous to Germany. These people dissipate their energies in futile demonstrations against everything and everybody which is harmful to our interests and those who indulge in them forget the fundamental principle which is a preliminary condition of all success, namely, that if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing well. Because they keep on grumbling against five or ten States, they fail to concentrate all the forces of our national will and our physical strength for a blow at the heart of our most bitter enemy and in this way they sacrifice the possibility of securing an alliance which would reinforce our strength for that decisive conflict. Here, too, there is a mission for National Socialism to fulfil. It must teach our people not to fix their attention on the little things, but rather on major issues, not to exhaust their energies on questions of secondary importance and not to forget that the object for which we have to fight to-day is the bare existence of our people and that the sole enemy at whom we must strike, is the Power which is robbing us of that existence.
715
It may be that we shall have to swallow many a bitter pill, but this is by no means an excuse for refusing to listen to reason or for raising a stupid and useless outcry against the rest of the world, instead of concentrating all our forces against our most deadly enemy. Moreover, the German people will have no moral right to complain of the manner in which the rest of the world acts towards them, as long as they themselves have not called to account those criminals who sold and betrayed their country. We are not acting sincerely if we indulge in long-range abuse and protests against Britain and Italy and then allow those scoundrels to go scotfree, who, acting in the pay of the enemy, wrested the weapons out of our hands, broke the backbone of our resistance and bartered away the paralysed Reich for thirty pieces of silver. Our enemies are acting in the only way in which they could be expected to act, and we ought to learn a lesson from their behaviour. Anyone who cannot rise to the level of this outlook must reflect that otherwise there would be nothing for us to do except to resign ourselves to our lot, since a policy of alliances would be impossible for all time. For if we cannot form an alliance with Britain because she has robbed us of our colonies, or with Italy because she has taken possession of South Tyrol, or with Poland or Czechoslovakia, then there remains no other possibility of an alliance in Europe except with France which, inter alia, has robbed us of Alsace and Lorraine. There can scarcely be any doubt as to whether this last alternative would be advantageous to the German people; the only matter for doubt is whether he who upholds such opinions is merely a simpleton or an astute rogue. As far as the leaders are concerned, I think the latter hypothesis is true. A change in public feeling among those nations which have hitherto been enemies and whose true interests will, in the future, coincide with ours could be effected, as far as one can foresee, if the internal strength of our State and our manifest determination to secure our own existence made it clear that we should prove valuable allies. Moreover, it is essential that incompetence or even criminal bungling should not furnish grounds which may be utilised for purposes of propaganda by those who would oppose our projects for establishing an alliance with one or other of our former enemies.
716
The answer to the third question is the most difficult. Is it conceivable that those who represent the true interests of those nations which may possibly form an alliance with us could put their views into practice against the will of the Jew, who is the mortal enemy of national and independent States? For instance, could the motive forces of Great Britain’s traditional statesmanship smash the disastrous influence of the Jew, or could they not? This question, as I have already said, is very difficult to answer. The answer depends on so many factors that it is impossible to form a conclusive judgment. One thing, at least, is certain: There is, at the present time, one State in which the regime is so firmly established and so absolutely at the service of the country’s interests that the forces of international Jewry could not possibly organise a real and effective obstruction of measures considered to be politically necessary. The fight which Fascist Italy waged against Jewry’s three principal weapons, even if it be to a great extent subconscious (though I do not believe this myself), furnishes the best proof that the poison-fangs of that power which transcends all State boundaries are being drawn, even though in an indirect way. The prohibition of freemasonry and secret societies, the suppression of the international press and the definite abolition of Marxism, together with the steadily increasing consolidation of the Fascist concept of the State—all this will enable the Italian Government, in the course of years, to advance more and more the interests of the Italian people without paying any attention to the hissing of the Jewish world-hydra. The situation in Britain is not so favourable. In that country of ‘freest democracy’ it is the Jew who, even to-day, can impose his will practically without let or hindrance, through his hold on public opinion. And yet there is a perpetual struggle in Britain between those who are entrusted with the defence of state interests and the protagonists of Jewish world-dictatorship. To what extent these two tendencies run counter to one another became obvious for the first time when, after the War, British statesmen adopted one attitude with regard to the Japanese problem, while the press took up a different one.
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Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the old mutual antipathy between America and Japan began to reappear. Naturally, the great European Powers could not remain indifferent to this new war menace. In Britain, despite the ties of kinship, there was a certain amount of jealousy and anxiety over the growing importance of the United States in all spheres of international economics and politics. What was formerly a colonial territory, the daughter of a great mother, seemed about to become the new mistress of the world. It is quite understandable that to-day Britain should re-examine her old alliances and that British statesmen should look anxiously ahead to a day when the cry will no longer be, ‘Britannia rules the waves’, but rather, ‘The seas belong to the United States.’ The gigantic North American State, with the enormous resources of its virgin soil, is much more invulnerable than the encircled German Reich. Should a day come when the fate of the nations will have to be decided, Britain would be doomed, if she stood alone. Therefore she eagerly reaches out her hand to a yellow race and enters upon an alliance which, from the racial point of view is perhaps unpardonable; but from the political standpoint it represents the sole possibility of reinforcing Britain’s world position in face of the tremendous developments taking place on the American continent. Thus, despite the fact that Britain and America fought side by side on the battlefields of Europe, the British Government could not decide to break off the alliance with their Asiatic partner, yet the whole Jewish press opposed the idea of a Japanese alliance. How can we explain the fact that up to 1918, the Jewish press championed the policy of the British Government against the German Reich and then suddenly veered round and began to go its own way. It was not in the interests of Great Britain to have Germany annihilated, but primarily a Jewish interest, and to-day the destruction of Japan would serve British political interests less than it would serve the far-reaching intentions of those who are leading the movement that hopes to establish a Jewish world-empire.
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While Britain is making every effort to maintain her position in the world, the Jew is laying his plans for its conquest. He already sees the present European States as pliant instruments in his hands, whether indirectly through the power of so-called Western Democracy or in the form of direct domination through Russian Bolshevism. But it is not only the Old World that he holds in his snare; alike fate threatens the New World. Jews control the financial forces of America on the Stock Exchange. Year after year the Jew increases his hold on labour in a nation of one hundred and twenty million souls, but a very small section still remains quite independent and is thus a cause of chagrin to the Jew. The Jews show consummate skill in manipulating public opinion and forge from it a weapon to be wielded in the struggle for their own future. The great leaders of Jewry are confident that the day is near at hand when the promise given in the Old Testament will be fulfilled and the Jews will rule the other nations of the earth. Among this great mass of de-nationalised countries which have become Jewish colonies one independent State could bring about the ruin of the whole structure at the last moment, the reason being that Bolshevism as a worldsystem cannot continue to exist unless it encompasses the whole earth. Should one State alone preserve its national strength and its national greatness the empire of the Jewish satraps, like every other form of tyranny, would succumb to the force of the national idea. As a result of his millennial experience in accommodating himself to surrounding circumstances, the Jew knows very well that he can undermine the existence of European nations by a process of racial bastardisation, but that he could hardly do the same to an Asiatic national State like Japan. To-day he can ape the ways of the German and the Englishman, the American and the Frenchman, but he has no means of approach to the yellow Asiatic.
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Therefore, he seeks to destroy the Japanese national State by using other national States as his instruments, so that he may rid himself of a dangerous opponent before he takes over supreme control of the last existing national State and transforms that control into a tyranny for the oppression of the defenceless. He does not want to have a national Japanese State in existence when he founds his millennial Jewish empire of the future and therefore he wants to destroy the former before establishing his own dictatorship. That is why he is busy to-day stirring up antipathy towards Japan among the other nations, as he once stirred it up against Germany. Thus it may happen that even while British statesmanship is still endeavouring to base its policy on an alliance with Japan, the Anglo-Jewish press is clamouring for war against the prospective ally and, to the accompaniment of the slogans, ‘Democracy!’ and ‘Down with Japanese militarism and imperialism!’ actually preparing for a way of annihilation. Thus, in Britain to-day the Jew is becoming refractory and so the struggle against the Jewish world-menace is bound to commence there, too. In this field, too, the National Socialist Movement has a tremendous task before it. It must open the eyes of our people in regard to foreign nations and it must continually remind them of the real enemy who menaces the world to-day. Instead of preaching hatred against Aryans from whom we may be separated on almost every other count, but with whom the bond of kindred blood and the main features of a common civilisation unite us, we must arouse general indignation against the malevolent enemy of humanity and the real author of all our sufferings. The National Socialist Movement must see to it that at least in our own country the mortal enemy is recognised and that the fight against him may be the beacon-light of a happier era, and show other nations, too, the way of salvation for struggling Aryan humanity. Moreover, may reason be our guide and our strength be in our indomitable will. May the sacred duty of acting thus grant us perseverance and our faith prove our supreme protection.
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